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Protection ... against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough:
there needs [to be] protection also against the tyranny of prevailing
opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by
other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as
rules.... how to make the fitting adjustment between individual
independence and social control-is a subject on which nearly
everything remains to be done.'
John Stuart Mill
1. JOHN STUART MILL. ON LIBERTY 6 (Norton ed. 1975) (1859).
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I. INTRODUCTION
They say the third time around is the charm. For backers of Flori-
da's "property rights" bill 2 this was true.3 After two close tries in as
many years,4 the 1995 Florida Legislature passed the Property Rights
2. Fla. CS for HB 863 (1995). The bill was enacted as 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 [herein-
after the Act or the Property Rights Act] and is now codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 70 (1995). The
final text of the Property Rights Act was presented on the floor of the House as an amendment
to a real estate disclosure bill sponsored by Representative Dean Saunders, Dem., Lakeland. The
text of the real estate disclosure bill was deleted in toto and replaced by the Property Rights Act,
which became the final text of the Committee Substitute for House Bill 863. FLA. H.R. JOUR.
1015-20 (Reg. Sess. May 1, 1995).
3. For the sake of simplicity, I am counting only the three most recent property rights
initiatives, beginning with a property rights referendum in 1992. However, property rights initia-
tives are not new to Florida. In the 1970s, several property rights bills introduced in the Florida
Legislature were similar in purpose to the 1995 Property Rights Act. See Fla. HB 571 (1977);
Fla. CS for SB 1055 (1977); Fla. H.B. 1165 (1977); Fla. SB 261 (1978) ; Fla. HB 438 (1978); Fla.
HB 889 (1978). These bills died in committee. See generally Kent Wetherell, Private Property
Rights Legislation in Florida: The "Midnight Version" and Beyond, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 525,
537-547 (1994): Robert M. Rhodes, Compensating Police Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws
of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 741 (Nov. 1978).
Additionally, two task force studies were completed in the 1970s. In 1975, Governor Askew
appointed a 26-member task force to study property rights, regulatory takings, and compensa-
tion to landowners [hereinafter 1975 Property Rights Task Force). See Govs.oR's PROP. RTS.
STUDy COMM'N, FiNAL REPORT OF Tim GOvERNOR'S PROPERTY RiGHTs STUDY COMNMISSION 2
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 PROPERTY RIGHTs REPORT]. The following year, Senate President
Dempsey Barron appointed a task force comprised of seven members of the Florida Senate. See
FLA. S. SELECT COMM. ON PROP. RTs. AND LAND ACQUISITtON, FINAL COMMrrTEE REPORT ON THE
"TAKING IssuE" (1976) [hereinafter 1976 PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT]. The Governor's commis-
sion issued a report on March 17, 1975, recommending a compensation provision similar to that
passed in section 1 of the 1995 Property Rights Act. See 1975 PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra,
at 12. This report recommended that "compensation [should be] paid for any regulation that
unduly diminishes the value of property, even though it does not constitute an unconstitutional
taking without compensation." Id. at 6.
4. In 1993, property rights advocates succeeded in garnering the signatures necessary for a
referendum on a proposed property rights amendment to the Florida Constitution. The proposed
text of the constitutional amendment added the italicized text below:
Basic Rights - All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights,
among which are the right to enjoy and defend life[,] liberty, to pursue happiness, to
be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the
ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible
for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of
any right because of race, religion or physical handicap. Any exercise of the police
power, excepting the administration and enforcement of criminal laws, which damages
the value of a vested private property right, or any interest therein, shall entitle the
owner to full compensation determined by jury trial with a jury of not fewer than six
persons and without prior resort to administrative remedies. This amendment shall
take effect the day after approval by the voters.
Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Florida Attorney General, to Stephen Grimes, Chief
Justice, and the Justices of the Florida Supreme Court 1-2 (July 8, 1994) (available at Fla. Dept.
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Act to protect landowners who have been denied reasonable use of
their property due to governmental regulatory actions. The Act, al-
though passed on the next to the last day of the session, represented a
compromise painstakingly crafted over weeks of intense negotiations
among an ad hoc group of Senators and Representatives who were
longtime property rights activists, key executives representing land use
agencies, lobbyists for developers and small and large agricultural in-
terests, environmentalists, and state and local governments.' The
brilliance of this political feat was evidenced by the vote-a
of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 49, carton 4, Tallahassee, Fla.).
The title for the proposed amendment was "Property Rights: Should Government Compen-
sate Owners When Damaging the Value of Homes or Other Property?" Id. The proposed Con-
stitutional amendment's ballot summary provided:
This amendment entitles an owner to full compensation when government action dam-
ages the value of-the owner's home, farm, or other vested private property right or
interest therein. Excepts administration and enforcement of criminal laws. Owners-
including natural persons and businesses-are entitled to have full compensation de-
termined by six-member jury trial without first having to go through administrative
proceedings. This amendment becomes effective the day after voter approval.
Id. The Florida Supreme Court found the proposed amendment violative of the Florida Consti-
tution's single-subject requirement, and also found that the ballot summary and title did not
adequately apprise voters of the purpose and ramifications of the amendment. League of
Women Voters of Florida, Inc. v. Smith, 644 So. 2d 486, 494-495 (Fla. 1994) (advising the At-
torney General regarding property rights referendum). During the 1994 Legislative Session, the
Legislature tried to pass a property rights bill-the thematic predecessor of the 1995 bill-but the
1994 bill died on the calendar during the waning hours of the session. Fla. CS for HB 485 & HB
1967 (1994); see generally Wetherell, supra note 3.
5. The ad hoc group worked outside the legislative process. Then Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs (DCA), Linda Loomis Shelly, led the group which was comprised
of a broad contingent of interest groups. See David Powell et al., A Measured Step To Protect
Property Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 255, 263 n.38 (1995).
The final version of the Property Rights Act was never considered by any committee of the
House. The ad hoc group presented its "compromise" bill, SB 2912, to the Senate Judiciary
Committee on April 19, 1995, less than two weeks before the end of the legislative session. Fla.
SB 2912 (1995); Fla. S. Judiciary Comm., tape recording of proceedings (April 19, 1995) (on file
with committee) [hereinafter S. Judiciary Comm. tape]. At this committee meeting the bill was
vigorously opposed by the Florida Association of Counties and the Florida League of Cities. S.
Judiciary Comm. tape, supra. On April 24, 1995, one week prior to the conclusion of the legisla-
tive session, SB 2912 was heard by the Senate Committee on Community Affairs. Again the bill
was opposed by the Florida Association of Counties and the Florida League of Cities. Support-
ers included Robert M. Rhodes and Jim Murley, then Executive Director of 1000 Friends of
Florida and now Secretary of the DCA.
Representative Bert J. Harris, Jr., Rep., Lake Placid, the sponsor of the bill in the House and
a property rights proponent since the 1970s, speculated that if the bill had been heard in a House
committee it would have died there. Telephone interview with Rep. Bert J. Harris, Jr. (May 24,
1995) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Harris, Interview One).
Governor Chiles described the Property Rights Act as a "reasonable" solution to a hard prob-
lem. Adam Yeomans, Property-Rights Bill Goes to Chiles, TAIL. DEM., May 4, 1995, at Cl.
State Senator Rick Dantzler, Dem., Winter Haven, the sponsor of the Senate version of the
property rights bill, is cited by Yeomans as stating that the bill "answered the cry from private-
property rights without going too far." Id.
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unanimous voice vote in the House and only one dissenting vote in the
Senate6 -and the pithiness of the floor debates. 7 On May 18, 1995,
Governor Lawton Chiles proudly signed into law the property rights
legislation' consisting of the Bert Harris, Jr., Private Property Protec-
tion Act of 19959 and the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dis-
pute Resolution Act. 10 The Act became effective on October 1, 199511
and applies only prospectively. 
2
As discussed in part II of this Article, the Property Rights Act was
the result of a populist movement in which voters demanded more
responsiveness and common sense from government officials." As dis-
cussed in part III below, this reformist surge was also fueled by a
widespread discontent with the procedures and the substance of land
use law.' 4 The Property Rights Act grants to private property owners
an alternative cause of action, outside of takings law,'" when they are
permanently denied reasonable use of their land by regulatory ac-
tions.'6 The Act also grants alternative procedures for property own-
ers, outside of the judicial and administrative process." Thus, the Act
does not change Florida takings law nor does it alter the substance of
Florida's sometimes controversial growth management laws."
6. FLA. H.R. Joutr. 1050 (Reg. Sess. May 2, 1995) (111 yeas, 0 nays); FLA. S. JoUR. 698,
708 (Reg. Sess. May 3, 1995) (38 yeas, 1 nay).
7. There was virtually no debate in the House and only a 30-minute debate in the Senate.
Fla. H.R., tape recording of proceedings (May 1-2, 1995) (on file with Clerk of the House) (floor
debate on the "strike-everything" amendment to CS for HB 863); Fla. S., tape recording of
proceedings (May 3, 1995) (on file with the Secretary of the Senate) (floor debate on SB 1326).
8. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 70 (1995)).
9. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1) (1995).
10. Id. § 70.51(1). Section 3 of the Act expressly states that sections 1 and 2 are separate
and distinct pieces of legislation, and are not to be construed in pari materia. 1995, Fla. Laws
ch. 95-181, § 3.
11. FLA. STAT. §§ 70.001(30), 70.51(30) (1995).
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 94-209 and accompanying text.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 70.001(2), (3) (1995).
16. Takings law is concerned with governmental actions, either by regulation or by physical
action, that are deemed to "take" private property. The Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution guarantees that no individual shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Id. amend. XIV. The Florida Constitution also guarantees that the government may not take
property without just compensation. FLA. CoNsT. art. X, § 6(a) ("No private property shall be
taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid."). In addition to
the Takings Clause, the Florida Constitution declares that Floridians have "inalienable rights
... to acquire, possess, and protect property." Id. art. I, § (2). See infra notes 131-201 and
accompanying text.
17. FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995); see infra notes 35-40, 271-76, 327-414 and accompanying
text.
18. The Wall Street Journal recently published a series of articles criticizing Florida's
19951
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The Act's most notable achievement is to identify areas in which
land use law can and should be reformed. Takings law, discussed in
part III below, has rightly been described as confusing, unpredictable,
and unresponsive to property owners' concerns. But the Act's re-
sponse to these issues is a mixed bag. Too often, its proposed solu-
tions fall short of solving the identified problems and instead create
opportunities for more confusion and arbitrary results. Only one
thing is clear: the Act provides many more job opportunities for real
estate appraisers, mediators, and arbitrators, and offers additional cli-
ent counseling and litigation opportunities for lawyers. 9
The Act provides property owners with a completely new alternative
outside of takings law: an independent cause of action that grants a
property owner "relief" if a state land use entity "inordinately bur-
dens" real property or vested rights in the use of real property either
"directly" or "permanently. '" 20 The question of precisely which
growth management laws. See Christina Binkley, Florida Land-Use Laws: A Solution to the
Land-Use Law? It Depends on What the Problem Is, WALL ST. J., March 29, 1995, at Fl;
Christina Binkley, Florida Land-Use Laws: How Florida's Land-Use Law Has Failed, WALL ST.
J., March 22, 1995, at Fl. Representative Ken Pruitt, Rep., Port St. Lucie, a longtime propo-
nent of property rights, called the growth management laws "a time bomb waiting to explode."
Binkley, Solution to Land Use Law, supra, at Fl.
Florida is among the growing number of states that have enacted comprehensive growth man-
agement laws. At last count 24 states have authorized some type of regional planning, including
all of the states along the east and west coasts. See Patricia E. Salkin, Regional Planning: New
Political Magnetism, 44 LAND UsE L. & ZowNNG DxG., June 1992, at 3. Florida's Environmental
Land and Water Management Act of 1972 enacts a regional system of planning designed to
manage growth pressures in a coordinated and controlled manner. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10
(1995). The statute creates regional planning councils, which, among other things, prepare com-
prehensive regional policy plans, and serve as review agencies for developments of regional im-
pact (DRIs), i.e., developments that may have a substantial regional effect. Id. §§ 380.021-.06.
The regional plans, in turn, must be consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan and consider
existing state, regional, and local plans. Id. §§ 186.021, .507, .508. See generally JoHN M. Da-
GROVE, LAND, GROWTH AND POLITICS (1984); Daniel W. O'Connell, Growth Management in
Florida: Will State and Local Governments Get their Acts Together?, FLA. ENvTL. & URB. IS-
suEs, Apr. 1984, at 1; THoMAs G. PELHAM, STATE LAND UsE PLANNO AND REGULATION (1979).
The growth management planning process itself remains largely a local process. The Local
Growth Management Act of 1985, codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 163, requires that local communi-
ties prepare a "scientifically based" comprehensive plan, Id. § 163.3177, which can be updated
twice per year. Id. § 163.3187(1). The Department of Community Affairs, in turn, is charged
with reviewing and ensuring that local comprehensive plans accord with regional plans, the state
plan, and other applicable laws. Id. § 163.3187(1). All land development orders issued by local
governments, such as zoning, rezoning, and issuance of permits, must be consistent with the
comprehensive plan. See id. § 163.3194; see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So.
2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993).
19. Jim Murley of 1000 Friends of Florida is quoted as calling the Act "one big law firm
relief act." See Binkley, Solution to Land Use Law, supra note 18, at Fl.
Lawyers, though, would be advised to become well-versed in mediation and other alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) techniques since there is clearly a trend to shift land use disputes away
from the administrative and judicial processes toward ADR.
20. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (1995).
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situations entitle a property owner to a compensation claim for an
"inordinate burden" is mostly left unanswered and up to the courts to
resolve. 2' In this way, the Act perpetuates the problems of takings
law. Like much judge-made takings law, the Act lacks doctrinal clar-
ity and political or theoretical guidance. Instead of clarifying or sim-
plifying an already confusing and complex area of the law, the Act
creates another legal remedy and a new set of legal concepts and terms
that reference familiar "takings" terms, but which are not necessarily
tied to such concepts. 22 Such lack of clarity can only lead to the unsat-
isfactory results experienced under takings law-inconsistent and ap-
parently arbitrary results, which can undermine public confidence in
the legitimacy of government.
23
Moreover, as discussed in part IV, the lack of clarity as to what
should be compensated under the inordinate burden test has the po-
tential to affect substantially and detrimentally those Floridians whose
personal wealth is not land-based. 24 The Property Rights Act does not
establish any funds or funding mechanism for state agencies and local
governments to compensate private property owners or to cover the
costs of implementation and administration. 25  One possible
21. See infra notes 289-93, 300-30 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 219-34 and accompanying text.
23. This "legitimacy" effect has been identified and discussed by leading takings and con-
stitutional process scholars including professors Ackerman, Michelman, Ely, Sax, and Tribe.
When the state appears to act in an arbitrary fashion, the legitimacy of the state is questioned.
For example, when the exercise of state police power impacts one group disproportionately and
the state fails to make necessary compensation, this will diminish citizens' trust in government.
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMmIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605-07 (2d ed. 1988); BRUCE
A. ACKERmAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TH CoNsTITToN (1977); Frank I. Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1165 (1967); JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REviEw (1980); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
24. James Madison viewed the Takings Clause as an anti-majoritarian device that protects
the rights of property owners. See THE FEDERATIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Lester De-
Koster ed., 1976) ("The most common and durable source of factions has ever been the unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold as opposed to those who are without property have
ever formed distinct interests in society.").
Scholars, as well, have directly and indirectly viewed takings law as a political struggle be-
tween groups. Frank Michelman views the Takings Clause as a negative restriction protecting the
status quo. Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1625 (1988). Susan
Rose-Ackerman observes that the Takings Clause is an ineffective way of equalizing political
power among groups. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory Takings: Policy Analysis and
Democratic Principles, in TAKINo PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION' LAW AND ECONOICS
PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINOS ISSUE 25, 34 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992). Rather, she posits that
it is most effective as a way of protecting diverse individuals from bearing disproportionate costs
of public policy. See id; see also infra note 243.
25. Under the Florida Constitution, counties and municipalities do not have to comply with
general laws that require expenditure of county or municipal funds, unless the Legislature has
1995]
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interpretation of the Act would affirm an extreme view of property
rights under which any regulatory action that restricts a private prop-
erty owner's use of her property is deemed compensable. 26 If so inter-
preted, the Act could redistribute substantial public wealth to an
already politically powerful and wealthy landowner group. 27 The esti-
mate is that between twenty-eight and fifty billion dollars could be
redistributed to private property owners from state entities, and even-
tually taxpayers, under the compensation provision of the Act.
2
1
The Act also reforms procedure. Under takings law, a claimant
must exhaust all administrative remedies and obtain a "final"
administrative determination before her claim is ripe for judicial re-
view. 29 According to one study, the application of the ripeness
determined that such law fulfills an important state interest and the law passes by two-thirds
membership of each chamber of the Legislature. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 18.
The Act was passed unanimously in the House and with only one dissenting vote in the Senate.
See supra note 6. Section 1 of the Act declares the importance of protecting private property
owners from laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and political entities in the state that
inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights, without amounting to a taking.
FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1) (1995). The House Report concluded that the Act is not an unfunded
mandate. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for HB 863 (1995) Staff Analysis (May 23,
1995) (on file with comm.); see generally FLORIDA ADVISORY CoUNcIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, 1991 REPORT ON MANDATES AND MEASUREs AFFECTNo LOCA GOVERNMENT FISCAL
CAPACITY (1991); Nancy P. Spyke, Florida's Constitutional Mandate Restrictions, 18 NOVA L.
REV. 1403 (1994); Kristin C. Rubin, Unfunded Mandates: A Continuing Source of Intergovern-
mental Discord, 17 FL. ST. U. L. Rv. 591 (1990); see also infra notes 266, 283.
26. From a classical viewpoint, property is a bundle of rights, consisting mainly of posses-
sion, use, and the right to exclude and to alienate, which the owner is free to exercise in the
manner that she wishes. Professor Epstein advocates an extreme version of this classical view,
under which, with limited exceptions, most governmental restrictions on this principal bundle of
rights would constitute a taking for which just compensation must be paid for by the govern-
ment. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKURGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOM.AIN
65, 177, 257-59, 297-99 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TA.KINGS].
27. The Act can be viewed as a windfall to a certain class of property owners. This windfall
does not favor Floridians whose property consists of home ownership but does favor owners of
large undeveloped parcels-mostly timber companies, agribusinesses, small-and-medium-sized
farmers and developers-who will now be entitled to compensation under the Act for govern-
ment regulatory actions. See infra note 234; see generally Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule
of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEoAL STUD. 13 (1972). This large landowner group was influential in
bringing about passage of the Act. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
28. Taking an asset-based accounting approach using property tax valuations, the Florida
Department of Revenue estimated that the value of private land ownership in Florida in 1994
was nearly half a trillion dollars and that nearly $50 billion of that was land that was vacant or
substantially unimproved. See GOVERNOR'S PROP. RTS. STUDY COMM'N II, REPORT OF TwE Gov-
ERNOR'S PROPERTY RIGHTS STUDY CoMMISSION II 74-75 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 PROPERTY
RIG Ts REPORT]. Of course, property tax valuations tend to be lower than fair market value.
Last year, the Florida Consumer Action Network, the Florida Public Interest Research Group,
and the Florida Sierra Club estimated that nine of the state's largest landowners, all of which
were corporations, stood to gain $28 billion if the law were passed. See Binkley, Solution to
Land Use Law, supra note 18, at Fl.
29. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
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requirement resulted in close to ninety-four percent of takings claims
filed in federal court never reaching a neutral arbiter.30 In addition, a
land use entity's delay in making decisions regarding permitted land
uses can constitute a hardship in itself.3 The Act revises this require-
ment. It requires land use entities, within six months of receiving a
written claim from a landowner, to issue a "ripeness decision" which
sets forth the permissible uses for the property.3 2 If the agency fails to
comply with this requirement, the Act provides that the petitioner's
claim is deemed to ripen under the Act, and she can proceed, as a
matter of law, to obtain judicial review for her compensation claim
under the Act.33 This ripeness modification, if applied as intended,
should enable petitioners to have their day in court.
Another procedural reform allows property owners to opt for either
negotiation or a special master proceeding simply by making a bona
fide written claim, which initiates negotiation under section 1 of the
Act,34 or, alternatively, by filing a "request for relief," which initiates
the special master procedure in section 2 of the Act." If the property
owner opts for a negotiation procedure, the agency must make a "set-
tlement" offer to the property owner within 180 days, and a negotia-
tion process follows. 3 6 Alternatively, the property owner can opt
instead for the special master process which involves a two-phase
process: first, the mediation of the dispute,3' and second, in the ab-
sence of an agreement, a special masters' nonbinding determination of
fact and law. 3
Part V of this Article will apply microeconomic theory to analyze
the procedural innovations encouraging decentralized decisionmaking
set forth under the "Private Property Rights Protection" portion39 in
section 1 of the Act. This Article will not focus directly on the "Dis-
pute Resolution" portion in section 2 of the Act.40 These procedural
30. See infra note 112.
31. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 70.OOl(5)(a) (1995); see also infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
33. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a) (1995).
34. Id. § 70.001(4)(a).
35. Id. § 70.51(4).
36. Id. § 70.001(4); see infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
37. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(17)(a) (1995).
38. Id. §§ 70.51(17)(b), (19), (21)-(22).
39. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-181, § 1, 1651, 1652 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)).
40. Id. The Powell et al. article, supra note 5, and another recent article, Martin R. Dix,
Richard Lee & Alicia M. Santana, Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Special
Master, 69 FLA. B.J. 63 (Nov. 1995), discuss the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute
Resolution section of the Act in more detail. The main weakness of the dispute resolution mech-
anism is that there is no incentive nor is there any obligation for local governments to participate
1995]
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reforms evidence naive assumptions and a lack of sensitivity to the
incentives that these reforms will likely create for property owners and
land use entities. The Legislature succeeded in identifying an area
where reform is needed; negotiation of a settlement order is a notable
attempt by the Legislature to improve land use decisionmaking by in-
troducing decentralized decisionmaking in a market-like framework.
But results of an individualistic bargaining situation are not always
just or efficient for society as a whole. 4' More specifically, assuming
self-interested rational behavior, bargaining results will turn on the
strategic behavior of the parties, which, in turn, will be influenced by
the availability of information, costs (transaction costs, the direct and
indirect costs of participating in that type of procedure, litigation
costs, and the cost of the compensation award), and each party's as-
sessment of the likelihood of succeeding in litigation.42 The Act's re-
forms shift significantly higher costs and risks to land use entities than
exist under the status quo.43 This shift may very well result in risk-
averse, cost-conscious land use entities deciding to settle early in the
process." Moreover, without funding, political guideposts, and efforts.
in this new dispute resolution process. Although the Act provides that the parties must agree on
a special master, the Act does not state what procedure is to be followed or what penalties, if
any, ensue if the parties cannot agree on a special master. See FLA. STAT. § 70.51(4) (1995).
Nowhere does the Act.place an absolute obligation on land use entities to use this special master
procedure. Therefore, a risk-averse, rational local government would be well-advised not to par-
ticipate in such a process, since the dispute resolution process markedly favors property owners.
Second, the special master procedure is a hybrid mediation-arbitration process. Id. §
70.51(19). The parties first negotiate and, then, if they fail to come to an agreement, the special
master is required to make a recommendation that could have legal effect. Id. §§ 70.51(17)(b),
(19), (21)-(22). Mediation techniques which are instrumental in arriving at a settlement, such as
consulting privately with each party, are not likely to be used if the special master has the poten-
tial to become a trier-of-fact and a trier-of-law.
Third, the results of the special master procedure are nonbinding. See id. § 70.51(21)-(22).
Even after going through the special master procedure, the land use entity and the property
owner are free to reject the findings of the special master. See id. §§ 70.51(21)(c), (22). If the
parties do not reach an agreement, the landowner is free to pursue other remedies including the
compensation remedy under section 70.001 of the statute. See id. § 70.51(24). Thus, local gov-
ernments that are happy with the conclusion of the special master procedure cannot count or
preserving the result.
The Florida Growth Management Conflict Resolution Consortium has prepared model ordi-
nances for implementing the special master procedure and is providing training for state and
local governments. See FLORIDA CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONSORTIUM, MODEL PROCEDURAL
GUIDELINES FOR SPECIAL MASTER PROCEEDINGS (1995) [hereinafter MODEL PROCEDURAL GUIDE-
LINES].
41. See infra notes 356-417 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 388-404 and accompanying text. Game theory can be used to predict
how the Act will affect decisionmaking. It is based on microeconomic theory that examines the
strategic behavior of rational, self-interested actors and how certain factors can influence behav-
ior in negotiations. See generally DOUGLAS 0. BArD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
43. See infra notes 356-78 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 379-404 and accompanying text.
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by government agencies to coordinate results, the Act may have a
chilling effect on public officials' decisionmaking, which could erode
the effectiveness of Florida's strong growth management and environ-
mental laws.
45
The Property Rights Act may prove to be the most important legis-
lation enacted by the Florida Legislature this year, and it is certainly
the most important land use legislation enacted in Florida during this
decade. How Florida, a leader in growth management and environ-
mental conservation, implements the Property Rights Act will have
implications not only in Florida, but also in other states struggling
with the issue of making land use and environmental regulation more
responsive to individual landowners' property rights.
As part of the recommendations for reform made in part VI, this
Article proposes that the Act's inordinate burden compensation test
not be left entirely to the courts to devise because this will inevitably
lead to the differing takings standards of fairness and systemic incon-
sistency which undermine confidence in land use laws.4 As part of the
statutory analysis of the Act in part VI, this Article proposes an inter-
pretive compass to assist those who must apply the Act. Nonetheless,
the interpretive compass cannot answer all of the questions raised by
the Act because the text and legislative history provide little guid-
ance.47 Instead, the compass attempts to respond to some of the fun-
damental questions left unanswered by the statute. For example, it
argues that interpreting the Act to espouse an extreme property rights
view would be erroneous." The Act is above all a political compro-
mise, not a consensus, born from the rising political pressure to do
"something" to protect property rights and curb the burdens of land
use regulation. 49 Accordingly, the Act does not intend a radical shift
in the political power balance between groups .1 Instead, because one
of the aims of the Act is to enhance responsiveness to landowners'
concerns and address the perceived arbitrariness of governmental
actions, the Article proposes an interpretive framework that is proce-
durally oriented and focuses on the reasonableness of the regulatory
action." The proposed analytical framework for inordinate burden
determinations, set forth in part IV, will still leave fundamental issues
45. See infra note 404 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 233-34, 418-22 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 219-66 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 239-66 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 58-93 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 255-66 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text.
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of fairness and efficiency for courts to sort out on a case-by-case
basis.
5 2
Most importantly, the economic analysis in part V concludes that
the Act's decentralized decisionmaking procedure has a great potential
to treat comparably situated Floridians very differently. 3 Disparate
treatment could be magnified if decentralization creates a competition
for laxity of standards and undermines Florida's enforcement of
growth management and environmental laws.5 4 These innovative pro-
visions require immediate rethinking by the Legislature and the Execu-
tive Branch. The Property Rights Act's potential for unintended
results is sufficiently serious that the judiciary and regulatory deci-
sionmakers cannot be left without guidance to work out the difficult
implementation issues."
Part II reviews the political climate that made passage of the Act
possible and places the property rights initiative in the historical con-
text of populist politics. Part III examines takings law and explains
the failures that encouraged passage of the Act. Part IV articulates an
interpretive framework for the Act, briefly describes the law, and ap-
plies that framework to key issues posed by the Act. Part V explains
how the settlement order mechanism is a type of decentralized deci-
sionmaking and explores why decentralized decisionmaking is becom-
ing a trend in regulatory reform. It also examines how information
asymmetry, transaction costs, perceived risks, and other factors could
affect the strategic behavior of property owners and agencies, thereby
skewing incentives in the settlement order process. Part VI suggests
reforms that, even at this early stage, need to be considered in order
to avoid results not intended by the Act.
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AS POPULIST POLITICS
People want to be part of governance, but what they want from
government is respect for their ways of living. People wish to
participate in government, but they do not wish to be manipulated
52. See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 410-17 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 412-14 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 418-28 and accompanying text. The Department of Community Affairs
has already provided guidance in the implementation of the special master procedure. The De-
partment contracted with the Florida Growth Management Conflict Resolution Consortium to
provide a set of guidelines and training programs for state and local governments. See MODEL
PROCEDURAL GUIDELINEs, supra note 40. I suggest that, in like fashion, the Executive Branch or
the Legislature act quickly to provide guidance in the implementation of the Act's decentralized
decisionmaking procedure.
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and shaped by some master plan for effective governance. They want
the opportunity to have a say in what affects them, but they also
wish to be allowed to live their lives, raise their children, and pursue
their own vision of happiness-whether in families, friendships, or




People are tired of being trifled with by the government."'
Rep. Bert J. Harris, Jr.
The property rights experience in Florida and other states" reveals
the continuing power and breadth of the populist movement. 9 In
Florida, the successful property rights movement was a mixture of
56. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, Democracy and
the Problem of Free Speech, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1946 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)).
57. Telephone interview with Rep. Bert J. Harris, Jr. (May 26, 1995) (notes on file with
author) [hereinafter Harris, Interview Two].
58. In 1995, six other states passed property rights bills; Idaho, see HB 212, 53rd Leg., 1st
Sess. (1995); Kansas, see HB 2015, 76th Leg., 1st Sess. (1995); SB 231, 54th Leg. (1995); North
Dakota, see SB 2388, 54th Leg. (1995); Texas, see SB 14, 74th Sess. (1995); Wyoming, see HB
171, 53rd Leg. (1995). Between 1991 and 1994, numerous states have also passed other similar
bills. Delaware, see SB 130, 136th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1991); Indiana, see HB 1646, 108th
Leg., 1st Sess. (1993); Maine, see HB 847, HB 1238, 116th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1993); Missouri, see
SB 558, H3 1099, 87th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1994); Tennessee, see SB 2643, 98th Gen. Assembly, 1st
Sess. (1993); Utah, see HB 163, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994); Utah, see HB 171, 50th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1993).
59. Populism is a political movement identified particularly with the South and farm states.
Populism reached its zenith during the election of 1891, when farmers suffered economic hard-
ship as a result of dropping crop prices and higher costs due to escalating interest rates and high
transportation costs passed on by railroads. The reforms advocated by populists were eventually
assimilated into, or co-opted by, the major political parties. Thus, populism as a formal political
reform movement became unnecessary. See ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN POPULISM: A
SOCIAL HISTORY 1877-1898 19, 44-49 (1993); see generally GENE CLANTON, POPULISM: THE Hu-
MANE PREFERENCE IN AMERICA 1890-1900 (1991). Scholars view populism as a continuing politi-
cal philosophy that manifests itself in contemporary politics, such as when Jimmy Carter, in the
1976 presidential election, had an almost solid victory in the South with the sole exception of
Virginia. See ROBERT E. BOTSCH, WE SHALL NOT OVERCOME: POPULISM AND SOUTHERN BLUE-
COLLAR WOr RS 3 (1980).
Populism is deeply rooted in the social and economic networks of the South and rural commu-
nities. One basic tenet of populism is a suspicion of centralized authority, whether the authority
is governmental or private, such as industrial cartels or elites which co-opt governmental
influence. Populists decry dependency and value individualism. Hence, for populists, the proper
role of government is to protect the rights that individuals need to make a decent living. On the
other hand, populists view corruption as endemic to the exercise of power. Thus, populists view
government bureaucracy with a great deal of suspicion and desire reforms that will make govern-
ment more accessible and responsive to commonplace people. See Balkin, supra note 56, at 1946.
To achieve this end, populists seek to facilitate participation by citizens in the process of govern-
ment. id. at 1945.
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savvy leadership in the Legislature, big money interests, the right po-
litical climate, and the populist ingredient-small- and medium-sized
landowners frustrated with the lack of common sense in land use and
environmental laws.
Powerful legislative leaders led the charge-some from areas where
agriculture, both big and small, is a powerful political force; 60 others
from areas experiencing growth pressures from and frustration with
Florida's growth management laws. 6' These legislative leaders not only
had a long-held commitment to help property owners obtain relief
from oppressive governmental interference, 62 but they also had seen
victory escape during the last legislative session when a property rights
bill died in the session's waning moments.
63
Monied political interests were also behind the property rights
movement. The Florida Legal Foundation, which was heavily in-
volved in the property rights surge beginning with the constitutional
60. Agriculture is the third largest industry in Florida, consisting of large agribusiness,
mostly sugar growers, and small- to medium-sized farmers. Many of the farms in the middle of
the state are owned and operated by "family" style farmers. See FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AOci-
CULTURE & CONSUMER SERVICES, AORicuLTuRE FACTS 1994 3 (1994).
Agriculture has a substantial stake in the property rights movement for two reasons. First,
environmental regulations can place significant restrictions on farming operations, thereby in-
creasing operational costs. For example, if a farm is part of an endangered species habitat, regu-
lations will restrict which areas may be farmed and how they can be farmed. Second, for small-
and medium-sized farmers, the bulk of their personal wealth is in their land. The land is their
savings. If land use regulations significantly influence the fair market value of a parcel, they will
also affect the farmers' personal wealth.
There is a perception, not based on evidence, that growth management regulations have af-
fected the value of farmland. One comment submitted to the 1991 Florida Land Value Survey
stated that "[tihe comprehensive plan has killed transition land and most farm land sales." DA-
vID DENSLOW ET AL., BUREAU OF EcoNoMIc AND BusiNEss RESEARCH, UNWERSITY OF FLORIDA,
Tis ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSWsE PLANS 51 (1994) (citing an un-
published comment to the 1991 Florida Land Value Survey). Not coincidentally, the Property
Rights Act provides that an owner's existing use can be the non-speculative use of neighboring
properties. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b) (1995). This "use" definition will benefit farmlands situ-
ated at the fringes of an urban area. See infra notes 240, 291.
61. For example, Rep. Ken Pruitt believes that land use laws are too intrusive, complex,
and anti-growth. See Binkley, Solution to Land Use Law, supra note 18, at FI.
62. Rep. Bert J. Harris, Jr., after whom the Act was named and a leading advocate of the
Act, represents an area of the state where there are many citrus farms, and is himself a citrus
farmer. In 1978 he sponsored a Property Owners Protection Act, and 17 years later he sponsored
the Property Rights Act in the Florida House of Representatives. Rep. Harris has been a long-
time supporter of property rights and has sponsored property rights bills in the 1993 and 1994
legislative sessions as well. See Fla. HB 1437 (1993); Fla. HB 485 (1994). Rep. Ken Pruitt, a real
estate professional from the rapidly growing area of Port St. Lucie, was the co-sponsor of the
1995 Act, the sponsor of the 1993 property rights bill, Fla. HB 1437 (1993), and a member of the
ad hoc group which drafted the 1995 Property Rights Act. Rep. Dean Saunders, who brought
the Property Rights Act to the floor of the Florida House of Representatives for a vote, was a
co-sponsor of the 1994 Property Protection Act. See Fla. HB 1967 (1994).
63, See generally Wetherell, supra note 3.
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amendment petition drive,6 counts among its supporters some of
Florida's largest corporate landowners. 5 But alongside these "big
business" interests, which had previously failed to gain the necessary
supporters in the fight for property rights," was a populist core-
small- and medium-sized farmers frustrated by the limitations placed
on their farming operations by environmental and land use laws;
67
small middle class landowners who had purchased parcels many years
ago and now could not build a house upon them;6a and developers
forced into substantial concessions by local land use entities. 69 It was
64. The $3 million drive for the 1994 property rights constitutional amendment was fi-
nanced largely by U.S. Sugar Corporation and other members of the Florida Legal Foundation.
See Binkley, Solution to Land Use Law, supra note 18; David J. Russ, How the "Property
Rights" Movement Threatens Property Values in Florida, 9 J. LAxD USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 399
(1994).
65. These corporations held among them at least 2.1 million acres of undeveloped private
land. See Russ, supra note 64, at 399. St. Joe Paper Company, U.S. Sugar Corporation, Lykes
Brothers, Collier Enterprises, and A. Duda & Sons were among the most public of the corporate
supporters of the property rights movement in 1994. See Mary Ellen Klas, Powerful Landowners
Fuel Property Revolt, PALM BCH. PosT, Mar. 11, 1994, at Al.
66. In 1993 the Florida Legislature attempted to pass a property rights bill but succeeded
only in enacting legislation which would have created a commission to study property rights and
regulatory takings. See Fla. SB 1000 (1993). This bill was vetoed by Governor Lawton Chiles on
the ground that it would be the first step toward dismantling the growth management laws. See
Margaret Leonard, Effort To Pass Property Law in Florida Is Still Brewing, TALL. DEM., Jan. 3,
1993, at A7.
67. For example, large portions of farming areas in central Florida are also designated wet-
lands. Farmers have complained about being forced to reduce the acreage that they cultivate
because of wetland regulations or because their land is a habitat to an endangered species.
Mickie Valente, Big Business Big Winner in "Contract," TAMPA TriB., Mar. 25, 1995, at Busi-
ness and Finance 1; Jeff Klinkenberg, Showdown in the Everglades, ST. PETE. Trns, Sept. 27,
1992, at Fl.
68. Representative Harris provided one example of the type of wrong that the Property
Rights Act was intended to correct. He cited the situation of one of his constituents, an elderly
lady who had purchased a lot 20 years ago with the intent of living there in a mobile home.
When she was ready to do this, land use regulations prohibited her from doing so. See Harris,
Interview One, supra note 5.
69. Consider these tales of travail recounted in Forbes:
[The] Horvitz family has fought Florida's land planning bureaucracy for ten years.
Their goal: to build a luxury residential community and marina on their 1,600 acres of
water-front property, considered by many to be the best big coastal site left in south-
ern Florida. Their development outfit, Hollywood Inc., spent at least $2 million on
plans, paperwork and lawyers, and appeared before an assortment of state, city and
county agencies and boards. Still the red tape multiplied. The Horvitzes filed thick
piles of forms, applications and memoranda. The upshot: The Horvitzes won permis-
sion to build apartments home [sic] and warehouses on 300 acres, but no marina. In
exchange, they had to agree to sell the remaining 1,300 acres to the state and Broward
Country [sic] as part of an effort to preserve a mangrove swamp.
David T. McWilliams ... spent three years wringing approval from half a dozen
local, state and federal agencies to buil[d] a small subdivision on 70 acres near Cape
Canaveral. After McWilliams started construction on six houses and 15 condos, the
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the addition of these advocates that tipped the scale in favor of the
property rights movement. The battle could no longer be character-
ized as big money interests against the environment. 70 Instead the de-
bate was now framed in populist terms: an interventionist and often
arbitrary government dictating to individuals how to use their land
and often, as a consequence, how to live their lives. An experienced
staff member of the Florida House of Representatives remarked that
she was struck by how much emotion the property rights lobby was
able to generate by presenting testimony of the oppressed landowner. 71
The property rights movement was also aided by a new political cli-
mate precipitated by a very close 1994 gubernatorial election and un-
expected victories in the Legislature that gave the Republican Party
control of the Florida Senate for the first time since Reconstruction. 72
As almost the first order of business following the 1995 elections, the
Governor officially acknowledged that there were too many govern-
ment rules that made little sense and that government was too remote
from Floridians. At the beginning of the 1995 Legislative Session,
Governor Chiles promulgated an executive order directing government
agencies to reduce regulations and encouraging them to resolve con-
flicts with citizens through alternative dispute resolution techniques. 73
Subsequently, he set a goal of reducing government regulations across
the board by fifty percent. 74 Governor Chiles cited as reasons for this
sharp reduction in government the facts that "citizen frustration with
government [is] at an all time high '"7 and that "rules have become
increasingly confusing, complicated and expensive." 7 6  He
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers abruptly slapped him with a cease-and-desist order and
stopped construction cold for six months. Only when McWilliams agreed to plant
cordgrass and mangroves along 2 miles of nearby waterfront (at a cost of more than
$30,000) did the Corps allow him to resume work.
Thanks to three gopher tortoise sightings on a 4,800-acre planned development
north of Tampa, the state's Fresh Water Fish & Game Commission recently ordered
Shimberg Cross Co. to cede 600 acres of its project for a preserve. The small land
turtle, which is not an endangered species, has prompted similar concessions on more
than one large project, including a luxury hotel site in Fort Lauderdale.
James Drummond, Florida's Great Red Tape Swamp, FonEs, Oct. 30, 1989, at 193, 193-95.
70. To some extent, big money interests sought to exploit this populist fervor. The Florida
Farm Bureau general counsel commented that the property rights movement had to offset the
prejudice against industry and exploit stories about the "little guy." See Klas, supra note 65, at
22.
71. Interview with Carol Gregg, Legis. Analyst, H.R Judiciary Comm. (May 25, 1995)
(notes on file with author).
72. See Democrats' Dominance Drops, ORLANDO SENT., June 19, 1995, at BI.
73. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-74 (Feb. 27, 1995).
74. Governor Lawton Chiles, Inaugural Speech (Jan. 3, 1995).
75. Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-74 (Feb. 27, 1995).
76. Id. at 1.
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characterized this new initiative "as an effort to bring common sense
back to government."77
The work The Death of Common Sense7s and the responsive chord
that it struck in many79 added fuel to Governor Chiles' initiative. In
The Death of Common Sense, land use attorney Philip K. Howard
describes Americans' disconnection from government.8 0 The book, an
extended essay that makes its case almost exclusively through colorful
anecdotes, condemns the "tyranny of law," the senselessness of gov-
ernment regulations,' the remoteness of government and law to real
world problems, and the law's lack of common sense solutions. 82 The
effect of this movement in bringing common sense back to govern-
ment is manifested in the procedural reforms that the Property Rights
Act attempts. Those reforms include more accessibility by citizens to
regulatory agencies, more individualized decisionmaking and
discretion so that rules can be applied "common sensibly," and more
accountability by land use entities for regulations that place inordinate
burdens on property owners.8"
77. Id.
78. Pismu K. HowARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994).
79. Even Professor Cass Sunstein, a well-known and widely respected constitutional scholar
identified with civic republicanism and the legal process movement, acknowledged the validity of
the general theme of Howard's book. See Cass R. Sunstein, Land of 4,000 Unreadable Rules,
N.Y. Trms, Feb. 12, 1995, at 12 (reviewing THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE). This book made the
reading list of the President of the United States, the Governor of Florida, and every agency
head of Florida, and, in general, swept the country. In remarks to the Florida Legislature, Presi-
dent William J. Clinton noted a common interest in The Death of Common Sense and in regula-
tory reforms designed to make government regulations simpler and more "common sensible."
FLA. S. Joura. 259-260 (Reg. Sess. March 30, 1995). Governor Chiles gave The Death of Com-
mon Sense to every agency head and commended each to read it and to be responsive to the
concerns expressed in the book. Scott Eyman, The Death of Common Sense, PALM BCH. POST,
Mar. 8, 1995, at Dl.
80. HowARD, supra note 78, at 173 ("It is no coincidence that Americans feel disconnected
from government: The rigid rules shut out our point of view. Americans feel powerless because
we are not given a choice: Modern law does not allow us ....").
81. Mr. Howard states that new housing subdivisions have an empty, open look because 50
years ago traffic engineers wrote a standard code requiring streets to be 50 feet wide, about 50%
wider than streets a few decades earlier, since that was the width necessary to allow two fire
engines going in opposite directions to pass each other at 50 miles per hour. HOWARD, Supra
note 78, at 5. Another example Howard cites is Mother Theresa's abandoned attempt to open a
mission for homeless men in of New York City. Mother Theresa's order was frustrated because
the city offered to sell the order an abandoned building for one dollar, as the site of the new
mission, but then required the installation of a $100,000 elevator, as required by the city's build-
ing code, which the order could not afford. Id. at 1-4.
82. Id. at 173.
83. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text. As part of this regulatory reform, the
1995 Florida Legislature enacted other far-reaching reforms of the ways that agencies exercise
regulatory power. Governor Chiles vetoed a bill which would have amended the Administrative
Procedures Act. See Fla. CS for SB 536 (1995). Although Governor Chiles was in agreement
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In addition, Governor Chiles had already appointed a diverse
seventeen-member task force,'4 the 1994 Property Rights Study Com-
mission II, to examine the concerns of property owners. On February
28, 1995,8 5 the task force recommended legislation substantially simi-
lar to the Property Rights Act.8 6 The task force called for compensa-
tion for private property owners affected by state or local land use
regulatory action that "inordinately limits the effective and practical
use of real property. "87 It also suggested an alternative dispute resolu-
tion procedure substantially similar to section 2 of the Act. 8
Given this joining of political and economic forces as the 1995 Leg-
islative Session opened, the Legislature accepted that land use regula-
tions and state governments had gone too far and that something had
to be done.8 9 The passage of a property rights bill in some form ap-
peared imminent. Seven property rights bills were introduced in the
Senate and HouseY. An informal ad hoc group consisting of members
of the Executive Branch, lobbyists, Senators, and Representatives met
weekly and then daily to hammer out a compromise outside of the
formal legislative process. Only two committee hearings were held on
property rights bills two weeks prior to the Legislature's vote on the
Property Rights Act. 91 The ad hoc group did most, if not all, of the
with the overall purpose of the reforms to simplify rulemaking, in his view some of the proposed
changes would have burdened agency resources and led to additional administrative hurdles and
burdens. See Letters from Governor Chiles to Sandra B. Mortham, Sec'y, Dep't of State, and
James A. Scott, Senate Pres. (July 12, 1995) (on file with author). Among other things, this
legislation would have required agencies to consider the economic cost of regulations, choose the
method with the least economic impact, and bear the burden of proof regarding the validity of
any new rule the agency promulgated.
84. The executive order creating the task force specified that it was to be made up of four
private property owners, one economist, two local government officials, four representatives of
environmental organizations, the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs, the Secre-
tary of the Department of Environmental Protection, a representative from a water management
district, as well as members of the House and Senate. The 1994 Property Rights Task Force was
chaired by a representative of the Florida Bar. Fla. Exec. Order No. 93-354, § 2 (December 29,
1994).
85. 1994 PROPERTY RIGHTs REPORT, supra note 28.
86. The 1994 Property Rights Report contains proposed legislation. Id. at 3-31.
87. Id. at 5-8. The 1975 Property Rights Task Force also recommended compensation for
"any regulation that unduly diminishes the value of property, even though it does not constitute
an unconstitutional taking without compensation." 1975 PROPERTY RIGHTs REPORT, supra note
3, at 12.
88. 1994 PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1-2.
89. According to the 1994 Property Rights Report, even environmentalists joined the
charge. Bob Wilson (an environmentalist on the 1994 Task Force) was characterized as advocat-
ing "almost entirely the ... position of property owners." Id. at 58.
90. Fla. SB 1326 (1995); Fla. SB 2912 (1995); Fla. SB 1868 (1995); Fla. HB 1381 (1995);
Fla. HJR 1847 (1995); Fla. SJR 218 (1995); Fla. HB 863 (1995).
91. Seesupra note 5.
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work on the bill. 92 The group's political muscle showed; what could
have been a bloody political battle became a smooth political compro-
mise .9
Ill. WHAT Is WRONG WITH TAKINGS LAW, OR WHY WOULD
FLORIDIANS NEED YET ANOTHER LAW?
To many [citizens], government was seen as an unresponsive
bureaucracy, the workings of which they did not understand. Resort
to the judicial system did not seem to present a meaningful
opportunity. Judges were perceived as not having the expertise in
takings law that would be needed; there is too much delay, and the
system is too complex and expensive. 94
1994 Property Rights Task Force
How could it be otherwise [disrespect for regulatory agencies], with
the delays, the costs, the manipulations, the hypocrisy, and, perhaps
worst, the boasts of fairness that destroys real fairness? 95
Philip K. Howard
You do not know the abuse I've been through.
96
Philip Emmer
Discontent with land use agencies and the common-law of takings
secured passage of the Property Rights Act. For many, takings law
provides illusory and unsatisfactory safeguards; a regulatory takings
lawsuit is complex, lengthy, and must overcome many obstacles. Tak-
ings law has been criticized for the inadequacy of the formal process
and the muddle of substantive takings common law.
A. Inadequacy of the Formal Process
1. The Ripeness Requirement
A property owner who wishes to fight the government over a tak-
ings claim must be ready to spend many years in litigation 97 and also
92. Telephone interview with Daniel Stengle, General Counsel, Dept. of Comm'y Aff.,
(June 15, 1995) (notes on file with author); interview with Carol Gregg, H. Judiciary Comm.,
Legis. Analyst (May 25, 1995) (notes on file with author).
93. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
94. 1994 PROPERTY Riorrs REPORT, supra note 28, at 57.
95. HowARD, supra note 78, at 108.
96. Philip Emmer, a Gainesville developer for more than three decades, describes his expe-
rience with land use and environmental officials. Binkley, Solution to Land Use Law, supra note
18, at Fl.
97. The foremost takings cases have all taken many years to wind their way through the
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have the capital to pay hefty attorney's fees and costs. 9 The ripeness
requirement, which applies to both federal99 and state'00 constitutional
takings claims, has much to do with the length and cost of takings
disputes.' 0' This requirement has two prongs: a petitioner must 1) ob-
tain a final decision from the governmental authorities regarding the
use of property (the final decision requirement); °2 and 2) seek
court and administrative system. The leading case in Florida, Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc., 399 So. 2d. 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981), took six years to reach the
Florida Supreme Court. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the
much acclaimed, recent "pro-property owners" case, took five years to reach the United States
Supreme Court. The legal fees incurred exceeded half a million dollars. LAND USE L. RaP. 117
(July 28, 1993). When the case was remanded to the lower court for a determination of state law
issues, Mr. Lucas decided to forego further litigation and settled with the state for approximately
$1.5 million. Id. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lucas founded a nonprofit "property rights" group.
See Brigit Schutte, Legal Victory Heats Up the Dispute, TALL. DEM., Jan. 3, 1994, at 7A. Two
other recent noted circuit court cases, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560
(Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995), and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), have already made several rounds between the district and
circuit courts. Florida Rock Industries has been in litigation for 10 years and has not yet been
resolved.
98. Accord S. 239, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(4) (1994) (stating in preamble to the Private
Property Owners Bill of Rights that "Private property owners are being forced by Federal Policy
[sic] to resort to extensive, lengthy and expensive litigation to protect certain basic civil rights
guaranteed by the constitution").
99. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193
(1985).
100. See Alexander v. Town of Jupiter, 640 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), appeal dis-
missed, 648 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1994); J.T. Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1990), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (1990).
101. One commentator has called the ripeness requirement "the most important legal princi-
ple in land use litigation." Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A
Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go To Avoid Adjudicating
Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 91, 91 (1994); see also Brian W. Blaesser, Closing
the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in
Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73, 75 (1988) ("In particular, the federal
courts have applied the doctrines of ripeness and abstention to either dismiss or stay constitu-
tional challenges to land use decisions, in effect, leaving the federal courthouse door only slightly
ajar for land use cases which involve only the most egregious examples of arbitrary action by
local governments.").
102. Courts cannot review a local forum's decisions for a takings violation until it is clear
that an adequate remedy has been denied. Only when the local decisionmaking entity has made a
final decision can it be determined just how far the regulatory action has gone to hinder a
property right. A court will not review another authority's decision until the petitioner has had
her case exhaustively reviewed at that level and the governmental agency has had an opportunity
to redress the petitioner's concerns or adjust or modify its decision. See Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 193 ("[Tlhe finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has
arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury."); Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986) (finding appellant had
not received a "final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue"),
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 622 (1981) (case dismissed because
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compensation from the state (the state compensation requirement).103
The ripeness requirement must be met in all "as-applied" takings
challenges'04 and pertains to questions both of whether the regulatory
action constitutes a taking, as well as whether the landowner has been
justly compensated. Failure to comply with the ripeness requirement
will result in dismissal of a takings suit.Io5
The final decision requirement has proven to be particularly oner-
ous in land use cases. Under the final decision requirement, the peti-
tioner must first apply for a permit and be denied.106 Then, if a
California Court of Appeal did "not decide whether any taking, in fact, occurred;" therefore,
the case was not "final"); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that appellants
failed to apply for alternative development on property; therefore case was not properly before
the court); Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 796 F. Supp. 1477 (N.D. Fla. 1992)
(requiring exhaustion of all remedies with respect to takings claims); see also Executive 100, Inc.
v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536 (l1th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 55 (1991) (requiring
exhaustion of all administrative remedies, including inverse condemnation proceedings).
103. The state compensation requirement responds to the question of whether there has been
a denial of just compensation. It requires a petitioner to seek compensation available under
state, local, and administrative processes and to have been denied relief under such processes.
See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95 ("[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings
without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been
denied .... If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation
and if resort to that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim
against the Government' for a taking.") (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1013, 1018 n.21 (1984)). However, such recourse must be an adequate process for securing com-
pensation. In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that the availability of an inverse
condemnation claim in state court was an "adequate" compensation remedy that the petitioner
should have exhausted. Id. at 197.
104. Only a facial challenge, that is, a challenge that the regulation itself is unconstitutional,
does not have to comply with both prongs of the ripeness requirement. Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty, Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); but see MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348 (stating that in a
facial challenge, the court may require the petitioner to exhaust local process). As the United
States Supreme Court has noted, the plaintiff "face[s] an uphill battle" in a facial challenge. See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
105. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194. The Lucas decision, however, showed some
flexibility with respect to the final decision requirement. In Lucas there was a question whether
Lucas should have applied for a permit under a special procedure established by the coastal
commission after Lucas had commenced his suit. The Court found that doing so would have
been "pointless," rejecting the state's ripeness defense. Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2891 n.3 (1992). This was the first time that the Court applied the "futility"
exception, which provides that a petitioner need not exhaust all local remedies if to do so would
be futile. Id. at 2891.
Professor Roberts argues that Lucas signals to federal lower courts that they may treat the
ripeness requirement as "prudential," rather than as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Thomas Roberts, Ripeness After Lucas, in AFTER LucAs: LAND USE REGULATON AND THE TAK-
tNo OF PROPERTY WITHOUT ComPENsAloN 23 (David Callies ed., 1993). In Reahard v. Lee
County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1133 (1lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995), a case de-
cided after Lucas, the Eleventh Circuit continued to regard ripeness as a question of subject
matter jurisdiction.
106. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (takings claim
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variance or exception is available (which will be the case for the most
part),' °7 the petitioner must seek a variance and be rejected.1°e If the
petitioner's original development plan required an intensive use and
her plan was rejected, she must reapply for a "less intensive, yet still
valuable development."'09 Moreover, the requirement that the deci-
sion be "final" requires that, at each step, the petitioner actually ob-
tain a final determination from the land use entity. Particularly
because a land use entity has a great deal of discretion, it could poten-
tially take years to make a final determination." l0
The effect of the ripeness requirement in "closing the court house
door" cannot be underestimated. The ripeness requirement can be ap-
plied by a court at any time and thereby bar a plaintiff from access to
rejected in part because petitioner had "not sought approval for the construction of a smaller
structure" than the 50-story office building to be built on top of Penn Central Station); Agins,
447 U.S. at 255 (challenge to zoning ordinance that permitted up to five single family dwellings
to be built on five-acre tracts dismissed because petitioner did not submit development plans to
local officials, who would have determined what petitioner would have been allowed to build).
107. Accord Roberts, supra note 105, at 22.
108. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. 199-200. In Williamson County the developer ob-
tained initial approval for a subdivision of 736 units in a single-family residential zone. Id. at
177. However, the planning commission subsequently amended the zoning ordinance to permit
less intensive use, known as "down-zoning," and denied subdivision approval. Id. The Court
ruled that the developer had not met the finality requirement because he did not seek a variance,
which could have overridden the planning commission's rejection. Id. at 186.
109. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 347 (1986). In this
case, the planning commission denied a subdivision proposal for 159 units, and petitioner argued
that the rejection effectively restricted use of the land to only agricultural activities, a low inten-
sity use. The Court rejected this argument and found as follows:
Here plaintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively intensive residential
development and the application was denied. The denial of that particular plan cannot
be equated with a refusal to permit any development, and plaintiff concedes that the
property is zoned for residential purposes in the County general plan and zoning ordi-
nance. Land use planning is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A governmental entity
is not required to permit a landowner to develop property to fthe] full extent he might
desire or be charged with an unconstitutional taking of the property. Here, as in
Agins, the refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the
landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. Accord-
ingly, the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Id. at 347.
110. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 ("The local agencies charged with administering regu-
lations governing property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they take with
one hand they may give back with the other."). A land use entity's ability to postpone a final
determination has prevented many a property owner from obtaining a fair hearing within a rea-
sonable time frame. In one extreme federal case, the land use agency took six years to make a
final determination. In that case, the court required the petitioner to wait until the agency made
a final determination. See Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1986). When a governmental entity takes an inordinate amount of time in making a final
determination, some courts have indicated their willingness to apply the futility exception, but
few courts have applied such exception. See, e.g., Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449,
1454 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988).
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a neutral arbiter and possible relief."' A comprehensive study of fed-
eral takings cases showed that in a five-year period beginning in 1983,
only 5.6% of all land use cases filed in federal court were found to
have satisfied the ripeness requirement."1
2
2. Layers of Governmental Authorities
The onerous effect of the ripeness requirement is compounded by
the typically complex and multi-layered permitting process. Each
agency and each level has its own mission and distinct view in the land
use process. In Florida, many agencies, local governmental entities,
and special districts"' have some authority in approving a land devel-
opment order. Although Florida's growth management laws direct
governmental entities to coordinate growth management efforts with
each other," 4 there is no directive or regulation that governmental au-
thorities coordinate their demands with respect to the applicant. "S
Land use permitting is a one-step-at-a-time process with only one
governmental entity involved at a time. The petitioner cannot deter-
mine, at the beginning of her project, the concerns of the pertinent
land use entities. Also, each land use entity may exercise a veto over
the project with respect to its area of concern. 16 The factors that
caused other entities to approve the project need not be given the
same weight or deference by another governmental entity. "7
111. Accord Overstreet, supra note 101, at 124 ("[F]ederal courts dislike adjudicating land
use cases and have applied the ripeness doctrine harshly in an effort to close the federal court
house doors to land use taking cases."). But see Roberts, supra note 105.
112. Blaesser, supra note 101, at 90-136.
113. Four hundred and fifty-eight local agencies had to prepare a comprehbnsive plan, and
by 1991 all had completed their plan. HousE Comm. ON CoMm'y AFF., 1995 FLORIDA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FORMATioN MANuAL 1-4 (4th ed. 1995) There are 11 regional planning councils in
Florida, five water management districts, and 1,040 special districts of which 92 are not active.
House Comm. ON NAT. REs., PRORAM REvEaw OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS 1, 21 (Nov. 1994).
114. See FL.A. STAT. §§ 163.3204, 186.509, 187.201(26) (1995).
115. A recent article describes environmental and land use permitting as follows:
Under Florida's current environmental regulatory framework, a person engaging in
water or land altering activity is likely required to secure separate permits from the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), a Water Management District
(WMD), and local government. Wetland impacts are regulated by these state, re-
gional, and local entities through wetland resource, surface water management, sover-
eign submerged lands, coastal construction, mangrove alteration, and in some cases,
city or county permitting programs. At the federal level, there is also a requirement to
obtain a permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for the
same development activities that impact wetlands.
John J. Fumero, At a Crossroads in Natural Resource Protection and Management in Florida,
19 NOVA L. REV. 77, 80 (1994).
116. See Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. WESTERN L.
REV. 187 (1992).
117. In spite of successful permitting at the local level, a state agency can veto a project,
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3. The Politics of Upset Neighbors
Land use decisions have always been, and likely will always be, po-
litical. Much is riding on the decision of local zoning boards. Neigh-
bors may perceive an end to their community as they have known it or
a threat to the value of their most important investment, their home.
For the developer, failure to obtain approval means wasted develop-
ment costs, a loss from which she may not be able to recover. For the
city, land use is one of the most visible and sensitive areas through
which the city serves the taxpayers and enhances future growth.",
Thus, land use decisions are frequently made on the basis of local pol-
itics and local sentiment. 19
Although Florida cases such as Board of County Commissioners v.
Snyder' 02 and Jennings v. Dade County2' have attempted to minimize
even if the project is much desired by local government. For example, the Southwood develop-
ment project in Leon County, Florida, sponsored by the St. Joe Paper Co., is an ambitious plan
to transform 6,000 acres in economically depressed southeast Leon County to a development
which will eventually employ 2,000 people and house 30,000 more in middle-class housing. Plan-
ning on this project began in March 1994 and was negotiated by the City of Tallahassee, Leon
County, and St. Joe Paper Co. The plan has been submitted twice to the Department of Com-
munity Affairs and twice it has been rejected. The local officials "thought [they] had answered
all [the State's] questions," but the Department of Community Affairs denied approval because
the project does not contain enough affordable housing and would permit St. Joe Paper Co. to
harvest pine trees. See Savannah Blackwell, State Halts Growth Plan: The DCA Ruling Puts the
Brakes on the Southwood Development, TALL. DEM., June 8, 1995, at C2. The issue is now
being litigated. Interview with Richard Geshwiller, Chief of Planning, City of Tallahassee-Leon
County Planning Agency (September 27, 1995) (notes on file with author).
118. See generally, RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CRMRaLs StawoN, THa ZomNIG GAMt REVsrrED
(1985); RICHARD F. BABCOCK, Tm ZorNmG G.A (1966).
119. Many examples can be cited. In spring 1994, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning
Commission considered a subdivision application for a mobile home development, which was to
be located at the fringe of an older, established community of single-family homes on the south
side of Tallahassee. See Savanah Blackwell, Neighborhood Up in Arms over Comp Plan, Trail-
ers, TALL. DEM., Jan 10, 1995, at BI, B3. The lots would be owned by the mobile home occu-
pant and the plan provided for two-car parking for each lot. Id. at BI. The community
adjoining the proposed development vigorously opposed the subdivision and attacked the devel-
opment at lengthy and raucous public hearings. Id. The petitioner, the developer of the mobile
home park subdivision, had complied with all zoning code and comprehensive plan requirements
and had exceeded them as requested by the city planning officials. Id. at B3. Nonetheless, during
the second public hearing, in the din of the upset neighbors, the planning commission denied
approval. Penelope M. Carrington, Board Rejects Trailer Park Plan, TALL. DEM., Jan 19, 1995,
at DI, D2. The Tallahassee City Commission, which heard the appeal, stood behind the plan-
ning commission's decision, and authorized the city to purchase the parcel in question. Savanah
Blackwell, Residents Defeat Mobile Homes, TALL. DEM., March 23, 1995, at 6B; see generally
BABCOCK & SrEmoN, supra note 118, at 5, 11-36, 183-206 (describing some land use cases as
"hysterical" and reminding attorneys to "[niever ignore the political climate when trying a zon-
ing case").
120. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
121. 589 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
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the influence of politics by imposing more rigor in local land use pro-
cesses, 12 local governments continue to have broad discretion and am-
ple flexibility.' While the Florida Supreme Court has made the local
zoning decisionmaking process more legalistic, forcing landowners
and planning commissioners to conduct themselves more like lawyers
and administrative judges, the supreme court has continued to bless
the broad political discretion exercised by local zoning boards. Under
Snyder, a local board has the discretion to deny a rezoning or an
amendment to a comprehensive plan, even if the change sought by the
petitioner is consistent with the comprehensive plan.'2 The local
board may determine that it is in the public interest to deny such use,
if its decision is supported by substantial competent evidence. 25 Thus,
even though Snyder introduces a higher level of scrutiny, local deci-
sionmakers can continue to factor in the politics of the situation.
Local politics, although responsive to the views of the community
on how to resolve competing land uses, l2 nonetheless increases
122. Snyder holds that a site-specific rezoning is a quasi-judicial proceeding, and upon judi-
cial review the local governing body's decision is subject to strict scrutiny for compliance with
the local comprehensive plan. 627 So. 2d at 473-75. Additionally, the local government's deci-
sion must be supported by "substantial competent evidence." Id. Moreover, Snyder is not lim-
ited to site-specific rezoning. Snyder has been applied to site plan approvals, see Park of
Commerce Ass'n v. City of Delray Beach, 636 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1994), and amendments to
comprehensive plans, see Florida Inst. of Technology, Inc. v. Martin County, 641 So. 2d 898,
899-900 (Fla. 4th DCA. 1994). Quasi-judicial proceedings are more formal than quasi-legislative
proceedings: ex parte communications are not allowed, Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341, witnesses
may be cross-examined, expert witnesses may testify, transcripts can be made available, and
opposing factions must receive copies of all notices and be given an opportunity to testify. See
generally, Mark P. Barnebey & Bonnie T. Polk, Quasi-Judicial Land Use Hearings: Does Your
Evidence Pass Muster?, FLA. B.J. 42-47 (March 1995) (describing cases therein); see also Section
28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County, 642 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (analyzing the
distinction between a quasi-legislative and a quasi-judicial zoning decision). Jennings has been
somewhat modified by legislative fiat, which has relaxed the formality of quasi-judicial proceed-
ings by permitting local officials to communicate with citizens if the local government adopts a
resolution permitting such conmunications. 1995, Fla. Law ch. 95-352 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
286.0115 (1995)).
More generally, the need to be able to determine whether local politics has had an undue
influence on local land use decisionmaking has caused courts to emphasize the need for local
decisions to be made "in accordance" or "consistent with" the comprehensive plan. Snyder, 627
So. 2d at 476; Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Faano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973) (en banc).
123. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986) ("[locaf
agencies] are singularly flexible institutions").
124. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475.
125. Id. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the applicant shows that a land use change is consistent
with the comprehensive plan, the burden of proof shifts to the local government to show that
maintaining the existing classification accomplishes a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at
476. The Snyder holding clearly bothered the 1994 Property Rights Task Force. See 1994 PROP-
ERTY RIosrrs REPORT, supra note 28, at 58-63, and probably influenced its recommendation to
adopt legislation substantially similar to the Property Rights Act.
126. See generally Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983).
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uncertainty, risk, and expense for developers.1 27 Some have argued
that the local land use boards are subject to capture by political
groups and that this renders the local process inherently inefficient
28
and subject to charges of unfairness.
29
B. The Muddle of Takings Law'30
Critics find the substance of land use law as unsatisfactory as its
process. The legal formulation of takings analysis, the ubiquitous na-
ture of takings, and the many unarticulated policy conflicts have
made a muddle of takings law.
127. To deter neighbors from taking an adversary position, some developers have filed
SLAPP suits (strategic lawsuits against public participation), usually alleging tortious interfer-
ence with business relations or defamation. See John C. Barker, Common Law and Statutory
Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 395 (1993). Alternatively, sophisti-
cated developers include in their planning strategy public relations campaigns to win local sup-
port. Dwight H. Merriam et al., Grass Roots Lobbying, in ALI-ABA LAND USa INSTITUTE,
PLANNING REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN AND COMPENSATION 769 (1994).
128. From an efficiency standpoint, government regulations should allocate to developers
only spill-over costs or externalities caused by new development that otherwise would be shifted
to nonconsenting third parties. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW &
ECON. 1 (1960); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1089 (1972). For example, local
officials may exact as terms and conditions of a building permit, costs that properly should be
financed by the entire community. Developer Philip Emmer cites as an example his having been
required by city officials to build a wall around a subdivision, the walls having been demanded
by a neighborhood group. He argues that if the city had to pay for the wall, it would have built a
much less expensive one. See Binkley, Solution to Land Use Law, supra note 18, at Fl.
129. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 701-02 (1973):
The pervasiveness of special influence is inherent in the zoning system. Judicial insis-
tence on uniform standards for decision, a basic way of preventing favoritism in gov-
ernment, is not possible in the case of zoning; the name itself suggests a system of
nonuniform regulation. Since the courts cannot easily distinguish good planning from
bad, judicial checks on unfair variations in land use restrictions have been minimal.
Studies have documented the lawlessness of zoning variance decisions in most commu-
nities. Many courts have stopped trying to police local zoning and consistently sustain
the local government's action under the "presumption of validity" given to zoning
provisions.
Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385, 407-408 (describing local zoning to be a system in which campaign contributions, fees
to politically connected attorneys, and personal relationships with planning officials and public
officials are key to positive outcomes); EPSTEIN, TAKNoS, supra note 26, at 265 ("[S]trict judi-
cial supervision of the zoning process is . . . appropriate to correct the unstable political situa-
tion ... judicial deference to local action is wholly inappropriate."); see generally SusAN RosE-
ACKERMAN, CoRRUPTIoN: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1988); BABCOCK, supra note 118; see
also FEDERAIST No. 10, supra note 24, at 83 ("The smaller the society, the fewer probably will
be the distinct parties and interests composing it ... and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they unite to execute their plans of oppression.").
130. I have borrowed this caption from Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the
Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
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1. Formulation of Legal Takings Analysis
Judging merely by how often and how prominently property rights
are mentioned in the federal and Florida constitutions,' property
rights appear to be among the most strongly protected of all rights.
The takings clauses of the federal and Florida constitutions clearly ap-
ply when a governmental entity physically "takes" or appropriates
private property by exercising its power of eminent domain. Land use
law in this area-eminent domain-generally functions smoothly and
without controversy.
32
But takings law is more complex when the government action is
more subtle, such as when a government regulatory action prevents a
property owner from using her property in a certain manner.'33 The
United States Supreme Court first addressed this issue in the 1922 case
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.3 4 Justice Holmes pronounced that
"if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 1 3 For
nearly three-quarters of a century following this decision, practition-
ers and courts have struggled with how to determine where the critical
point lies at which "the regulation goes too far."'13 6 The purpose of
the takings inquiry has also been described as determining whether a
property owner has been unfairly burdened by a regulation that bene-
fits the community, when the costs, in all fairness, should be borne by
all.'37 Justice Brandeis's solution is to provide compensation when the
131. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(2) & art. I, § (2).
132. The 1976 Property Rights Report committee contacted practitioners and academic and
government officials practicing in this area in the State of Florida and concluded that "the [emi-
nent domain] system appears to be working well and appears to be fundamentally fair." 1976
PROPERTY RIGHTs REPORT, supra note 3, at 68.
133. These cases are commonly referred to as regulatory takings or inverse condemnation
cases.
134. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
135. Id. at 415.
136. Id. In addition, scholars have struggled to reconcile the "too far" standard of Mahon
with the Court's earlier pronouncement in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), in which the
Court found that a government regulation that forced the defendant to close his brewery was a
valid exercise of the police power and did not amount to a taking. This holding was based on the
noxious use exception, which provides that a regulation of land use is not a taking if it is to
control some "evil" or "noxious" use. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 640; see generally FRED P. BOSSEL-
MAN ET AL., THE TAKINGS IssrE (1973); William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due
Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057 (1980).
137. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v, DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987) (stating that
purpose of Fifth Amendment is to prevent "the public from loading upon one individual more
than his just share of the burdens of government, and [it] says that when he surrenders to the
public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the
public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him") (quoting Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893)); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
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state, through the police power, acquires a virtual proprietary inter-
est.138 After seventy-odd years of common law, there are remarkably
few clear guideposts; but, clearly, regulatory takings analysis is an ad
hoc inquiry.139
Following Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 4 the Supreme
Court's most recent regulatory takings case, it is the Holmesian ap-
proach, which promotes formalistic notions of property rights, that
dominates takings jurisprudence.' 4' Accordingly, the Court has devel-
oped categorical rules that outline when a governmental entity goes
too far. If there is a physical invasion due to a regulation, then this is
a per se taking.' 42 Likewise, if all economically viable use of the prop-
erty is destroyed by the governmental action, then a per se compen-
sable taking has occurred.' 43 Yet few government regulations go this
far.
Florida takings law closely tracks federal takings law and recognizes
a regulatory taking under the state's constitution.'" The Florida
Supreme Court has stated that "there is no settled formula" for deter-
mining "when the valid exercise of police power stops and an imper-
missible encroachment on private property rights begins."''14  The
court has also held that the regulatory takings inquiry should deter-
mine the fair balance between the costs of a regulation imposed on a
(1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public
use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.").
138. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Sax, Takings & Police Powers,
supra note 23, at 39 ("Under this ... theory then the constitutional issue turns upon whether
the government has asserted a proprietary interest for itself in the affected property.")
139. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
140. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
141. The Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, recharacterizes the police power noxious use
cases, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), and
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), as "simply the progenitor[s] of our more contemporary
statements that 'land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests.' " Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. The approach under Lucas protects expectations based on
traditional common law notions of property rights. See infra notes 185-190. Similarly, Justice Holmes
emphasized in Mahon that the Kohler Act went too far because it "purports to abolish what is recog-
nized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land." 260 U.S. at 414.
142. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see Yee v. City of
Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (rejecting the lower court's finding that the combination of rent
control and landlord-tenant statutes conceded to renters virtual physical possession of mobile home
lots).
143. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
144. See Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1380 (1981); Newman v.
Carson, 280 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1973); State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Var-
holy v. Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943).
145. Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1380.
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private property owner and the public benefits, the costs of which
should properly be borne by the public.'4 As in the federal context,
there are few categorical rules. A physical invasion caused by a gov-
ernmental regulatory action is a per se taking. 47 The court has recog-
nized under the state constitution the right of a property owner to
exploit the economically viable use of her land.148 However, it has not
yet determined whether denial of all economically viable use is a per se
taking.
Given the very narrow scope of per se categories under either fed-
eral or state law, the outcome in partial regulatory takings cases turns
upon an inevitably uncertain and inconsistent ad hoc balancing and
fairness test. 49 The modern approach to regulatory takings first estab-
lished in Penn Central 0 requires a court to 1) examine the character
of the governmental action; 2) assess the economic impact of the regu-
lation on the landowner; and 3) determine the extent to which the reg-
ulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations., Lower
courts have added more factors to the Penn Central test 512 and
146. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1138 (Fla. 1979) ("[Wlhile govern-
ment clearly has the right to expropriate private property for purposes beneficial to the general
public, it cannot require a single property owner to bear the cost of such general benefits. This
principle, which is the essence of the 'property clauses' of the United States and Florida Consti-
tutions, commands that the cost of public benefits be borne by the public.") (citing State Road
Dep't v. Tharp, I So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1941)).
147. Storer Cable T.V. of Fla., Inc. v. Summerwinds Apartments Ass'n, Ltd., 493 So. 2d
417 (Fla. 1986) (Under article X, section 6 and article I, sections 2 and 9 of the Florida Constitu-
tion, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, the
Florida supreme court found that a statute permitting cable companies to install cable equipment
on property that a tenant did not specifically have the right to use was a taking because it re-
suited in a permanent, physical invasion.)
148. Askew, 381 So. 2d at 1137.
149. Such uncertainty and inconsistency is increased by the way in which courts apply the
test-often blending due process and takings analysis and, in effect, balancing the public pur-
pose served by the regulation against the economic harm imposed on the individual landowner.
E.g., Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1381 (finding that the public interest in preserving the integrity of
the environment "promotes the welfare of the public, prevents a public harm, and has not been
arbitrarily applied"); see generally Glen E. Summers, Private Property Rights: Toward a Tak-
ings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L. Rav. 837, 862-877
(1993) (identifying this blended approach and deploring "balancing" as clearly an inadequate
protection of property rights); Stoebuck, supra note 136, at 1065 ("Balancing is a false taking
test .... [It] is also too dangerous to function as a test for a police power taking.").
150. 438 U.S. at 124.
151. Id.
152. In the leading modern regulatory takings case in Florida, Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1374,
the Florida Supreme Court reformulated the Penn Central balancing test into six non-exhaustive
factors:
I. Whether there is a physical invasion of the property;
2. The degree to which there is a diminution in value of the property, or [] whether
the regulation precludes all economically reasonable use of the property;
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subsequent United States Supreme Court cases have reformulated the
Penn Central factors.
The Lucas Court recast takings analysis as a two-tier test. The first
tier examines whether the land use regulation "substantially
advance[s]" a "legitimate state interest,"'5 3 that is, the legitimacy of
the regulatory action." 4 If the land use regulation substantially ad-
vances a state interest, a court proceeds to the second tier of the test:
determining whether the regulatory action denied the property owner
3. Whether the regulation confers a public benefit or prevents a public harm;
4. Whether the regulation promotes the health, safety, welfare, or morals of the
public;
5. Whether the regulation is arbitrarily and capriciously applied; [and]
6. The extent to which the regulation curtails investment-backed expectations.
Id. at 1380-81.
Reahard is a decision involving permitting of a subdivision on a 40-acre piece of waterfront
property, once part of a larger parcel of 540 acres purchased 48 years earlier. The court listed a
total of eight factors as relevant to the inquiry of whether the landowner has been deprived of all
or substantially all economically viable use of the property:
(1) the history of the property-when was it purchased? How much land was pur-
chased? Where was the land located? What was the nature of title? What was the
composition of the land and how was it initially used?;
(2) the history of development-what was built on the property and by whom? How
was it subdivided and to whom was it sold? What plats were filed? What roads were
dedicated?;
(3) the history of zoning and regulation-how and when was the land classified?
How was use proscribed? What changes in classifications occurred?;
(4) how did development change when title passed?;
(5) what is the present nature and extent of the property?;
(6) what were the reasonable expectations of the landowner under state common
law?;
(7) what were the reasonable expectations of the neighboring landowners under state
common law?; and
(8) perhaps most importantly, what was the diminution in the investment-backed ex-
pectations of the landowner, if any, after passage of the regulation?
Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693
(1995). These factors are duplicated in the dispute resolution portion of the Act as factors to be
considered in the inordinate burden determination. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 70.51(18) (1995).
In Florida Rock Industries, Inc., the court listed other factors to be considered in addition to
the loss of economic use to the property owner as a result of the regulation imposed:
[A]re there direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and others similarly
situated, flowing from the regulatory environment? Or are benefits, if any, general
and widely shared through the community and the society, while the costs are focused
on a few? Are alternative permitted activities economically realistic in light of the
setting and circumstances, and are they realistically available? In short, has the Gov-
ernment acted in a responsible way, limiting the constraints on property ownership to
those necessary to achieve the public purpose, and not allocating to some number of
individuals, less than all, a burden that should be borne by all?
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
153. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
154. See DAVID L. CALIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 283 (2d ed. 1994).
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economically viable use of her land,' that is, the reasonableness and
magnitude of the individual economic harm. 1
56
The first tier of the Lucas analysis applies a deferential scrutiny to
the governmental purpose. 57 However, the Court has recently inti-
mated that such review should be more stringent in certain categories
of land use cases. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission58 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard,5 9 the Court expands the application of the
"substantially advances" test for cases of permit exactions.60
155. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
156. Id.
157. The deferential standard found in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), an eminent
domain takings case, is often applied to this prong of the takings analysis. The Berman standard
has been characterized as a virtual abandonment of judicial review. In Berman the Court stated:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable.
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present
case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take
into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.
348 U.S. at 38 (citations omitted); see also Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243
(1984) ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases
make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings ... are not to be carried out in the
federal courts."); see generally EpsTEN, Tn wC s, supra note 26.
The Court's frustration with virtual abandonment of the governmental purpose requirement is
evidenced in Lucas, where it voiced skepticism at the Legislature's finding that it was necessary
to prohibit construction along the area where Lucas had applied for a building permit. 112 S. Ct.
at 2898. Other owners' structures were permitted to remain and the Commission subsequently
permitted construction subject to a hardship procedure. Id. The Court stated that to scrutinize a
legislative governmental purpose "amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid
staff." Id. at 2898, n.12.
However, this analysis is not always entirely deferential. Professor Merrill analyzed the appli-
cation of the governmental purpose test in takings cases and found that between 1964 and 1985
over 16% of the takings cases in state appellate courts were invalidated based on the govern-
mental purposes prong. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv.
61, 96 (1986). Professor Merrill concluded that "judicial enforcement of the public use require-
ment is not a thing of the past." Id.
158. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, Justice Scalia argued that the level of review in takings
cases should not be so deferential to legislative judgement as in due process and equal protection
cases. Id. at 834 n.3 ("[Tlhere is no reason to believe .. .that so long as the regulation of
property is an issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges and equal pro-
tection challenges are identical ....").
159. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
160. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (holding unconstitutional permit conditions that require a
property owner to deed portions of her property to the government because the exaction was not
reasonably related to the governmental purpose, and noting that such exactions can be justified
only if the government "make[s] some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development");
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (holding that there must be an "essential nexus" and "rough
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This test would also apply to cases where the governmental entity
has acted arbitrarily or improperly. For example, courts have been
willing to declare a taking when a governmental entity is acting in an
enterprise capacity, 16 1 in a predatory manner, 62 or where the govern-
ment treats one property owner in a markedly different manner from
other similarly situated property owners. 163 This legitimacy analysis is
proportionality" between the governmental interest and exactions required in a land use permit).
It is not entirely clear that permit exaction cases should be treated as takings cases. In Lucas,
the Supreme Court cited Nollan as a takings case in which a regulation denied a property owner
all economically viable or productive use of the land. 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
Some would argue that such heightened scrutiny applies to exaction cases where there was a
physical invasion. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission requited a public easement
bounded by the Nollan's seawall on one side and mean high-tide mark on the other side. In
Dolan, the local planning commission required Dolan to deed the city a portion of her property
in and adjacent to the 100-year flood plain so that the city could control flooding and build a
pathway. 114 S. Ct at 2314.
161. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), cited in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1981). See Sax, supra note 23, at 55-60.
162. See, e.g., San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (city officials interrupted plaintiff-developer's development of his property by refusing a
permit for installation of utilities because the development of the land would increase the city's
costs of acquiring the land for a dam project the city was planning); Nemmers v. City of Du-
buque, 716 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1983) (government rezoned plaintiff's property to light industrial
use, plaintiff spent a substantial amount of money to develop the property and donated substan-
tial sums to the city and county, but the city rezoned again; the court found that the plaintiff
had acquired a vested right to continue developing); Archer Gardens, Ltd. v. Brooklyn Ctr. Dev.
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (conspiracy between city and private developer to
inhibit private landowner's ability to sell or lease land, which ultimately resulted in title forfei-
ture was a taking). See generally Sax, supra note 23; William C. Leigh and Bruce W. Burton,
Predatory Governmental Zoning Practices and the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause For-
mulation: Timing, Value, and R.LB.E., 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 827 (1993); but see Cambria
Spring Co. v. City of Pico Rivera, 217 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Redevelopment
Agency v. Contra Costa Theater, Inc., 185 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Toso v. City of
Santa Barbara, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980).
163. Although in takings analysis, courts do not explicitly articulate an equal protection con-
cern in assessing the legitimacy of a regulation, markedly disparate treatment of the petitioner
has clearly influenced the Supreme Court's view as to the reasonableness of the governmental
entity's action. In Nollan, the Court called the Coastal Commission's permit condition "extor-
tion" because the Court believed the Nollans were singled out and force to bear a disproportion-
ate share of the cost of the Commission's beach access program. 483 U.S. at 835 n. 4 ("If the
Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's attempt to remedy these prob-
lems, although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the State's
action, even if otherwise valid, might violate [thel Takings Clause .... "). In Lucas, the Court
emphasized that Lucas's neighbors had been permitted to build dwellings and allowed to have
their houses stand, while Lucas was now prohibited from building. 112 S. Ct. at 2889; but see,
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 ("zoning laws often affect some property owners more severely
than others but have not been held to be invalid on that account"). Professor Summers justifies
this higher level of scrutiny in these cases because "[wihen individuals or small groups are sin-
gled out by government and forced to surrender property rights, they may have little ability to
appeal to the political process .... a government that takes from a few and gives to many may
be quite popular indeed." Summers, supra note 149, at 880.
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similar to the first prong of the Penn Central test involving the
"character of the governmental action."' 1 Under this prong, particu-
larly egregious governmental infringement on property rights will be
prohibited, either because such infringement amounts to a physical in-
vasion, 6 15 a restriction on alienation,'6 or an improper and arbitrary
cause of action.
The second tier of Lucas, whether the property owner retains "eco-
nomically viable or beneficial use" of her land, is equivalent to the sec-
ond and third parts of the Penn Central test, 167 the economic impact of
the regulation, given a property owner's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations. s In Lucas, the Supreme Court fashioned the bright-line
rule that when a property owner is left with no economically viable use
of her property, there is a taking.16 Absent such a categorical showing,
the landowner must prove that the regulation has diminished the value
of the property enough to constitute a taking. A mere diminution of the
property's value is not a taking. 170 Nor is tlhe property owner entitled to
the highest and best use of her property. 17' If a regulation permits pres-
ent use of property, then no taking results.'
164. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
165. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
166. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
167. Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127, 138 n.36 (emphasizing that the holding was
based on the finding that Penn Central's current use of the property was "economically viable")
with Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (examining whether regulation denies "all economically beneficial
or productive use of land").
168. See Nollan v. California Costal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (citing Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (a regulation is a taking if it denies property owner of "economic
viable use" of her property); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (to establish individualized financial
harm, petitioner had to show "a serious financial loss from the regulatory imposition."); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260
U.S. 393, 414 (1922) ("To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."); see generally Lynda
J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark. Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in
Takings Analysis, 70 WAsHi. L. Rav. 91, 117-120 (1995).
169. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (stating that "we have found categorical treatment appropriate
... where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land"). For Justice
Scalia, total deprivation of use is comparable to physical appropriation. Id. at 2894. An exception
exists if state nuisance or tort law would have permitted a total deprivation. Id. at 2900.
170. See, e.g., Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
854 (1988); Jengsen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1213 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017
(1982); Arnold v. Prince George's County, 311 A.2d 223 (Md. 1973); Bonds v. City of Webster
Groves, 432 S.W. 2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Oriental Blvd. Co. v. Heller, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431
(App. Div. 1969).
171. Goldblatt v. New York, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (deprivation of most beneficial use
does not constitute a taking); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-137; see also Graham v. Estuary
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Courts are left with the difficult task of determining when a regula-
tion that does not completely destroy the value of the property sub-
stantially denies economic benefit so as to constitute a taking. Many
difficult issues must be resolved."' How much return or profit is a
property owner entitled to make? 7 4 In order to measure such losses,
the court must first define the property interest comprised by the
government action,175 determine how to measure lost profits or
Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (1981); Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d 996, 1006
(Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Penn Central).
172. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
173. See generally Oswald, supra note 168; Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. Rav. 1369 (1993).
174. Penn Central is the only Supreme Court case that addresses the issue of adequate rate
of return in takings law, and it does so obliquely. In Penn Central, the Court found that the
railroad company's present use of the premises for its operations and leases was an adequate
return. 438 U.S. at 135.
Profit is relevant to takings analysis, although the Supreme Court does not always use the
term "profit." See Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. 292, 414 (1922) ("What makes
the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit."); Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 137 n.36 (ability to use property in "gainful fashion"); Lucas v South C arolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992) ("productive options" other than leaving land in its natural
state); Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985) (not profitable to develop
[only] 67 units); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 501 (property interest cannot be
used profitably by one who does not also possess the surface or mineral estate). Other courts
also have been willing to consider whether the uses under the regulation permit a reasonable
return. E.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Orion
Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 642 (Wash. 1987) ("present, possible, and reasonably profita-
ble use"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988); Hornstein v. Barry. 530 A.2d 1177 (D.C. App.
1987) ("reasonable financial return"); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 271
(1 th Cir. 1987) ("the landowner's loss takes the form of an injury to the property's potential
for producing income or an expected profit"). However, lower courts have not uniformly ac-
cepted that profit is relevant to takings analysis. See, e.g., Park Ave. Tower Assocs. v. City of
New York, 746 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (inability of owners to receive reasonable return on their
investment did not, in itself, amount to an unconstitutional taking), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087
(1985); William C. Haas and Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (im-
pairment of economic value of property due to rezoning, although substantial, was insufficient
to give rise to constitutional claim to just compensation), cert denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980);
MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541, 549 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 572 U.S.
1009 (1985). In MacLeod, the Court found that denial of a permit to harvest timber did not deny
the owner the economically viable use of the property amounting to a taking. The landowner
could still raise cattle on it. The fact that the owner would not realize a profit over expenses on
land did not mean that the denial of the harvesting permit was a taking.
175. This segmentation issue is brought into sharper focus with the mining extraction cases.
Compare Mahon 260 U.S. al 414 (regulation requiring mining companies to operate mining so as
not to affect habitable houses was a taking, because private deeds granted to the mining compa-
nies such rights) with Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 470, 498 (taking not found where
statute required mining companies to leave 27 million tons (20o of rights in coal) in place). In
Lucas, Justice Scalia muses that when "a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the
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returns, 7 6 and set the relevant timeline. 177 Ultimately the inquiry may
be mathematical: how much use of the property must be eliminated
before there is a taking? 78 Yet courts have not fashioned rules to an-
swer these important questions but have instead been guided by the
facts and circumstances of each particular case. 1
79
In addition to showing that the regulation substantially decreases
the economic benefit of the property, the petitioner must also show
that such decrease interferes with her reasonable or distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations (RIBEs) (the third Penn Central require-
ment).180 That is, not all losses will be treated as legally cognizable.
Takings are ubiquitous; with every regulatory action someone gains
value and someone else loses value.' 8' If every regulatory loss were
considered a taking, "government hardly could go on."' 8  To answer
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract,
or .... [as one in which the owner) has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a
whole." 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7; see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d at 1572 n.32 ("Prop-
erty interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive."); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings
I02 YALE L. J. 1077, 1158-61 (1993).
176. Should a court determine whether there is a taking by measuring the residual fair mar-
ket value of the property? See Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d at 1575 (Nies, J., dissenting)
(market value of land is not relevant to takings analysis). What evidence should the court con-
sider in determining fair market value? See id. at 1567 (whether, for the purposes of takings
analysis, fair market value of property should include speculative value).
177. In Lucas, the relevant timeline was when the petitioner acquired the parcel. Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2899. But often, development of a large parcel occurs over an extended period. In
Reahard, the parcel was acquired by petitioner's parents 48 years prior to petitioner's claim and
developed over that period. The court remanded the case, in part, for the lower court to deter-
mine the relevant timeline. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (1 Ith Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995).
178. In Lucas, Justice Scalia recognized that there are no guidelines as to what level of denial
of economically viable use, short of 100%, rises to a taking and conceded that in some cases
denial of 95% of economically viable use may not be a taking. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
Past Supreme Court cases have found no taking even when denial of use was substantial. See
Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365 (75% diminution); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405
(1915) (88% diminution); see CALLIEs ET AL., supra note 154, at 32.
179. Justice Scalia straightforwardly acknowledged that "[u]nsurprisingly, this uncertainty
regarding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced incon-
sistent pronouncements by the Court." Lucas, at 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.7 (comparing Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n).
180. This concept was first mentiorred as the "primary expectation concerning the use of the
parcel" in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. RIBE is a term of art. Accord Epstein, Expectations,
supra note 173, at 1370.
181. See Steven Medema, Making Choices and Making Law: An Institutional Perspective on
the Takings Issue, in LAW AND EcoNomics PERSPECTIVs, supra note 24, at 45, 46 ("losses are
ubiquitous: any legal change restricts someone's opportunity set, that is, engenders loss [and
expands someone else's opportunity sets, that is, engenders gain.] The question that remains is
whether the losers will be compensated for their losses.").
182. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; accord Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1176 ("the second criterion
... was intended to ensure that not every restraint imposed by government to adjust to the
competing demands of private owners would result in a takings claim").
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which losses are legally cognizable, the court must determine the na-
ture of the petitioner's expectations" 3 and whether such expectations
were "reasonable" and "investment-backed."'.'
The most clearly protected expectations are those which arise from
title in the property. When used in this context, "expectations" are
akin to entitlements. Thus, the landowner is allowed to challenge reg-
ulatory actions that impinge upon expectations relating to the "tradi-
tional" and "core bundle" property rights,' including interference
with the landowner's exclusive physical possession,8 6 her right to al-
ienate,1 7 and her right to exclude others.' In addition, under Lucas,
expectations are informed by how property is defined by state prop-
erty law,8 9 and how property interests are limited by state common
183. It is useful to begin by observing that the term used in takings jurisprudence is expecta-
tion, not interest or right. The use of the term "expectation" indicates that a property owner's
expectation is something less than a legal interest or right, but something more than mere specu-
lation. See Oswald, supra note 168, at 108.
184. Professor Epstein would prefer the use of the term "reasonable expectations" rather
than "investment-backed" since the latter overly emphasizes whether the property owner has
made an "investment," rather than whether the investor is reasonably entitled to protection
under the law. Epstein, Expectations, supra note 173, at 1370.
185. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2888 ("[Tlakings jurisprudence .. . has traditionally been guided
by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over the
'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property."). Professor Epstein,
explains why this formalistic view of property is important:
[P]roperty rights .. . are only of value if the holder ... is in a position to preserve
their use against all comers. Thus, there are legal rules to protect exclusive rights
of possession of privately owned property .... [Their] importance cannot be under-
estimated. The rules of trespass and nuisance are for the protection of property inter-
ests, and they insure that once the rights in property have been assigned to one person
. . . they cannot be taken or destroyed by another individual.
Epstein, Property, supra note 116, at 191.
186. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419 (statute that permitted small television antennas to be
placed on roofs was a taking); Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (intermittent air invasions were a taking).
Although Professor Tribe criticizes this group of cases as the Court's "fetish," it may reflect the
Court's comfort in treating property as a "thing," TRsE, supra note 23, at 47; see Frank Mich-
elman, Takings, 1987, supra note 24, at 1628 ("[T]hese may be regarded as judicial devices for
putting some kind of stop to the denaturalization and disintegration of property .... [and al-
though] logically vulnerable, can still make sense ideologically as tokens of the limitation of
government by law."); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE Ll ATs OF AMERICAN
CONSITUTIONALISM 234-239 (1991).
187. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 704.
188. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) ("We have
repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, the right to exclude
[others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property'."); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) ("[Plublic access
would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property'.").
189. In Lucas, Justice Scalia states that "the owner's reasonable expectations [are] shaped by
the state's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land .... 112 S.Ct. at 2894.
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law, such as nuisance law and the principle of "sic utere tuo ut al-
ienum non Iaedas."' 9
But with respect to the most difficult questions regarding RIBEs,
courts are virtually rudderless. RIBEs are more than a "unilateral ex-
pectation or an abstract need." 191 A property owner has no RIBE of
being able to obtain the permits necessary to exploit the highest and
most profitable use of her property. 92 Should a property owner "rea-
sonably" expect changes in government regulation? 93 If government
regulation or action adds value to a property owner's parcel, can the
governmental agency amend or repeal the regulation without the ac-
tion's amounting to a taking?'9 Should the property owner expect
that a governmental agency will act "reasonably"? 1 9 How much
knowledge of permitting and land use regulations should be attributed
to a property owner when assessing the property owner's expecta-
tions? 196 In addition to resolving these issues, to be able to define the
190. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7, 2900 ("[R]egulations that prohibit all economically bene-
ficial use of land . .. cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation) but must
inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of prop-
erty and nuisance already place upon land ownership.").
191. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
192. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978); Graham v.
Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1382 (1981).
193. The Supreme Court has equivocally defined "expectations" in the context of existing
and future regulatory schemes. Justice Scalia would rule that a property owner's reasonable
expectations need not factor in the possibility that a regulatory agency will alter its regulations
from time to time. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 ("[Tihe notion . . . that title is somehow held
subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically
valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has
become part of our constitutional culture."). On the other hand, Justice Kennedy views existing
regulatory schemes as part of the background that should inform reasonable expectations. Lu-
cas, 112 S.Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The State should not be prevented from
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts must consider
all reasonable expectations whatever their source .... Coastal property may present such
unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its develop-
ment and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit.").
194. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. 292, 414 (1922) (distinguishing regulations
where there was "reciprocity of advantage"); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135 (noting that historic
preservation regulations benefit the owner of the train terminal).
195. In Ruckelhuas, 467 U.S. at 999, the Court held that Monsanto did not have a reasona-
ble expectation that the EPA would not disclose trade secrets, although the applicable statute did
not require the agency to refrain from such disclosures.
196. Generally, courts will impute to the petitioner the knowledge that a reasonably diligent
property owner would have regarding existing land use regulations. See Namon v. Dept. of
Envtl. Reg., 558 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (appellants who learned that wetlands regula-
tions would bar construction on the property were attributed with constructive knowledge of the
regulation). Some courts have been willing to apply differing standards depending on the type of
regulation. See Vatalaro v. Dept. of Envtl. Reg., 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
(court found that the petitioner did not have constructive knowledge of wetland regulations but
had constructive knowledge of zoning regulations).
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expectation and whether it is reasonable, the court must again deter-
mine the property interest, the relevant timeline, and the range of
profit expectations that are reasonable (and thus legally cognizable).
Inevitably, each court and each case provides a different answer based
on competing notions of justice and fairness. i9
The confusion engendered by the takings analysis is evidenced by
inconsistent results, the length of litigation in complex cases,," and
the number of cases remanded to lower courts. 1" Such confusion has
led to a general belief that courts are not qualified to make land use
decisions. 200 The language of law cannot hide the fact that the infinite
flexibility of a balancing test allows the judge to prioritize and weigh
competing values of her own.201
2. Unarticulated Policy Conflicts
The United States Supreme Court's failure to articulate the theoreti-
cal foundation of takings analysis also accounts for the doctrinal con-
fusion. At a fundamental level the purpose of the analysis is merely to
be "fair," where fairness is not defined. Thus, lower courts attempt
to find fairness without an articulated starting point.
Legal scholars have suggested numerous alternative theories and
justifications as to why, when, and how courts should protect prop-
erty interests under takings law. In searching for "fairness," are we
concerned with the ability of an individual property owner to preserve
her wealth against a less well-off majority? 2 Do efficiency concerns
about government interference lead us to protect certain classes of ex-
pectations? 203 Are we concerned with government excesses in the exer-
cise of the police power? 204 Or are we concerned with
"demoralization" costs that occur when the police power is exercised
197. See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
198. See supra note 97-98 and accompanying text.
199. E.g., Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (case
remanded for fifth time).
200. See 1994 PROPERTY RIGrrs REPORT, supra note 28, at 57. As Professor Rose-Ackerman
noted, inconsistent results contribute to a lack of confidence that courts are making just deci-
sions. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 24.
201. See Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1693 (1995); EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 26, at 116 ("The asserted incoherence of legal doc-
trine becomes the entering wedge to allow, encourage and indeed justify judges to reach what-
ever result they prefer on any given state of affairs."); see generally RONALD M. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGnrs SERIOUSLY (1977).
202. See Tim FEDEA IST No. 10, supra note 24, at 83-84.
203. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAs ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoimcs (1988); Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 24; WIn.IIAM A. FISCHEL, REGUATiORY TAKINGS (1995).
204. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 26.
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to redistribute wealth arbitrarily?20 1 Are we simply unable to reconcile
our individualist view of property-that society is better-off formulat-
ing rules that protect acquisition of property-with our civic view-
that communities must rely on the public spiritedness of its mem-
bers?2 Is "property" a socially constructed set of entitlements, which
courts and legislators should be able to change? 207 The courts have
failed to adopt any single view of property. 20 This lack of theoretical
coherence in takings law, which is pragmatic, inevitably plays itself
out in the form of unresolved takings conundrums. 2°9
IV. UNPACKING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT
[The] law is what the courts say it is.
2 1 °
HLA Hart
205. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 24.
206. Rose, supra note 130, at 596-97.
207. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971);
NEDELSKY, supra note 186, at 239-40.
208. Perhaps the single most important factor in explaining the shift in takings analysis from
Penn Central to Lucas is the Court's differing view of property rights. Justice Brennan's view of
property is clearly a view based on a series of entitlements that the community is free to add or
take away. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104 (reciprocity of advantage); Nollan, 483 S.Ct. at
842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disputing private landowners' expectations to beach access).
Justice Scalia's views are more "thing" based, relying on "traditional" state law concepts of
what is property. See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. 2894 n.7 (property owner's expectations determined by
state property law); Noflan, 483 U.S. at 831 (right to exclude others is an essential stick in the
bundle of property rights).
This flexible view of property has been condemned by some legal scholars, see Epstein, Prop-
erty, supra note 116, but others view this flexibility as a function of our common law system
responding to a changing environment:
"Property" is the product of 800 years of judicial manipulation. "Property" is, liter-
ally, what the courts have made it. The concept of property is part of the common law
.... Our system contemplates that the ingredients (in the old bottle labeled "prop-
erty"] will change to, among other things, accommodate the needs of a changing soci-
ety. All we require of our judges is that they proceed in a rational manner, retaining
enough of the existing ingredients to give stability . and adding enough new ingre-
dients to meet the needs of society.
Stoebuck, supra note 136, at 1072-73.
209. Some legal scholars have viewed indeterminate outcomes under takings law not as a
negative, but a necessary part of takings law. See Gerald Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on
the Legal History of New York City, 3 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 673-91 (1976) (stating that judges
should recognize that takings law does not reflect a particular methodological or conceptual
approach, but instead requires a judge to experiment and exercise imaginative solutions); Jeremy
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1542-48 (1991) ("[Can]
the riddles posed by our allegiance to conflicting views of property . . . be escaped at all. The
most obvious improvement would involve coming to terms with the absence of a 'set formula'
for takings decisions so that our current state of affairs need no longer pejoratively be judged
'ad hoc'.")
210. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (1961).
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Whoever has an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken
laws it is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and purposes and not
the person who first wrote or spoke them.
2 1 '
Bishop Hoadly
The Property Rights Act has an "all things to all people" quality.
Longtime property rights activists view the Act as a victory because
they believe property owners' rights are finally protected; state agency
and local government officials view the Act as part of the 1995 legisla-
tive reform directing them to act "common sensibly"; 1 2 and environ-
mentalists view the Act as successful damage control in a
disappointing legislative session.21 3 The Executive Branch took com-
fort in seeing that any attacks on Florida's growth management laws
were temporarily averted.
21
It is precisely this "all things to all people" quality that makes the
Act good politics, but not good law. Far from being a "modest" pro-
posal, 215 the Act, while short and terse, is very complex. It uses many
takings terms of art; consequently, many of the interpretive conflicts
present in takings lore are duplicated in the Act. In addition, as there
is almost no legislative history, 216 the courts have been given very little
guidance on how to resolve historical conflicts between community
and individual property interests. In short, a plethora of issues await
those who must interpret and implement the Act.
There are four main themes within the Property Rights Act. It aims
to 1) provide a "fair" compensation remedy, outside of takings law,
to property owners who may have to bear an "inordinate" burden for
government regulations that benefit the community at large; 2) signal
local governments to exercise greater caution and use more "common
sense" in issuing and amending land use regulations; 3) provide to
211. J.C. GRAY, TIE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 276 (1902).
212. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
213. David Gluckman, a longtime environmental lobbyist, offered this assessment of the
1995 legislative session: "I had no expectations and they've been met. We've generally had a
fairly miserable session." Elizabeth Wilson, Environmentalists Gloomy After a Session of Set-
backs, ST. PETE. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at B5.
214. The supporters of "property rights" also often oppose growth management laws. For
example, Rep. Ken Pruitt, a co-sponsor of the Property Rights Act, is also a leading opponent
of growth management laws. See supra note 18.
215. The 1994 Property Rights Report credits Robert M. Rhodes, a participant in the Gover-
nor's Task Force with the "modest" suggestion that the 1994 Task Force consider a program,
outside of takings law, whereby property owner could obtain relief if government regulations
"inordinately burdened" her land use. See 1994 PROPERTY RIoGTMs REPORT, supra note 28, at 70.
The 1975 Property Rights Report contained the same recommendation. See 1975 PROPERTY
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
216. See supra notes 6-7.
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property owners mechanisms that sidestep the slow, laborious and
costly administrative and court processes; and 4) facilitate decentral-
ized decisionmaking.
Part A below sets forth an interpretive model for the Act based on
these four themes. Rather than providing the reader with a detailed
explanation of the Property Rights Act, which is already provided in
the companion piece, 217 part B then briefly describes how a property
owner would proceed to make a claim under section 1 of the Act.
21
1
Part C will apply this model to the major interpretive issues that will
likely arise under the Act.
A. Constructing a Compass
Despite the Act's many shortcomings, it is possible to use the text
and history of the Act to articulate an interpretive model that can pro-
vide guidance. I call this model a compass because, although it can
help point the way, it cannot ultimately resolve the most difficult is-
sues under the Act. The four points of the compass are as follows:
first, the Act is a response to the muddle of takings law; second, tak-
ings common law is relevant to the construction of the Act; third, the
Act is a signal to local governments to exercise more caution, common
sense, and flexibility in issuing and amending land use regulations; fi-
nally, the Act does not select a political theory of property rights.
1. The Property Rights Act Is a Response to Takings Law
The Act is a direct response to the procedural and substantive prob-
lems perceived to exist in takings law. Although the 1994 Property
Rights Study Commission's "modest" proposal, 19 which one year
later became the model for the Property Rights Act, did not attempt
to revamp takings law head on,22 0 the Act did address both procedural
and substantive concerns not addressed by takings law.
The Property Rights Act creates new procedures that address the
dilatory effects of state ripeness doctrine. First, an aggrieved property
owner can bypass administrative and state courts-instead, she can
negotiate under section 1 of the Act or directly employ the special
master mechanism in section 2 of the Act. 221 Second, ripeness doctrine
217. Powell et al., supra note 6, at 296-313.
218. See supra note 40.
219. See supra note 215.
220. E.g., Fla. SB 1326 (1995) (mandates the numerical proportion at which denial of eco-
nomically viable use becomes a taking); FLA. S. Jout. 218 (Reg. Sess. 1995) (amends the state
constitutional takings provision).
221. See supra notes 34-30 and accompanying text.
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is substantially modified for compensation claims under the Act.
Whereas takings common law and administrative procedures permit
delays, under the Act the state land use entity must issue a "ripeness
decision" within 180 days; whether or not the land use entity re-
sponds, the claim thereafter is deemed "ripe" for purposes of litigat-
ing a compensation claim made under the Act.32
With respect to substantive issues of takings law, the Act provides a
compensation remedy, outside of takings law, to property owners who
may be forced to bear an "inordinate burden" caused by regulations
that benefit the community at large.m Under current takings law,
only regulatory actions categorized as per se takings can be resolved
with any certainty. 22 The Act appears to sidestep these hurdles by
providing property owners a new cause of action which is not neces-
sarily wedded to the takings common law.
25
2. Takings Law Is Relevant in Interpreting the Act
The Property Rights Act provides that it "may not necessarily be
construed under the case law regarding takings, if the governmental
222. See supra note 36 and infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
The Property Rights Act also addresses indirectly the problems of multilayered and highly
politicized governmental decisionmaking discussed in part III. See notes 113-29 and accompany-
ing text. The Act seeks to help the property owner cut through multiple layers of government by
permitting the property owner to file simultaneously a claim to initiate negotiation or the special
master procedure with all the land use entities that have some authority over the disputed use of
the property. See FLA. STAT. §§ 70.001(4)(a), 2(3) (1995). Moreover, the Act provides an incen-
tive for each land use entity to notify and involve in the dispute resolution other state land use
entities with potential jurisdiction. Id. § 70.001(4)(a). If compensation is due the property owner,
the state land use entity's responsibility will be reduced to the extent the circuit court finds that
other participating land use entities are responsible for the "inordinate burden." Id. §
70.001(6)(a). The Act could have addressed this issue more directly by creating a one-stop per-
mitting procedure.
It is not clear whether the drafters ever considered how the Property Rights Act would impact
the well-established publicity and notice procedural safeguards in local land use decisionmaking.
The Act requires that the land use entity notify the contiguous neighbors and all parties involved
in prior administrative actions that an inordinate burden claim has been made, see id. §
70.001(4)(b), or that the special master procedure has been invoked, see id. § 70.51(4). The Act
does not require notice to the public at large. Moreover, the Act is silent as to whether the
negotiation or special master process is open to the public. The Act appears to regard the claim
of the property owner, not primarily as a land use issue requiring community input, but rather as
an issue of compensation affecting the individual.
Additionally, the issue of how the Property Rights Act interacts with the Florida Administra-
tive Procedure Act, which requires notice and publicity of administrative actions, is likely to be
litigated. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.53-542, .55 (1995). While the Florida Administrative Procedures
Act does not apply to most local government land use decisions, see Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 65, it
does apply to decisions made by state agencies, including wetlands permitting.
223. Id. at § 70.001(2); see infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 133-79 and accompanying text.
225. See infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
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action does not rise to the level of a taking." 26 This confusing decla-
ration must be construed in applying almost every provision of the
Act. Certainly the phrase should not be interpreted to preclude a court
from considering takings precedent.
As argued in part III of this Article, the Property Rights Act was
drafted as a response to problems identified in existing takings law.
Moreover, the Property Rights Act and takings common law have
similar purposes-to determine when a regulatory action has gone so
far that an individual property owner has been forced to bear a bur-
den that in all fairness should be borne by the public as a whole. 2 7
With such close parallels, then, it should not be surprising that many
of the principles in the Property Rights Act are similar to or refer
directly to takings common law doctrine. In fact, many of the sparse
provisions of the Property Rights Act can be interpreted only in the
context of the background principles of takings common law. 228 For
example, the Act adopts certain takings law concepts, such as "exist-
ing use ' 229 and "reasonable, investment-backed expectations. ' 230
Moreoyer, the "inordinate burden" determination is remarkably simi-
lar to regulatory takings analysis 231 and incorporates the nuisance and
noxious use exception as well. 232 Ultimately, as in takings law, no po-
litical guidance is provided as to which factors to prioritize, and no
226. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(9) (1995).
227. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
229. The definition of "existing use" includes reasonably foreseeable non-speculative uses,
see FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (1995), and "actual present use or activity." Id. § 70.001(3)(e). These
definitions are similar to the concept of "economically viable use" in takings jurisprudence. See
supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
230. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995). "Inordinate burden" can be found if govern-
mental regulation permanently impairs a property owner's reasonable investment backed expec-
tations. See id. The Act does not define this term. The only area of the law where this concept is
applied is regulatory takings law. See supra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
231. The Property Rights Act inordinate burden determination and the Penn Central test are
similar. The first step under the Act, which directs the court to consider whether there is an
existing use, corresponds to the second prong of the Penn Central test, the economically viable
use prong. See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text. The second step of the Act, the inor-
dinate burden determination requires consideration of one of the following: 1) reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations, a concept which corresponds to the third prong of the Penn Central
test, see supra notes 180-184 and accompanying text; or 2) whether the property owner's remain-
ing use is reasonable. The statute defines reasonable in terms of the Armstrong fairness test-
fairness to the individual, given the benefits to the community as a whole. See supra note 137.
232. The Property Rights Act provides that the law of nuisance and noxious use should be
read into what a property owner should reasonably expect to be her use of property. Cf. FLA.
STAr. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995) (carving out an inordinate burden exception for "remediation of a
public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of private property"). Compare with Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2900 (an exception to denial of economically viable use lies if state nuisance or tort
law permitted a total deprivation).
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theoretical framework is articulated for the inordinate burden analy-
sis.
The Legislature's equivocation may be plausibly interpreted as the
drafters' recognition of the continued relevance of takings analysis
and concepts. Arguably, having recognized the great difficultly of bal-
ancing the interests of the many against the private property interests
of individuals, the Legislature decided not to clarify doctrine or the-
ory. Instead, the Act again delegates to the courts, already experi-
enced in resolving regulatory takings dilemmas, the question of when,
under the Property Rights Act, a regulation has become an inordinate
burden. In the Legislature's view, courts should be able to calibrate
the "fairness" to be meted out under the Property Rights Act, just as
courts mete out "fairness" under regulatory takings law. 2"3 Takings
analysis, then, as complex, contradictory, and inconsistent as it is,
was not rejected outright by the Legislature, but rather the Legislature
intended that takings jurisprudence inform the interpretation of the
Property Rights Act.
Rather than totally proscribing courts' consideration of seventy-odd
years of common law regulatory takings, perhaps all that the Legisla-
ture was stating with this limiting provision was that it did not like
certain results under takings law. A reasonable construction of this
provision is that relief for regulatory action should be more available
to property owners under the Property Rights Act than it is under the
common law of takings. 234
233. Fla. S. Comm. on Comm'y Aff., tape recording of proceedings (April 24, 1995) (on file
with comm. secretary) (consideration of Fla. SB 2912 (1995)) [hereinafter Fla. S. Comm. on
Comm'y Aff. tape]. In response to a question concerning how the courts would interpret terms
similar to terms used in the Property Rights Act, then DCA Secretary Linda Loomis Shelly
responded:
We trust the circuit courts of Florida, when dealing with the facts presented to them
by the property owners, [having been] told by the Legislature that it doesn't have to be
a takings to be an inordinate burden, will find that new regulations that impose res-
trictions on property owners which are not fair, considering how the property owner is
impacted .... [are] an inordinate burden; one that should have been [born] by the
taxpayers or public-at-large . . .. [Wle don't feel that an arbitrary number, 10076,
2507o, 400o, no matter what the number is, [is appropriate.] [T]hat just throws it into
an issue of appraiser['s] [opinions] .... We think the circuit courts are well-equipped
to make these decisions. They are often called upon to interpret the common law.
What would a reasonable person do under similar circumstance? This is the type of
[decision] that a circuit court can make.
Id.
234. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2) (1995) ("The Legislature recognizes that some laws, regula-
tions, and ordinances of the state and political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately
burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State
Constitution or the United States Constitution.").
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3. The Property Rights Act as a Signal
The Property Rights Act should be viewed as a signal requiring land
use entities to reorient their organizational culture to be more respon-
sive to property owners' concerns and to act with more common
sense. The Property Rights Act was enacted in a populist and reform-
ist political climate, which fostered reform of administrative proce-
dures in general.2 35 The directive of the Property Rights Act, just as
the general directive of the entire 1995 Legislative session to all admin-
istrative agencies, called for more common sense, more reasonable ac-
tions, and more connectedness to people's problems. 23 6
When viewed as a whole, the innovative provisions of the Act are
the mechanisms that apply this directive. First, the settlement offer
requirement is a mechanism that requires the land use entity to focus
on the individual concerns of a property owner, to reassess its regula-
tion in light of the impacts on the particular property owner, and to
make an individualized counterproposal. 237 Whereas land use entities
previously made decisions on a broad basis, with relatively little con-
cern for individualized impacts, the Act now requires more individual
decisionmaking. Second, the ripeness decision innovation, granting
property owners much readier access to courts, is a response to
charges of delayed decisionmaking and its detrimental impact upon
individuals.23
4. The Property Rights Act Does Not Adopt Any Particular
Theory of Property
The single most important fact arising from the available legislative
history is that the Act was a compromise among interest groups with
widely divergent views. 39 During the work of the ad hoc committee
drafting the legislation, no particular group was able to prevail over
another in securing a radical redefinition of compensable property
rights. 240 Rather, the group rejected more drastic alternative models.
235. See supra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 279-84, 334-45 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 285-86, 295-98 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 5.
240. Note, however, that the definition of "existing use" was amended by way of a technical
amendment, in the waning hours of the Legislative session, after the Legislature's nearly unani-
mous approval of the bill. The definition was expanded to add the second sentence of section
1(3)(b), which now recognizes non-speculative, reasonably foreseeable use as a compensable "ex-
isting use." FLA. STAT. §§ 70.001(2), (3)(b) (1995). It is not clear whether all members of the ad
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For example, the committee did not consider legislation that would
have imposed a formulaic approach to the takings balancing-fairness
test.2' With the Act, the Legislature certainly created additional enti-
tlements that benefit property owners. 242 But these additional entitle-
ments should not be viewed as representing an intention to make any
fundamental changes as to what comprises "property," to announce a
fundamental political shift in favor of property owners, or to free
property owners from the constraints and protections of zoning and
environmental laws. 243
hoc group were aware of this last minute amendment (called by some a "midnight amend-
ment"), or that the majority of legislators were aware of the importance of the "technical"
amendment. Compare version passed by voice vote in the House of Representatives with final
version, FLA. H.R. Jous. 1050 (Reg. Sess. May 2, 1995); see also infra note 291.
241. The proposal, contained in the 1994 legislation and revisited in HB 1381, was that any
government regulation that resulted in a diminution of economically viable use by 25% would be
deemed a taking. Fla. HB 1381 (1995).
242. Property can be viewed as a series of entitlements protected by legal rules. Society
makes choices as to which group to grant legal entitlements, based on policy choices such as
efficiency, fairness, or income redistribution. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 128, at 1089-
1990. The enactment of the Property Rights Act represents a "windfall" in favor of property
owners because, under the Act, property owners are now entitled to claim compensation for
regulatory actions that do not rise to the level of a taking. See supra note 27.
243. There is a class conflict character to the property rights movement. See supra notes 24-
28 and accompanying text; see also Medema, supra note 181, at 48 ("The choice of a particular
rule serves several functions, the most important of which are the resolution of the problem of
order, the obfuscation of loss, legitimation, and psychic balm. In the face of radical indetermi-
nacy, the law establishes order, or social control."); Warren J. Samuels & Nicholas Mercuro,
The Role of the Compensation Principle in Society, in LAW AND EcoNoMwcs: AN INsTrrroNAL
PERSPECTrVE, 210-47 (Warren J. Samuels & Alan A. Schmidt eds., 1981). At some level, those
whose wealth is concentrated in real property are resentful of land use laws that inhibit their
ability to exploit the commodity value of their land. They feel that growth management and
environmental laws benefit primarily those whose wealth is not concentrated in land, but con-
centrated mainly in intangibles, such as stocks or intellectual property (a law degree for exam-
ple). Such "elites" should pay for the benefits that they derive from growth management and
environmental laws. Accord Harris, Interview One, supra note 5. This anti-elite sentiment is also
a basic tenet of populist ideology. See supra note 59; compare James V. DeLong, It's My Land
Isn't It?, N. Y. Tma~s, March 15, 1995, at A-10;
Yet it is easy for many proponents of regulation to [oppose pro-property rights legisla-
tion]. After all, real estate means little to them. Their estate lies in their professional
degrees, connections or civil service job protection-possessions that are shielded from
appropriation. They don't understand the fear and anger of people whose economic
well-being and very identity is bound up with their land
Id.; with Dan Gordon, Want a Toxic Dump Next Door? N. Y. TiwES, March 15, 1995, at A-10.
The advocates of these laws seem to have ignored the cliche that the factors that most
affect home values are location, location and location. An incinerator built close by or
polluted water will immediately reduce home values in a neighborhood. Coastal pro-
tection and wetland laws protect property values by keeping communities attractive
and by buffering floods and ocean storms. A band of wetlands along the coast invari-
ably increases the value of homes behind it. So under the new anti-regulation agenda,
homeowners' property values are threatened. Also, the sheer cost of paying property
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There are many competing political theories of property rights, and
the choice of a political theory will influence the outcome of a takings
challenge.'" For example, in addition to the classical view of property
rights 45 there is the utilitarian approach, which takes a Benthamite
view of human behavior. Utilitarianism assumes that, in the long run,
most people are self-interested actors who will act in rational ways.
246
For utilitarians, "property is nothing but a basis of expectation-the
expectation of deriving advantages from a thing, which we are said to
possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards
it.' 7 Applying the utilitarian approach to takings law, one can for-
mulate a clear political framework: results should maximize total util-
ity of all society24 and, wherever possible, the takings test should
result in outcomes that are predictable so that rational actors can ad-
just their behavior.2 49 Consequently, uncompensated takings should be
limited to those which society as a whole can view as beneficial.
2 0
On the other hand, a communitarian view of property rights recon-
structs property as the rights determined by the political process.
251
Government's function is to mediate between competing and often
owners for their claims and the specter of continual litigation would dramatically un-
dermine our environmental and zoning laws.
Id.
244. See supra notes 202-209 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 26.
246. JEREMY BENTHAM, THt THEORY OF LEGISLATION 92, 90 (1975).
247. Id.
248. Id; see, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 128, at 1096 (justifying eminent domain
power as a method of minimizing transaction costs and avoiding the holdout problem); Ellick-
son, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 129, at 723-38 (rejecting zoning regulations as generally
inefficient).
249. This is the public investment issue raised by law and economics scholars such as Susan
Rose-Ackermann, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen. Law and economics scholars have been
particularly concerned as to how the unpredictability of the exercise of the takings power can
affect investment decisions of individual property owners. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 24;
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 203; Thomas tlen, The Public Use of Private Property: A Dual
Constraint Theory of Efficient Governmental Takings, in LAW AND ECONOMCS PERSPECTIVES ON
TmE TAxINos IssuE, supra note 24, at 163.
250. Michelman, supra note 23, at 1224.
251. See generally, Sax, supra note 207 (property is interconnected and mutually dependent);
Robert Reich, The New Property, 73 YA.LE L. J. 733, 771 (1964) (property rights create areas of
independence and self-reliance which the majority democratic process should protect); Margaret
J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 957 (1982) (courts should protect the area
of "personhood" from incursion by the majority and other property owners); Frank I. Michel-
man, Property As a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981) (property rights
are political rights affecting democratic participation); Rose, supra note 130, at 593-99 (property
rights include civic responsibilities which may require property owners to sacrifice and bear
losses); Robin P. Malloy, A Classical Liberal Critique of Takings Law: A Struggle Between
Individualist and Communitarian Norms, in LAW AND ECONOMCS PERSPECTIVES ON THE TAK-
twos IssuE, supra note 24, at 199-215.
362 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:315
conflicting private uses. 25 2 The political process validates controversial
land use regulations. 213 Applying this theory to takings law, the state
can regulate property for public benefit, except when there are impor-
tant countervailing policies, such as ensuring that the police power is
not exercised arbitrarily.2 54
Consider what would likely happen if the Property Rights Act were
construed to select a theory of property rights that substantially favors
real property owners, such as the classical utilitarian Hobbesian view
championed by Professor Epstein.255 From a classical viewpoint, prop-
erty consists of a bundle of rights minimally including possession, use,
and the right to exclude and to dispose rights which the owner is free
to exercise in the manner she wishes. The role of courts and the law is
to protect private property rights and owners' liberty interests in exer-
cising such rights, so that individuals can freely pursue their profit-
maximizing strategies .256 Any governmental restriction on this princi-
pal bundle of rights that cannot be justified on clear efficiency
grounds is a taking for which just compensation must be paid by the
government.
217
If the Property Rights Act were interpreted to adopt this view, it
would cause either a massive redistribution of wealth to private real
property owners from state and local governments and taxpayers or
the virtual cessation of issuance of land use regulations. Under the
current growth management system, local land use entities routinely
make decisions that restrict the ability of property owners to use their
property and exploit its economic value. For example, zoning has
been characterized as a form of regulatory action that enables prop-
erty owners to preserve their value in land by excluding certain uses,
such as operation of a noisy, dirty factory that would depress adjoin-
ing land values. 218 Every time a land use entity issues a land
252. See Sax, supra note 207.
253. Not all scholars rely on the political process as a justification of the communitarian
view of property, but instead rely on their original insight as the basis for justifying actions by
the majority. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 251 (relying on the moral importance of personhood);
Reich, supra note 251 (positing that property is necessary for individuals to remain independent
and to preserve dignity); Sax, supra note 207 (viewing property as an interdependent network);
Rose, supra note 130 (viewing property as a civic responsibility).
254. See supra note 163.
255. EPsTEN,, TAKiNos, supra note 26, at 65, 177, 257-59, 297-99.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. The utilitarian justification for zoning is based on preventing "harmful externalities
(which would] decrease the utility and thus the values of neighboring property." Ellickson, Al-
ternatives to Zoning, supra note 129, at 687-90. However, the evidence as to whether zoning
preserves property value is mixed. See generally, WnL ki A. FiscIxL, Do GROWTH CONTROLS
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development order that forbids or impairs a use, at least one property
owner is prevented from realizing the potential use of her property,
while at least one other is able to preserve her land value. 59 That is,
each land use regulatory action results in winners and losers. Under
the Property Rights Act, every "loser" could attempt to claim com-
pensation,m while the government would not necessarily be able to
claim the increase in value given to another property owner by the
same regulatory actions. If the state and local government had to
compensate every "loser," then "state and local governments could
not go on.''261 Alternatively, government would either have to desist
radically from enacting additional land use regulations or attempt to
tax the increases in value attributable to regulatory action so that it
could fund compensation for losses. The latter alternative would be
administratively costly and burdensome and would radically increase
the "presence" of government in citizens' lives. 62
Neither alternative was intended. Even the sparse legislative history
of the Act makes clear that the Act was not intended to affect
Florida's growth management or environmental laws.263 Clearly the
overall thrust of the legislative session was to simplify government,
not to push local governments towards more cumbersome and com-
plex regulation. 264 Moreover, no comment in the debate, no legislative
report, and no public statements by government officials involved in
the ad hoc committee indicate an intent to shift significant public
MATTER? A REVIEw OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENEsS AND EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAND UsE REGU.ATION (1990) (empirical evidence was inconclusive); Macmillen &
McDonald, Could Zoning Have Increased Land Values in Chicago?, 33 J. URB. ECON. 167, 168
(1993) (study of Chicago property values showed no increase in property values following zon-
ing); Patrick Beaton, The Impact of Regional Land-Use Controls on Property Values: The Case
of the New Jersey Pinelands, LAND ECON. 172 (May 1, 1991) (study of growth management
controls in New Jersey Pinelands area showed increase in value of developed residential property
in the growth-controlled areas). Professors Epstein and Ellickson have argued that the tort law
of nuisance is all that is needed in land use to mediate disputes between conflicting land uses. See
EpsTEN, TAsxNGS, supra note 26, at 224-62; RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (1995) [hereinafter SIMPLE RuLEs].
259. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
260. The only exception under the classical view, reflected in the Property Rights Act, is
where a land development regulation prohibits a nuisance or a noxious use. See FLA. STAT. §
70.001(3)(e) (1995).
261. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
262. Consider how complex a task it is for local governments to keep property values on
local tax rolls current. The task is so administratively onerous that property tax assessments
consistently lag behind market values, even though it is clearly to the advantage of local govern-
ments to keep property values current since this would increase tax revenues.
263. In the Senate debate, the sponsor of the Act, Sen. Mackey unequivocally states in his
closing argument that the Act is not intended to have any drastic effect on growth management
and environmental laws.
264. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
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resources from taxpayer-financed land use entities to private property
owners. 265 Moreover, no fundamental redefinition of property rights
could have been intended if a legislature as diverse as Florida's passed
this Act with near unanimity.
2
6
Rather, the Legislature granted this additional entitlement as an
acknowledgment that the current scheme of property entitlements was
not satisfactorily meting out "fairness." Again, it is up to courts to be
"fair" in balancing. The Property Rights Act, like the past seventy-
five years of takings common law, does not select any political theory
to provide guidance to courts in balancing the interests of the many
against the property rights of the individual.
B. A Walk Through the Act
This part of the Article briefly describes how a potential claimant
and a land use entity would proceed under the Act.
1. The Claim
Consider the following hypothetical case. In the County of Mithica,
Florida, local land use officials'O have ordered an exhaustive study of
what the county needs to do to conserve Lake Purewater, which pro-
vides most of the drinking water for the residents of the county. The
county's comprehensive plan includes a goal to conserve the quality of
the drinking water and to preserve the ecological viability of Lake
Purewater. The study of Lake Purewater, now completed, concludes
that current densities around Lake Purewater should not be increased
in order to assure the purity of the lake's drinking water.
265. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 6. The Legislature did not allocate any funding to land use entities when
it enacted the Act, even though the potential monetary effect of the Act is in the billions of
dollars. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The Act provides that its application is pro-
spective, applying only to new regulations or amendments. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(12) (1995). This
provision could put off indefinitely the application of the Property Rights Act if it is interpreted
to mean that any land use regulation issued under the growth management laws is an application
of an existing law, and not a new land use regulation. However, this is an extreme interpretation
of this provision and one that would be contrary to the interpretation of the Act as a signal to
regulatory agencies to mend their organizational culture. Nonetheless, at some time the wealth
transfer effects due to the compensation provision in the Property Rights Act will have to be
confronted. Concerns regarding funding surfaced in the subcommittee meetings of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and Committee on Community Affairs, when the Florida Association of
Counties and Florida League of Cities opposed the Act. See Fla. S. Judiciary Comm., tape
recording of proceedings (April 19, 1995) (on file with comm. secretary) [hereinafter Fla. S.
Judiciary Comm. tape]; Fla. S. Comm'y Aff. Comm. tape, supra note 233.
267. These officials would most likely be members of the local planning board and the local
water management district. For purposes of discussion of the hypothetical, I will assume that the
only officials involved are the members of the Mithica planning commission.
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On October 1, 1996, the Mithica County Planning Commission
"downzones" a three-mile band around the perimeter of Lake Pure-
water to a low-density conservation zone. No new construction will be
permitted, but existing uses will be grandfathered. Six months ago,
Growth Inc. (Growth) purchased fifty acres, twenty acres of which
front on Lake Purewater, to develop a project consisting of a fifty-
unit condominium (the Project). The price Growth paid reflected the
value of the land to Growth if it could develop it at the highest use for
Growth-building the Project. Growth has not yet applied for any
permits and no county official has acted in such a way that would give
rise to a vested right that Growth could claim. Nonetheless, Growth
has invested significant development costs in the Project.
Although Growth's attorneys believe that Growth could have a tak-
ings claim, Growth decides to proceed under the Property Rights
Act. 26 Accordingly, Growth files a written claim with the head of the
county planning commission and all other pertinent government agen-
cies. 269 The claim includes the following: 1) a statement that Growth is
the title holder 270 of the parcel; 2) a description of how the change in
zoning classification "permanently" and "directly" 271 frustrates
268. Growth would have to exhaust numerous local administrative procedures to meet ripe-
ness requirements necessary to file a takings claim. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying
text. Therefore, Growth, like any other rational property owner, would probably opt first for
the procedures offered under the Property Rights Act. Under the Act, Growth can, within six
months, and at relatively low cost, secure a "final decision" from the land use entity that, under
a worst case scenario, would render Growth's compensation claim "ripe" under the Act or, at
best, secure a favorable remedy.
269. It is the property owner's responsibility to file a claim with the appropriate government
agencies, although a land use entity can also notify another entity whose active participation may
be required. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1995). There is actually an incentive for agencies to in-
volve other land use entities that may have responsibility for impairing the existing use of the
property, since the land use entity's potential financial liability to the property owner will be
reduced to the extent a circuit court finds other land use entities are responsible for the property
owner's inordinate burden. See Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
270. Under the Act, only persons who hold legal title may file a claim. Id. § 70.001 (3)(f).
271. The Act defines "inordinate burden" as:
an action of one or more governmental entities [that] directly restrict[s] or limit[s] the
use of real property such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the
reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or
a vested right to a specific use of the real property with respect to the real property as
a whole, or that the property owner is left with existing or vested uses that are unrea-
sonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a
burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the
public at large. The terms "inordinately burden" or "inordinately burdened" do not
include temporary impacts to real property occasioned by governmental abatement,
prohibition, prevention, or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a nox-
ious use of private property. . ..
Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
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Growth's "reasonable, investment-backed expectations ' 272  or leaves
Growth with an existing use2 73 that is unreasonable 7 4 with respect to
the property "as a whole"; 271 and 3) a description of losses2 76 incurred
by Growth as evidenced by a real estate appraiser's report 277 stating
the fair market value of the parcel before and after downzoning
27 8
2. The Settlement Offer
The county planning commission must now make a "settlement of-
fer" within the next 180 days.279 The planning commission will
272. Id.
273. The Act defines "existing use" as:
an actual, present use or activity on the real property . or such reasonably foreseea-
ble, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for the subject real property and com-
patible with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in
the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on
the real property.
Id. § 70.001(3)(b).
274. An existing use is unreasonable when "the property owner bears permanently a dispro-
portionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be
borne by the public at large." Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
275. Id.
276. Business damages are excluded from the compensation calculation. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
277. See id. § 70.001(4)(a). The Act contains no requirement for professional certification of
the appraiser, a precaution normally observed in commercial real estate transactions.
278. See id.
279. Id. § 70.00(4)(c). The Act specifies what a government agency must do in extending a
settlement offer as follows:
During the 180-day-notice period, unless extended by agreement of the parties, the
governmental entity shall make a written settlement offer to effectuate:
1. An adjustment of land development or permit standards or other provisions con-
trolling the development or use of land.
2. Increases or modifications in the density, intensity, or use of areas of develop-
ment.
3. The transfer of developmental rights.
4. Land swaps or exchanges.
5. Mitigation, including payments in lieu of onsite mitigation.
6. Location on the least sensitive portion of the property.
.7. Conditioning the amount of development or use permitted.
8. A requirement that issues be addressed on a more comprehensive basis than a
single proposed use or development.
9. Issuance of the development order, a variance, special exception, or other ex-
traordinary relief.
10. Purchase of the real property, or an interest therein, by an appropriate govern-
mental entity.
11. No changes to the action of the governmental entity.
Id. This description does not specify whether the settlement offer is the result of a bargaining
process between the property owner and the government agency or a single offer. Nonetheless, a
bargaining process is contemplated by the Act:
Any proposed settlement offer or any proposed ripeness decision, except for the final
written settlement offer or the final written ripeness decision, and any negotiations or
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review20 its earlier decision to determine whether, given its statutory
obligations and existing laws,28' it can modify its earlier decision in a
way that will lessen the burden of the regulation on the individual
property owner.1
28
After careful review, the planning commission decides that the
study is very clear that the county's water supply will be jeopardized if
additional building is permitted around the lake. The planning
rejections in regard to the formulation either of the settlement offer or the ripeness
decision, are inadmissible in the subsequent proceeding established by this section ex-
cept for the purposes of the determination pursuant to this paragraph.
Id. § 70.001(6)(c)3 (emphasis added). A bargaining process may be advantageous to both parties
since it would facilitate the exchange of information about the property and the offers they
would have been willing to accept. See infra note 337.
280. Whether this process is a review or reconsideration is not expressly provided in the Act.
However, this 180-day settlement offer period can be viewed as a "cooling-off" period during
which local governments can reconsider their decisions, removed from the political pressures
generated at the moment the decision was initially made.
281. A government agency must obey its enabling act and existing laws and regulations. In
addition, during this bargaining process, land use entities should be aware of the common law
doctrine of contract zoning, which prohibits a land use entity from contracting away their police
power. The policy behind this doctrine is a concern for arbitrariness and subversion of local
processes in favor of influential parties able to exact concessions from local governments. The
police power can be exercised only in the interest of the whole community. See Hartnett v. Aus-
tin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818,
821-22 (N.Y. 1981) ("Because no municipal government has the power to make contracts that
control or limit it in the exercise of its legislative powers and duties, restrictive agreements made
by a municipality in conjunction with a rezoning are sometimes said to violate public policy.");
Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251 (2d Dist. Ili. 1972) ("When zoning is condi-
tioned upon collateral agreements or other incentives supplied by a property owner, the zoning
officials are placed 'in the questionable position of bartering their legislative discretion for emol-
uments that had no bearing on the merits of the requested amendment.' "); see generally Judith
W. Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements,
and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. Rav. 957, 983-84
(1987) (contract zoning and spot zoning are in essence a substantive due process and procedural
due process judicial review).
282. The final "settlement offer" is to be taken into consideration by the court if negotia-
tions fail and the property owner proceeds to seek compensation for "inordinate burden" com-
pensation under the Act. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(a) (1995) ("The circuit court shall determine
... considering the settlement offer . . . [whether] the governmental entity . . . inordinately
burdened the real property.") The "settlement offer" is also considered in the award of attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party in subsequent litigation under the Act. The Act provides that
"the property owner is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney [sic] fees . . . if the
property owner prevails in the action and the court determines that the settlement offer ... did
not constitute a bona fide offer to the property owner which reasonably would have resolved the
claim .. " Id. § 70.001(6)(c)l. Similarly, the land use entity may be awarded attorney's fees
and costs if "the property owner did not accept a bona fide settlement offer. Id. § 70.00
(6)(c)2.
These types of penalties would encourage the land use entity to make a settlement offer that it
could defend as reasonable in court. It will not necessarily be the entity's "best offer," since the
agency will anticipate that the court, and other parties, will use the agency's "settlement offer"
as a starting point for settlement negotiations in any ensuing litigation proceedings.
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commission would consider offering to purchase the land or making a
land swap, but since no funds are available,', 3 its settlement offer to
Growth is that it cannot make any change in zoning classification.
2 s4
3. Ripeness Decision
At the same time, as required by the Act, the planning commission
issues a "ripeness decision," in which the planning commission states
1) that Growth's intended use of the parcel is not permitted under the
present zoning classification and 2) what uses are allowable under the
new zoning classification. 285 Whether or not the planning commission
complies with issuing the "ripeness decision," as a matter of law,
Growth's claim will be deemed ripe for purposes of seeking compen-
sation under the Act. 286
4. Going to Court
Growth, dissatisfied with the planning commission's settlement of-
fer and ripeness decision, files a claim under the Act in the circuit
court of Mithica County, where the property is located. 287 The well-
pleaded complaint alleges the facts contained in Growth's initial writ-
ten claim to the planning commission, describes the planning commis-
sion's settlement offer and ripeness decision, and asserts that Growth
283. There is no funding for local entities under the Act, although funding was recom-
mended by the 1994 Property Rights Report and the 1975 Property Rights Report. See 1994
PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 91-92; 1975 PROPERTY RGHTS REPORT, supra note
3, at 8. The only funds available for purchase of environmentally sensitive land would be under
one of Florida's land acquisition programs, such as the Conservation and Recreation Lands
(CARL) program which gives local governments grants to buy land in their own communities.
FLA. STAT. § 259.032 (1995).
284. This is an enumerated settlement option. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(c)l 1 (1995) ("No
changes to the action of the governmental entity.").
285. See id. § 70.001(5)(a) ("[t]he governmental entit[y] ... issue[s] a ripeness decision iden-
tifying the allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.") (emphasis added).
286. See id. § 70.001(5)(a).
The failure of the governmental entity to issue a written ripeness decision during the
180-day-notice period shall be deemed to ripen the prior action of the governmental
entity, and shall operate as a ripeness decision that has been rejected by the property
owner. The ripeness decision, as a matter of law, constitutes the last prerequisite to
judicial review, and the matter shall be deemed ripe or final for the purposes of the
judicial proceeding created by this section, notwithstanding the availability of other
administrative remedies.
Id. (emphasis added). "If the property owner rejects the settlement offer and the ripeness deci-
sion of the governmental entity or entities, the property owner may rile a claim for compensation
in the circuit court." Id. § 70.001(5)(b). Thus, the property owner need not apply for variances
or exceptions, propose a less intensive use, or await a final decision, as required under current
takings common law. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
287. Id. § 70.001(5)(b).
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has rejected these. 28 Growth must prove the elements of its claim: 1)
that the land use entity's action is responsible for 2) an inordinate bur-
den on the existing use of the property.2 9
There is a two-tier fact-finding process in the litigation. First, the
court must determine whether the land use entity's actions have cre-
ated an inordinate burden by considering, among other things, the set-
tlement offer and the ripeness decision. The court must analyze2'9
whether the subject property has an "existing use," which can be ei-
ther 1) an actual present use or activity, or 2) the potential, nonspecu-
lative use of the property, if suitable to the property and compatible
with neighboring properties. 9' Additionally, the court must analyze
whether, considering the settlement offer and ripeness decision, the
land use entity "inordinately burdened" the existing use. There is an
"inordinate burden ' 92 when 1) the property owner is permanently
unable to attain her reasonable, investment-backed expectations for
the existing use of her property (or vested right), with respect to the
property as a whole, or 2) the property owner is left with an existing
use (or vested right) that is unreasonable, which is defined as a gov-
ernmental action that places a disproportionate burden on an existing
use that, in all fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole. An
288. The Act requires that the landowner reject the land use entity's settlement offer in order
to file suit. See id. The Act does not require that the property owner's rejection of the settlement
offer be reasonable. Id. If the county had made a settlement offer that was more advantageous
to the land owner than the original decision, then the land owner could file a claim based on the
land use entity's original decision. However, the court would be directed to consider the subse-
quent settlement offer in reaching its decision. Id.
289. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e), (6)(b) (1995). It is not clear whether the property owner
would also have to show that the property owner's desired use is not subject to a common law
nuisance or noxious use exception, or if the exceptions are defenses that the governmental entity
would have to prove. See id. § 70.001(3)(e) ("The terms 'inordinate burden' or 'inordinately
burdened' do not include ... impacts to real property occasioned by governmental abatement,
prohibition, prevention, or remediation of a public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of
private property .... ").
290. See id. § 70.001(6)(a). The circuit court shall determine whether an existing use of the
real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property existed and, if so, whether,
considering the settlement offer and ripeness decision, the governmental entity or entities have
inordinately burdened the real property. Id.
291. For the definition of "existing use," see supra note 273. Clause (ii) of the existing use
definition was added in the last minute "technical amendment." See supra note 240. This clause
has great potential for abuse. Consider that developers purchase land for its potential use, not
for its actual use, and at the urban fringes development of any undeveloped parcel will be "suit-
able" for the property and "compatible" with neighboring properties. Hence this clause will
increase pressure for urban sprawl, which is against the policies of Florida growth management
laws. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3180 (1995).
Moreover, the line between "speculative" and "more speculative" potential uses will be diffi-
cult for the courts to draw. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560,
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
292. For the definition of "inordinate burden," see supra note 271.
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inordinate burden does not include a restriction on use that would be
considered a public nuisance or a noxious use.
If the court does find a compensable claim, it will impanel a jury of
twelve members to determine compensation based on the loss in fair
market value caused by the regulation's prohibition or curtailment of
the existing use.2 93
C. Marching into the Interpretive Swamp: Using the Compass
The following applies the interpretive compass2 9 to three key issues
that likely would arise in the Mithica hypothetical set forth in Part B
(Scenario 1). The first issue is what the Mithica County Planning
Commission must do to comply with the "ripeness decision" require-
ment. The second issue is how the court should evaluate the planning
commission's "ripeness decision" and "settlement offer" if Growth
litigates its compensation claim. The third issue is whether a court
should find that the Mithica County Planning Commission placed an
inordinate burden on Growth.
1. The Ripeness Decision Requirement
As discussed earlier, the Act's ripeness provision requires the Mith-
ica County Planning Commission to provide Growth with a statement
clarifying allowable uses within 180 days of filing a compensation
claim. 295 But what is required if a land use entity does not have suffi-
cient information or requires other studies or input to make a final
determination?
296
293. The Act provides that "[t]he award of compensation shall be determined by calculating
the difference in the fair market value of the real property, as it existed at the time of the gov-
ernmental action at issue, as though the owner had the ability to attain the reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation or was not left with uses that are unreasonable, whichever the case may
be, and the fair market value of the real property, as it existed at the time of the governmental
action at issue, as inordinately burdened, considering the settlement offer together with the ripe-
ness decision, of the governmental entity or entities." FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b) (1995). The
jury's compensation findings will overlap with the court's "inordinate burden" findings. The
jury will have to determine 1) the existing use, and 2) whether the existing use is reasonable, or
the governmental action interfered with the property owner's reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectations. Thus, this two-tier fact-finding process is inefficient.
294. See supra 219-66 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
296. If the study Mithica had commissioned had been inconclusive and required further
tests, Mithica should place a moratorium on further development, and not permanently down-
zone to a conservation use. The Act applies only to a "permanent" denial of an existing or
reasonable use, see FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995), so under a moratorium, Growth would not
be able to bring a complaint under the Act, unless it could show that the moratorium was a de
facto permanent change in zoning classification, or that it was unreasonable. See First English
Evangelical Church v. Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 906 (1989), remanded by, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
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Adding to Scenario I, suppose that aggressive opposition by prop-
erty owners leads the Mithica County Planning Commission to review
the conservation zoning of the perimeter around Lake Purewater. The
planning commission orders additional scientific studies of the effect
of further development around Lake Purewater on the drinkability of
the water. Meanwhile, it does not change the conservation zone classi-
fication. Growth then files a claim under the Act. These additional
facts create Scenario II.
The Act requires a ripeness decision regardless of circumstances;
29 7
so, under Scenario II, Mithica should issue a decision even if it has
insufficient information. 98 Mithica's ripeness decision would be based
on the information available at that time-the scientific studies al-
ready completed. Its ripeness decision would indicate that the allowa-
ble uses for Growth's parcel are conservation only and that no
construction would be permitted. But Mithica should go beyond this
answer. If the Property Rights Act is construed as a signal to land use
entities to act "commonsensibly" and be more responsive to property
owners' concerns, the land use entity should provide all relevant infor-
mation in its response. The ripeness decision should also indicate that
the planning commission will review the conservation zoning classifi-
cation upon completion of further studies. Further, if the ripeness
provisions are viewed as a reaction to takings law, land use entities
should view the ripeness decision requirement as a directive to arrive
as expeditiously as possible at a "final determination" of allowable
uses. Thus, where an immediate final decision is not issued, the ripe-
ness decision should ideally bind the agency to issue a decision by a
particular date or at least indicate the approximate time frame in
which the planning commission would expect to be able to complete
its reconsideration.
2. The Court's Evaluation of the Ripeness Decision and
Settlement Offer
Given the interpretive model, the court should review the ripeness
decision and settlement offer both procedurally and substantively.
Specifically, the court should determine whether Mithica acted reason-
ably, and in good faith, in rendering its ripeness decision and
297. The Act only provides that the land use entity must issue a ripeness decision within 180
days. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a) (1995).
298. This would be the cautious approach. Mithica's failure to issue a ripeness decision could
affect the court's inordinate burden determination if the claim proceeds to litigation. Addition-
ally, if the property owner prevails the court could award the property owner court costs and
attorney's fees. See supra note 282.
19951
372 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:315
settlement offer. The court should then substantively assess whether
the allowable use set forth in the ripeness decision and settlement of-
fer is so limited as to constitute an inordinate burden.
299
In both Scenario I and Scenario II, Mithica issued a ripeness deci-
sion and settlement offer reasonably and diligently. In Scenario II,
although Mithica did not issue a definitive ripeness decision, it did
what was reasonable under the circumstances by binding itself to
make a final determination by a particular date. Therefore, the court
should find that the planning commission's actions did not create an
inordinate burden on Growth under the procedural prong of its re-
view. If, on the other hand, Mithica had not issued a ripeness decision
at all, even though it had the information available as to what uses
were allowable, then the court should weigh this factor against Mith-
ica in its inordinate burden determination.
3. Inordinate Burden Analysis
In making the inordinate burden determination, the court would
first determine the existing use, which is either 1) the actual, present
use of the property prior to the Mithica conservation rezoning, °° or 2)
the reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative use suitable for the prop-
erty and compatible with adjacent land uses.3 °0 Under the first prong
of the existing use definition, Mithica's actual and present use of the
property is holding the property as it is, without any development on
it. Since the conservation rezoning would have the same result as
Growth's present use of the property, which is leaving the property
undeveloped, Mithica would not be able to sustain a claim under this
prong of the existing use definition.
Under the alternative definition of existing use, Growth's develop-
mental interest in the property would be protected if Growth is able to
establish that its intended development of the project is an "existing
use" under the Act. The Act sets forth the following requirements for
a future use of property to be considered an "existing use": the
299. When conducting the inordinate burden analysis the court is not limited to the original
governmental action that initiated the property owner's compensation claim. The court should
consider both the land use entity's original action and its response within the 180-day period
following the filing of petitioner's claim. The Act, however, seems to provide that the compensa-
tion award shall be based only on the property owner's original claim. See supra note 280.
300. Section 70.001(2) of the Act provides that "when a specific action. .. has inordinately
burdened an existing use of property . . . the property owner is . . . entitled to relief." FLA.
STAT. § 70.001(2) (1995). This phrasing indicates that, for purposes of determining inordinate
burden, the relevant timeline for the determination of existing use is the existing use prior to the
enactment of the regulatory action being challenged.
301. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b) (1995).
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development of the project must be 1) a reasonably foreseeable use of
the property, 2) nonspeculative, 3) suitable for the property, and 4)
compatible with adjacent property. 0 2
What is a reasonably foreseeable use? What type of future develop-
mental use is nonspeculative? And under what circumstances is a use
that will have environmental impact "suitable" for the property and
"compatible" with adjacent uses? The answers are not clear in this
hypothetical, as they are not likely to be clear in most cases.
Mithica would argue that the development of the condominium
project, a high-density use, in an environmentally sensitive area adja-
cent to Lake Purewater, which is the source of the drinking water for
the county, is not a reasonably foreseeable use of the property. Fur-
thermore, Mithica would argue that the scientific analysis shows that
such a high-intensity use of the property is not suitable for the prop-
erty and is not compatible with adjacent property since such use
would harm the purity of the lake's drinking water and would
threaten the viability of the community as a whole.
Growth, on the other hand, would argue that, given the informa-
tion available to it at the time that it purchased the property, its pro-
posed use of the property was a reasonably foreseeable use. Zoning
regulations permitted such a use, neighboring properties had been de-
veloped-albeit to a lesser extent-and there was no reason for Mith-
ica to believe that the environmental permits would not be obtainable.
No information available to Growth or any regulatory authority
would have indicated that Growth's proposed project would have any
impact on the lake's drinking water. Moreover, Growth would argue
that the proposed project is a suitable use of the property and compat-
ible with other adjacent property uses. It is not Growth's use of its
property that will negatively impact Lake Purewater; rather, it is the
cumulative impacts of all of the properties surrounding Lake
Purewater that threaten the viability of the lake's drinking water. If
other property owners are permitted to maintain their developments
around Lake Purewater and benefit from such use, Growth should
also be permitted to sustain a similar development. At the very least,
this would mean that Growth should be able to develop on its prop-
erty a project equivalent to the intensity of adjacent properties.
If a court were to turn to takings jurisprudence to resolve this issue,
Florida pre-Lucas takings cases would favor Mithica's position. These
cases have narrowly construed a property owner's reasonable expecta-
tions of use of property. A property owner is not entitled to the
302. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b) (1995).
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highest and best use of her property 3 Further, under the leading pre-
Lucas Florida takings case, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., a
court should not find it reasonable for a developer to expect to be able
to develop a project that has significant environmental impacts.
3t 4
Furthermore, Florida courts have applied Justice Kennedy's view ex-
pressed in Lucas3 1 that existing regulation and the expectation that
regulations will be modified should inform how a court construes a
property owner's reasonably foreseeable use.1°6
Assume, for purposes of our discussion, that a Florida court would
adopt a definition of existing use that would recognize Growth's de-
velopmental interest in the Project. The court would then proceed to
determine whether Mithica's rezoning to conservation classification
constitutes an inordinate burden. The inordinate burden determina-
tion involves a disjunctive two-prong test: 1) does the conservation
zoning restrict Growth's existing use so that Growth cannot perma-
nently attain its RIBEs (the expectancy prong), or 2) is the conserva-
tion use restriction unreasonable because it places an inordinate
burden on Growth that, in all fairness, should be borne by the entire
community of Mithica (the fairness prong)?3°7
Under the expectancy prong of the inordinate burden test, Growth
would be successful if it could show that the conservation rezoning
permanently frustrates its RIBEs. This inquiry would be similar to the
inquiry as to whether Mithica's future development of the project is
an "existing use" under the second prong of the existing use defini-
tion. In both cases, the court would have to determine whether the
property owner's desired use of the property is reasonable given the
303. See Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 1981); Lee County
v. Sunbelt Equities, 1I, 619 So. 2d 996, 1006 (2d DCA 1993) (citing Penn Central Transp. Corp.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
304. 399 So. 2d at 1382 ("[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change
the natural character of his land .... ) (citations omitted) see also Smith v. City of Clearwater,
383 So.2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
305. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in
response to changing conditions, and the courts must consider all reasonable expectations what-
ever their source.").
306. See Cason v. Florida Power Co., 76 So. 535 (Fla. 1917) ("All property is owned and
used subject to the laws of the land."); Namon v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 558
So.2d 504 (3d DCA 1990) (holding that constructive knowledge of existing regulatory scheme is
ascribed to the purchaser of property). But see Vatalaro v. Dept. of Envtl Reg., 601 So.2d 1223
(Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (holding that the property owner should not be ascribed with constrictive
knowledge of state wetlands regulations in effect at the time she purchased the property); Valerie
A. Collins, Vatalaro v. Department of Environmental Regulation: The Mysterious Takings Rule,
8 .1. LAND UsE & ENvaTL. L. 611 (1993).
307. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e) (1995).
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surrounding circumstances, including the regulatory terrain, and
whether such desired use is more than a mere expectation.3 0s
But it is the fairness prong of the inordinate burden test that would
be the most favorable to Growth under the facts set forth in our hypo-
thetical. The conservation zoning classification clearly benefits the
community of Mithica as a whole, because the rezoning will protect
the community's drinking water, which is a resource that is needed by
the entire community. However, only Growth is being forced to bear
the cost of ensuring the purity of the drinking water. No other prop-
erty owner around Lake Purewater is being required to curtail her
present use of property, nor is any property owner being required to
share in the costs of conserving the purity of Lake Purewater in other
ways. On the other hand, the loss to Growth is substantial. Growth
purchased the property with the expectation of developing the condo-
minium project. However, the rezoning to conservation forecloses
Growth from developing the condominium project or any other
lower-density development. Therefore, given the imbalance in the bur-
dens and benefits, a court should conclude that Mithica's zoning regu-
lation is unreasonable under the fairness prong of the inordinate
burden test.
However, Mithica's actions would not constitute an "inordinate
burden" if the court finds that Mithica's zoning ordinance prohibits a
public nuisance at common law or a noxious use of private prop-
erty.20
A public nuisance is very broadly defined; 310 it protects the public
interest in freedom from activities that 1) endanger or injure the
health, safety, or property of a considerable number of persons, or 2)
offend public morals. 1 Furthermore, nuisance analysis is very
308. See supra notes 167-97 and accompanying text.
309. It is not clear under the Act who has the burden of proof to show the existence or
nonexistence of a public nuisance exception.
310. See Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla.
1972) ("nuisance" is difficult to define comprehensibly and before the fact); United States v.
County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Miss. 1979) ("nuisance" incapable of
absolute definition).
311. Florida law defines a nuisance as "any place which tends to annoy the community or
injure the health of the community, or become manifestly injurious to the morals or manners of
the people ... or any place where the law of the state is violated." FLA. STAT. § 823.05 (1995).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8211(l) ("a public nuisance is an unreasonable interfer-
ence with a right common to the general public"); DAMNIL R. MANDELKER, PL INi- GAND CON-
TROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 48 (1992); William Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. RaV. 997, 999 (1966) ("[A] public nuisance is a species of catch-all low-grade criminal
offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large, which may
include anything from the blocking of a highway to a gaming house or indecent exposure.").
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flexible and ad hoc. '12 Florida's case law has been expansive in its de-
terminations of public nuisances. 3 In a well-reasoned article, Richard
Grosso and David Russ have characterized Florida cases as "put[ting]
governments in good stead when they are called upon to show the
'background principles of the law of property and nuisance.' "314 A
1939 Florida Supreme Court case, National Container Corp. v. State
ex rel Stockton, 1 supports the proposition that a public nuisance may
be found where an incompatible use would create a public environ-
mental harm. In Stockton, the plaintiff argued that the increased dis-
charge from a wood pulp and paper plant on the St. Johns River,
when added to the City of Jacksonville's poorly treated sewage, would
cause the level of pollutants to rise to dangerous levels. The court re-
lied on specific evidence and a series of inferences to find a causal link
between the wood pulp mill and the threat to a public resource, the St.
Johns River.316 Accordingly the court held that the wood pulp and
paper plant would be a public nuisance and granted an injunction pro-
hibiting construction of the plant. Hence, a court relying on Stockton
could find a public nuisance abatement exception that would exoner-
ate Mithica from inordinate burden liability.
The Act's reliance on the public nuisance exception to distinguish
acceptable governmental actions is ultimately circular and can easily
engulf the entire inordinate burden analysis."' The court's nuisance
312. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 154, at 265-68 (discussion of nuisance and takings law).
313. Cason v. Florida Power Co., 76 So. 535 (Fla. 1917); Sheip v. Amos, 130 So. 699 (Fla.
1930); Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 111 So. 801 (Fla. 1927); Rearer v.
Martin Theaters of Florida, Inc., 52 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1951); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc., v.
State ex rel. Powell, 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972); National Container Corp. v. State ex rel. Stock-
ton, 189 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1939).
314. Richard J. Grosso and David J. Russ, Takings Law in Florida: Ramifications of Lucas
and Reahard, 8 J. LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. 431, 463 (1993).
315. 189 So. 2d 4 (1939).
316. In finding that the State could enjoin the mill's polluting activities, the Court reasoned:
If the ... [mill] .. .discharge[s] . . .waste and refuse matter into the River which
will be highly toxic to . . . fish and aquatic life ... upon which the fish are accus-
tomed to feed and the result will be that the supply of fish in the river will be seriously
reduced .. .and commercial (fishing] . .. will [be] seriously and permanently dam-
aged and the facilities for pleasure will be thereby diminished, we think that it requires
no citation of authority to support the assertion that the state may enjoin ... even
before the damaging condition comes into being.
Id. at 13.
317. This circularity did not bother Justice Scalia in Lucas where he crafted a public nui-
sance exception to the "no economic use" category of per se takings. Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 n. 18 (1992). He clearly recognized that a similar balanc-
ing analysis would be undertaken by courts in a public nuisance analysis, but he reasoned that
such balancing would be constrained by "well-established" common law doctrine. Id. By con-
trast, he is much more skeptical of legislatures that balance the interests of the community
against private property owners. ld; see Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the
Takings Clause, 18 CoLutm. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).
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analysis is a balancing test: is the private property owner's use reason-
able, or should the property owner be prohibited from using and en-
joying her property as she wishes because of community concerns?
Not surprisingly, courts' outcomes are closely related to theories of
property rights" ' and policy concerns. 19
The public nuisance exception can yield results that would not be
satisfying from an equity perspective because of the inherent tension
in the interests that the court is balancing: 20 in the case of Mithica,
the public interest in protecting the community's drinking water
through the exercise of the police power versus Growth's private, but
substantial, losses. The whole community of Mithica benefits from
Growth's loss which goes uncompensated; the result is a negative re-
distributive impact on Growth.32' A justification for this outcome is
318. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (Brandeis, J. dis-
sent) (discussing that noxious fumes could be abated without compensation because the property
owner never had a right to inflict noxious fumes on his neighbors and therefore the regulation
was not a taking) with Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (Scalia, J.) (nuisance exception is based on
traditional notions of state property law).
319. Compare application of nuisance law based on efficiency notions, Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co. 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); EpsTEIN, TAxNqos, supra note 26, at 229-45; Cala-
bresi, supra note 117; Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 129, at 722-27; Polinsky,
Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32
STA. L. REv. 1075 (1980); Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63
VA. L. Rev. 1299 (1977); Comment, Internalizing Externalities: Nuisance Law and Economic
Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 219 (1978) with application of nuisance law based on communi-
tarian policies and Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis. 1972); Sax, supra note 207,
at 150-53; Michelman, supra note 23, at Sec. VD (nuisance law forces individual property owner
to give back to society what it was not entitled to take); see also Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercu-
les Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[Recent] economic analysis proceeds on the basis that the
goal of nuisance law is to achieve efficient and equitable solutions to the problems created by
discordant land uses ... [however] to so extend private nuisance beyond its historical role would
render it little more than an epithet.").
320. See Summers, supra note 149, at 876 (balancing of public versus private interests provides an
inadequate protection for private property rights because the governmental interest advanced is often
viewed by courts as being more important than the property rights of the individual).
321. Consider the following justifications for noncompensation based on fairness and
efficiency policy concerns. Professor Michelman proposes a balancing test that would consider
1) demoralization costs of regulations (for example, a regulation which takes away bargained-for
property rights may affect the whole community's perception of such unfair treatment), and 2)
the cost of compensating the "losers", including the transaction cost for each settlement. See
Michelman, supra note 23, at 1214-18. These costs should be balanced against the benefit of the
regulation. The case for noncompensation is strongest if demoralization and compensation costs
are low and efficiency gains are high. As stated by Professor Michelman, demoralization costs
can be low when the "disappointed claimant can appreciate how such regulatory decisions might
fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to property owners similarly
situated." See id. In this case, if Growth can appreciate that in the long run it will benefit from
the zoning ordinance and other ordinances like it, demoralization costs would be low, and a
result of noncompensation under the Mithica scenario can be justified.
Professor Ellickson differs with Professor Michelman's conclusion on demoralization costs.
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that a court should not attempt to balance the public interest in pro-
tecting the public, health, safety, and welfare of the community
against a private economic loss. 3 2" But this justification remains fun-
damentally inequitable when the losses are concentrated on one indi-
vidual and this loss virtually destroys the economic value of the
property owner's land.
In sum, the interpretive issues involved in the inordinate burden
analysis under the Act are no less daunting than regulatory takings
interpretive issues. Moreover, the inordinate burden analysis set up by
the Act would not necessarily protect property owners' interests more
effectively than has takings law. First, the inordinate burden test
could be interpreted to give land use entities a great deal of latitude,
especially if a court is loathe to second-guess the judgment of the land
use entity. The first prong of the disjunctive inordinate burden test
recognizes only the property owner's reasonable expectations. Hence,
courts could construe "reasonable expectations" to permit exercise of
the police power even when it impacts disproportionately on an indi-
vidual. The second prong of the inordinate burden test is in essence a
balancing test: how fair was the regulation given its impact on the
individual owner and the benefits gained by the community as a
whole? Only in extreme cases, such as the Mithica hypothetical, could
a court be clear as to whether the burden imposed on an individual is
"unfair" in view of the benefits to the community as a whole. Finally,
the public nuisance exception, essentially another balancing test,
permits courts to countenance restrictions of uses that can be shown
necessary to protect the public safety and welfare. Thus, although a
regulation is clearly an unfair burden on an individual property
owner, it could still fail to be compensable under the Act.
A better approach would be to focus on the reasonableness of the
government agency's action. The Property Rights Act directs land use
entities to be more accessible to citizens and more responsive to their
concerns. It further requires that land use decisions be less arbitrary
and that individuals' concerns be considered in the decisionmaking of
He sets forth a paradigm case for noncompensability that is similar to Professor Michelman's,
but emphasizes to a greater extent efficiency concerns. Professor Ellickson proposes noncom-
pensation when the following conditions are met: 1) the efficiency of the government program
that caused the loss is transparently obvious, 2) the administrative cost of compensation is high,
and 3) the losses suffered are small and widespread. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra
note 129, at 699-704. Professor Ellickson maintains that in a downzoning demoralization costs
are high because property owners view zoning decisions as random and subject to special influ-
ence in the zoning system. See id. at 700.
322. This justification focuses on an analysis of the justifiable exercise of the police power.
See Oswald, supra note 168, at 138-45; Sax, supra note 23.
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the land use entity. If this policy is emphasized, a court's inordinate
burden analysis should focus primarily on the reasonableness of the
exercise of the police power, which would de-emphasize attempts to
"balance" individual interests against community interests323 or deter-
mine when a property owner's economic expectations should be le-
gally cognizable.
A "reasonableness" review is a form of the substantive due process
review that originated with City of Euclid v. Ambrose Realty Co.
324
and has evolved into various forms in other areas of land use law.
3 2
Reasonableness review would require compensation if the court deter-
mines that the land use agency 1) fails to choose a means to imple-
ment the governmental purpose that was closely related to that
purpose, and 2) the regulation places an onerous and disproportionate
burden on a single property owner. a26 The court would ask several
questions. How over-inclusive or under-inclusive is the regulation in
attaining its purpose?327 Are other means to implement the regulation
available that would have been less intrusive or less burdensome to the
property owner's existing use?321 Can the governmental entity justify
323. Cf. Oswald, supra note 168 (arguing that the Penn Central economically viable use
factor and RIBEs are fraught with theoretical inconsistencies and open-ended questions; accord-
ingly, in applying the takings test courts should focus on how regulatory agencies exercised the
police power); see also Summers, supra note 149, at 882 (arguing that heightened ends-means
scrutiny is justified when a limited class of individuals may be burdened by a majority which
benefits form the regulation).
324. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
325. Contract zoning, spot zoning and subdivision cases involve unarticulated substantive
due process review. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Cederburg Contrac-
tors & Builders Assoc. v. City of Dunedin, 329 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1978); St John's County v.
Northwest Florida Builders Ass'n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1991); see generally Wegner supra
note 281. Takings cases frequently mix substantive due process and takings analysis. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Estuary Properties Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1381 (1981) (in applying takings factors
analysis the court concluded that the "regulation ... promotes the welfare of the public, pre-
vents a public harm, and has not been arbitrarily applied"); Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department
of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 626-27 (Fla. 1990) (court invalidated a statute as an unreasonable
regulation that had "taken" substantially all of the beneficial use of property."); see also supra
note 152.
326. This approach would be similar to the Dolan-Nollan test which requires 1) an "essential
nexus" between a dedication requirement (the government action) and the governmental pur-
pose, and 2) "rough proportionality" between the dedication requirement and the impacts
caused by the use of the land. The first prong is an inquiry into whether government action is
sufficiently related to the governmental purpose. The second prong is an inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the burden on the individual property owner. See generally Stoebuck, supra note
136, at 1058.
327. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
328. The purpose of a "less burdensome alternative" inquiry is to determine if the means
used by the land use entity "fit" the governmental purpose. The test would not require that the
land use entity choose the less burdensome means since that would in effect be usurping much of
the discretion needed by land use entities in exercising the police power.
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the reasonableness of the restrictions placed on the use of private
property?
329
Applying a reasonableness test to the Mithica hypothetical, the
court would examine the process by which Mithica enacted the zoning
ordinance. In addition to examining the scientific studies, the court
should ascertain both whether Mithica considered the impact of its
regulation on the property owners around the perimeter of Lake Pure-
water and whether Mithica considered alternative means of protecting
the lake other than the zoning regulation. If Mithica did consider all
these factors and still proceeded with the zoning conservation ordi-
nance, Mithica would still have to justify the reasonableness of a regu-
lation that burdens a single property owner's use of her property when
the benefits are gained by the community at large. From our informa-
tion, it does not appear that Mithica would be able to justify the bur-
dens imposed upon an individual property owner; thus, under this
"reasonableness" approach, a court could find that Mithica placed an
inordinate burden on Growth.
Such an approach would de-emphasize balancing, which, without
an articulated theoretical framework, would require courts to make
value choices in which individual interests pale compared to the public
interest. Admittedly, a reasonableness analysis is also subjective and
invites courts to second-guess the land use entity's decisions. Accord-
ingly, reasonableness review should be circumspect and courts should
intercede in land use administrative decisionmaking only where deci-
sions are clearly unjust or the land use entity clearly acted unreasona-
bly. However, under such an approach, the courts would not be
placed in the position of making policy choices in an area where ten-
sions cannot be easily reconciled; instead, courts would be exercising
their pragmatic judgment as to whether land use entities wield their
regulatory power reasonably. Outcomes would continue to be ad hoc,
but this result was intended by the Act.330
V. A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY: REGULATORY REFORM THAT DOESN'T
QUITE WORK
A fair law can be unfairly administered, even by those who seek in
good faith to achieve their perceived notions of public good. To
assist in alleviating this problem, the Legislature should carefully
examine and statutorily define its intent in enacting regulatory
329. This is in essence the second prong of the Act's inordinate burden test, which focuses
on burdens disproportionatly placed on individual property owners.
330. See Fla. S. Comm'y Aff. Comm. tape, supra note 233.
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legislation and should develop a greater sensitivity to administrative
costs and responsibilities required by regulatory programs.
3 '
1975 Property Rights Report
Part IV has used the content and legislative history of the Act to
provide a model for its interpretation. As discussed earlier, the Prop-
erty Rights Act identifies significant problems and offers some in-
triguing solutions. While the Act may have been modest and cautious
in its approach to reforming takings law, the Act is innovative and
bold in its attempt to reform the regulatory process. In an effort to
reform decisionmaking by land use regulatory bodies, the Property
Rights Act attempts to 1) make land use entities more accountable by
imposing costs for regulatory actions that create an inordinate burden
on private landowners, and 2) provide more flexibility by creating a
framework for decentralized decisionmaking.33 2 However, while the
impulse for reform may have been amply justified, the Legislature's
naive reform efforts will likely have unintended, unjust results.
A. Decentralized Decisionmaking
333
1. Settlement Offer as Decentralized Decisionmaking
The Act seeks to introduce flexibility into the land use regulatory
system by facilitating decentralized decisionmaking 3 4 A property
331. 1975 PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
332. This approach is another example of how the Act seeks to create reform without going
outside established frameworks. For instance, the Act does not seek to abolish zoning or growth
management controls, but instead seeks to reform the process by imposing marketike mechan-
isms. Free market analysts have argued that zoning is inefficient when compared to individual-
ized decisionmaking among private individuals. See generally Coase, supra note 128. They also
point to the high transaction costs of zoning schemes. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning,
supra note 129, at 719-725; WILLIAm A. FIscHEL, TEI EcONOMACS OF ZONING LAws: A PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH TO AhMRicAN LAND USE CONTROLS 30 (1985); ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING
AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE A&ERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND USE RoUtL3AON
(1977); Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 719 (1980).
333. When the land use entity is a state agency there may be an issue whether this type of
settlement offer process falls within the provisions of the Florida Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the Florida APA does not apply to
the settlement offer process. This appears to be the assumption of the ad hoc committee that
drafted the Act and of the legislators involved in the two Senate committee hearings, since no
comment reveals any concerns with this potential issue. See Fla. S. Judiciary Comm. tape, supra
note 258; Fla. S. Comm'y Aff. Comm. tape, supra note 233.
334. The opposite of decentralized decisionmaking is legal centrism, the belief that govern-
ment is the chief source of rules. Supporters of decentralized decisionmaking in certain kinds of
situations include Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 519 (1983), ROBERT C. EI.iCKSON, ORDER WrTHoUT LAW (1991),
and Robert Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentral-
ized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 214 (1994).
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owner need file only a written claim under the Act to trigger an obli-
gation on the part of the government entity to make a written settle-
ment offer to the property owner within 180 days. 35 The only initial
constraint precluding the property owner from filing a frivolous claim
is the requirement that the landowner attach a real estate appraiser's
opinion.
3 6
The events that follow are a form of legislatively directed bargain-
ing. 3." The Legislature implicitly instructs agencies to exercise wide
discretion and flexibility in fashioning a settlement offer. Specifically,
it directs agencies to fashion "appropriate relief necessary to prevent
the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the
real property.' '338 The Act even goes so far as to provide expressly that
an entity's settlement offer may "contraven[e] the application of a
statute as it would otherwise apply to the subject real property" so
long as the public interest served by the regulation is protected. 39 The
land use entity may offer "variance, special exception, or other ex-
traordinary relief ' 3 40 to the property owner. The Legislature lists addi-
tional alternatives, such as a land swap or outright purchase of the
property owner's rights or land.3' The Legislature lists only as the
very last option that the governmental entity may respond "no
change" to its original determination.
42
The negotiation process envisioned by the Act is to be a private
process devoid of input of the public at large.3 43 The notice require-
ments are limited to parties previously involved in any related admin-
istrative actions and contiguous property owners. The Act does not
require a general public notice that a bargaining process has been initi-
ated. 44 In general, no court or neutral third party need approve the
335. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1995); see supra notes 267-282 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
337. Although the Act does not mandate the format of the negotiation, the parties' igno-
rance as to each others' position will likely lead parties to opt for a process that enables them to
obtain more information about the other's claim, such as exchanging offers. See Robert Cooter
et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, II J. oF
LEGAL STU. 225 (1982); Daniel Fudenberg & John Tirole, Sequential Bargaining with Incom-
plete Information, 50 Rav. EcoN. STUD. 221 (1983); Lucian A. Bebchuck, Litigation and Settle-
ment Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404 (1984).
338. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)1 (1995).
339. Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2.
340. Id. § 70.001(4)(b)9. This kind of flexibility was also recommended by the 1975 Property
Rights Task Force. See 1975 PROPERTY RI Hrs REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
341. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(c)4, 10 (1995).
342. id. § 70.001(4)(c)1.
343. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
344. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(b) (1995).
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settlement offer; a neutral third party is introduced into the process
only if the proposed settlement offer contravenes a statute. 345
The Property Rights Act, then, sets up a very flexible, privately ori-
ented, and relatively unrestricted form of decentralized decision-
making.
2. Why Move Toward Decentralized Decisionmaking?
Free-market economists,34 as well as legal analysts sharing their
views, have argued that market mechanisms are superior to central-
ized governmental regulation in numerous ways.147 First, they note
that the market process is voluntary and thus can minimize the need
for governments to implement rules by coercion. Free-market econo-
mists, who would characterize growth management laws as central-
ized, top-down government, 34 argue that market mechanisms can,
345. Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2.
346. Economics is a form of analysis that is particularly powerful for analyzing legal rules.
See generally COoTER & ULEN, supra note 203; RICHARD POSNER, THE ECoNoAGcs OF JusTIcE
(1981). Economists make certain assumptions that have normative implications; for example,
markets maximize efficiency and individual or aggregate utility, and that individuals behave ra-
tionally when they seek to maximize their individual welfare. See Jom RAxws, A THEORY OF
JusTIcE 27-33 (1971).
347. CHARLES ScHULTzE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977); KErnETrH J. ARRow,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDrvauAL VAL Es (2d ed. 1963); GEOREo SnOxEa, THE CITIZEN AND THE
STATE (1965); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 129; Epstein, Property, supra note
116; EPsTEIN, SDAPLE RULES, supra note 258; Cooter, supra note 334, at 214.
348. The growth management laws could be viewed as a modified form of centralized "com-
mand and contrdl" lawmaking. Local governments are under legal obligation to develop local
comprehensive plans. The Local Growth Management Act sets forth in great detail what the
comprehensive plan must contain and how these elements are to be scientifically-based. FLA.
STAT. § 163.3177 (1995); see generally David L. Powell, Managing Florida's Growth: The Next
Generation, 21 FL. ST. U. L. REv. 223 (1993); Thomas G. Pelham, William L. Hyde & Robert
P. Banks, Managing Florida's Growth: Toward an Integrated State, Regional and Local Com-
prehensive Planning Process, 13 FL. ST. U. L. Rtv. 515 (1985). Local governments must submit
their plans to the Department of Community Affairs, which in turn must approve them. FLA.
STAT. § 163.3184 (1995). The Local Growth Management Act requires the local comprehensive
plan to be consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan and the applicable regional plan. FLA.
STAT. § 186.001-.91 1 (1995). The Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is responsible for
reviewing local comprehensive plans to ensure consistency. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(9)(c) (1995). If
the DCA believes that local comprehensive plans are not in compliance with legal requirements,
the DCA is empowered to challenge the local government's comprehensive plan in administrative
hearings. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(4) (1995). The Property Rights Act amends the Local Growth
Management Act to permit alternative dispute resolution to resolve intragovernmental disputes.
See 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 § 4, 1651, 1664 (codified at FLA. STAT. 163.3184(10)(c) (1995)). If
the DCA is not satisfied with the local comprehensive plan, the Governor and the Cabinet may
direct state agencies to withhold funds for water and sewer system improvements, roads and
bridges, revenue sharing, community development block grants and recreation development as-
sistance. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(11) (1995); see generally EPSTEIN, TAKINos, supra note 26
(wherein he calls Washington State's growth management laws "coercive"); Cooter, supra note
334, at 214-16; Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Con-
ceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1259 (1981); HoWARD, supra note 78.
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instead, harness individual self-interest to promote societal good.
3 49
Market proponents further argue that markets, which revolve around
individual decisionmaking, reduce the need for collection or provision
of information. For a centralized planning process to function effec-
tively, the agency must obtain so much detailed and complex
information3 50 that it may be impossible for complex planning ever to
function well. In private bargaining, by contrast, the parties will have
or take the time to obtain the relevant information. In short, propo-
nents of decentralized lawmaking have argued that as societies become
more complex, law should become more decentralized, not central-
ized.35"'
In the land use area, therefore, decentralized lawmaking can be de-
fended as providing a more flexible, effective approach to solving in-
dividual land use problems. Already, land use laws have adopted
forms of zoning and permitting that are more flexible and decentral-
ized. For example, conditional zoning, development agreements, and
planned unit developments (PUDs) are land use innovations encour-
aged by the Local Growth Management Act; 52 they provide an
opportunity for developers and planning officials to negotiate permis-
sible land uses and to mitigate the impacts of such uses.
33
Citing a proposition known as the Coase theorem, free-market
economists argue that, regardless of the initial legal rule, individuals
can negotiate a legal outcome that will maximize their individual wel-
fare. 354 This proposition is based upon the assumption that there are
no significant transaction costs and that both parties have the same
349. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY nNTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF TE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(William Benton, ed., Chicago Books 1952) (1776) (discussing work of "invisible hand" of the
market, which through price signals will guide self-interested individuals to do what is best for
themselves and also for society as a whole); see also POSNER, supra note 346, at 51-115; CooTER
& ULEN, supra note 203, at 1-14; SChULTZE, supra note 347.
350. See SCHULTZE, supra note 347, at 27; FRIEDREICH VON HAYEK, CONSTITUTION AND LIR-
ERTY (1960); Kenneth Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 1
(1974). In land use regulation the information needed is varied and complex. The costs borne by
developers, demand curves of homeowners, valuation of natural resources, and costs of alterna-
tives for less damaging development are examples of complex land use information necessary to
formulate good laws. Growth management laws have been criticized because the information
required to formulate good laws takes too much time to gather and process. See Epstein, Prop-
erty, supra note 116, at 110.
351. Cooter, supra note 334, at 285; SCHULTZE supra note 347, at 22. Schultze adds that
market-like arrangements have the potential ability to direct innovation in socially desirable di-
rections.
352. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(4) (1995).
353. Such individualized decisionmaking is generally used in high impact developments be-
cause these techniques have high transaction costs. See generally, Wegner, supra note 281.
354. See generally Coase, supra note 128.
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information.3" Thus, the Act can be seen as setting up a situation that
allows parties to maximize their utility. Two parties, one a private
property owner and the other a land use entity, can set new conditions
for a particular land use and allocate the costs of a restrictive land use
to meet their objective and subjective requirements.
B. Thinking Beyond the Beguiling Mantra of "Market Solutions"
In setting up a decentralized decisionmaking process, the Legisla-
ture intended regulatory reform but followed too readily the mantra
of "efficient markets." 35 6 Even assuming that the individual bargain-
ing process under the Act would allow those involved to maximize
their utility under existing constraints, microeconomic theory recog-
nizes that the results of an individualistic bargaining process will not
always be equitable (distribution issues).357 Further, to the extent that
bargaining parties impose costs on other nonconsenting, nonbargain-
ing parties, the negotiated solution will not be efficient for society as a
whole (negative externalities)."' In addition to these considerations,
efficient market outcomes, even between only two parties, are prem-
ised on three key assumptions: no significant transaction costs, perfect
information, and rational utility maximization by the bargaining
agent on behalf of its principal.
Game theory research has analyzed what happens in a bargaining
framework when these assumptions do not hold. Let us examine how,
in a noncooperative bargaining situation5 9 under the decentralized
decisionmaking framework envisioned under the Act, factors such as
transaction costs, limited information, the parties' perception of
355. Id. There are many other ways to state the Coase theorem. See Cooter, supra note 334;
Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11
J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968); Coase Theorem Symposium: Part I, 13 NATURAL REsoURcES J. 557
(1973); BRuCE AcKRmcAN, EcoNomc FouNDATIoNs OF PROPERTY LAW 23-24, 30-31 (1975).
356. Markets are efficient in the sense described by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" theorem.
See SmrrH, supra note 346. Welfare efficiency is established when no consumer can be made
better off by a transfer of goods or services. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 203.
357. The economic concepts of "utility maximization" and "efficiency" are not concerned
with the initial distribution of resources between parties (i.e. "equity"). See PosNER, supra note
346.
358. Coase, supra note 128; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 128.
359. Under a cooperative framework parties may not necessarily maxinrize their short-term
individual outcomes, but instead maximize the group long-term outcome in order to maximize
their own individual long term utility. Cooperative frameworks, for the most part, require that
relationships be long-term and stable, that both parties have a stake in the success of the cooper-
ative relationship, and that both parties be able to easily monitor mutual compliance. See gener-
ally ELLICKSON, supra note 334; Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing
Ground, 78 VA. L. Rav. 421 (1992). For purposes of this analysis, I assume noncooperative
behavior because the conditions for a cooperative framework are difficult to achieve.
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favorable or unfavorable litigation outcomes, and shifting costs to the
land use entity could affect government decisionmaking and property
owners' incentives. 360
1. The Market Is Imperfect
a. Cost Shifting
Proposition 1. The Act shifts significant costs to agencies, increasing
the likelihood of negative impacts on the land use entity if is fails to
settle.
The Property Rights Act has granted Florida property owners a new
entitlement to receive compensation for land use regulatory actions
that create an inordinate burden. 361 This compensation scheme can be
viewed as imposing a direct cost on government agencies that make
improper regulatory decisions.
Under the prior regime, although, in theory, a landowner could
bring and win a regulatory takings claim, the procedural and substan-
tive hurdles previously discussed in detail made it quite difficult for
the landowner to prevail. But now, under the Act, the likelihood of
succeeding on a compensation claim has increased because the ripe-
ness doctrine does not apply to compensation claims under the Act,
and the intent of the Act is to make compensation more readily avail-
able than under takings law. 362 Accordingly, many of the costs of un-
reasonable government action are shifted back to the land use entity
to manage. These costs must be covered from the land use entity's
existing budget allocation, since no additional funds have been budg-
eted to land use entities under the Act.
363
In addition, at the discretion of the court, the Act shifts costs and
attorney's fees to the losing party (the British rule).36 Since the plain-
tiff will not have to bear her litigation costs and attorney's fees if she
prevails, a landowner who is optimistic about her likelihood of
prevailing will be further encouraged to proceed to litigation. 65 On
360. Proofs of the propositions set forth below would require statistical empirical analysis
which this Article will not attempt to undertake.
361. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
362. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(9) (1995).
363. Since the state did not fund such expenditures, the land use entity will have to either
reallocate funds initially dedicated to other tasks or seek additional funding. Both the 1975
Property Rights Report and the 1994 Property Rights Report recommended funding for reforms.
See supra note 25.
364. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(c) (1995).
365. Steven Shavell, Suit Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEOA STuD. 55 (1982).
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the other hand, if one party is pessimistic as to its litigation outcomes,
then that party will have an even greater incentive to settle.
36"
b. Transaction Costs3 67
Proposition 2. Given profit-maximizing incentives, there should be
more claims filed by property owners under the Property Rights Act
than under the present takings law regime.
The Act makes it relatively easy and cheap for a property owner to
file a claim under the Act. The claimant's costs would be only her
administrative expenses in preparing a claim, 361 her opportunity
cost,369 and any direct costs, such as the fee for the real estate
appraisal.3 70 When a property owner files her claim, the only provision
in the Act designed to ensure that the owner has filed a bona fide
claim is the requirement that her claim be supported by a real estate
appraiser's report stating that there has been some loss in fair market
value due to the regulatory action. No neutral arbiter screens the
property owner's claim to determine whether it is meritorious. The
only penalty that would attach to filing an unmeritorious claim ap-
plies when the property owner decides to proceed from negotiation to
litigation. If she loses in the litigation, the court may order the prop-
erty owner to pay the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the land
use entity from the date of filing the circuit court action371
In addition, the negotiation process under the Property Rights Act
provides to the property owner substantial procedural advantages not
366. H.S.E. Gravelle, The Efficiency Implication of Cost-Shifting Rules, 13 INTL. REv. LAW
AND ECoN. 3, 12 (1993).
367. The Coase theorem emphasizes the importance of transaction costs in considering the
effect of legal rules. See Coase, supra note 128; see also AcKERMAN, supra note 355, at 23-24;
EPsTEIN, SnMPLE RuLEs, supra note 258. In this case, transaction costs are the costs associated
with negotiating the settlement order.
368. Once a property owner has deciphered the appropriate procedure under the Property
Rights Act, the administrative costs (time of preparation and consultant fees) should be very low
for the average property owner. Attorney counseling, a high cost item, would be most appropri-
ate in formulating an overall strategy; for example, whether to negotiate or mediate under the
Property Rights Act, whether the property owner should seek compensation under the Property
Rights Act, or whether she should file a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) civil rights claim in federal
court. An attorney's advice would most likely benefit a sophisticated property owner with much
at stake.
369. Opportunity costs are the costs of selecting one option rather than another. In this in-
stance the property owner's opportunity cost is the time allocated to processing her claim which
she could have used to pursue other alternatives. See Cooma & ULEN, supra note 203, at 35.
370. The Property Rights Act does not require that the appraiser be certified or selected by
both parties. Accordingly, the property owner will have a wide range of appraisers from whom
she can select. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a) (1995).
371. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)(2).
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available under the normal regulatory scheme. The property owner
will obtain a use determination within 180 days, a decision which is
not required under other growth management and environmental
laws. Following this 180-day period, the property owner's claim will
"ripen" and she can go forward to litigation.172 Moreover, the prop-
erty owner can engage the land use entity in an individualized negotia-
tion process. If she has at her disposal superior negotiation skills, she
may be able to generate options more favorable to her than she could
otherwise have secured.
373
Given low costs, lack of constraints, and other procedural advan-
tages, property owners have an incentive to file claims under the Act,
even with respect to the most reasonable governmental action.
Proposition 3. Agencies will be at a transaction cost disadvantage.
While for individual property owners transaction costs will be much
lower under the Act than under the prior regime, the land use entity
will incur increased transaction costs. An agency, because of effi-
ciency concerns, is organizationally designed to handle land use issues
in a general fashion; for example, agencies issue zoning regulations or
building codes that set forth general requirements with which indivi-
duals must comply. Individualized determinations, by contrast, are
generally resolved outside of the land use entity; for example, land use
adjudicative bodies, rather than a centralized agency, determine
whether to grant a variance or subdivision approval.
374
Now, under the Property Rights Act, the land use entity must make
a careful, individualized determination for each claim filed. The Act
requires that a land use official be assigned to process the claim.375
This personnel cost will have to be absorbed by the agency, since ad-
ministrative costs of the Act are not funded. 376 Moreover, because of
the consequences of a cursory review, the agencies will not be able to
go blithely through the motions of a review. The agency's ripeness
determination and the settlement order will be considered by the court
372. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
373. Negotiation theory, a relatively new area of study, is premised on the insight that indivi-
duals with superior negotiation skills can achieve better outcomes. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTiNo To YES (1981). Negotiations will yield more options to property owners than the
current regulatory process, which tends to center on whether the property owner meets the man-
datory requirements of an agency rule. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 129; see
generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory
Negotiation, 43 DuscE L. J. 1206 (1994).
374. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 129, at 691-94.
375. FiA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(b) (1995).
376. See supra notes 25, 266.
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in any subsequent compensation litigation. " The ultimate result of
not giving a landowner's claim proper attention could be a large com-
pensation award to the landowner.
As agencies, already working with lean staffs, are required to pro-
vide careful review to more individual claims with the same adminis-
trative resources, they could be overwhelmed. Consequently, the land
use entity will be at a transaction cost disadvantage. 3
c. Information
Information is key to a party's ability to negotiate its desired out-
come. 379 In the settlement negotiation the key information issues are 1)
the value of the claim if successfully litigated, and 2) the likelihood
that a court will find that the land use regulation has inordinately bur-
dened the property owner's existing use.
Proposition 4. The property owner most will likely have an
informational advantage over the agency.
The value of the compensation claim is the fair market value of the
existing use that has been impaired by the agency's regulatory ac-
tion. 8 0 Establishing the fair market value of real estate is notoriously
difficult; evaluating an "existing use" will be even more difficult.
Each piece of real estate is said to be unique. Its location, physical
characteristics, uses of the land, its improvements, and its resources
are all characteristics that make each parcel unique and create its
value. 8 1 A commonly used method of establishing the "fair market
value" of real estate is to collect sales data for parcels of real estate
that have comparable characteristics and then to estimate what a rea-
sonable buyer would be willing to pay for the property.382
The landowner, naturally, will have an advantage in gathering in-
formation regarding her own land. Having owned the property for
some time, she will have some familiarity with its positive and
377. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(a) (1995); see supra note 274 and accompanying text.
378. 1 am not arguing that the land use entity will always incur transaction costs higher than
the property owner's costs. Rather, I am suggesting that the agencies will not be equipped to
handle these additional claim transactions, so each claim will impose strains on the planning
system which will be difficult for the agency to absorb.
379. Informational asymmetry as a variable in a settlement negotiation has been explored by
others. See generally Cooter et al., supra note 337; I.P. L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit,
Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 539 (1983); Bebchuck, supra note 337; Bruce L. Hay,
Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1995).
380. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b) (1995).
381. GEORGE LEFCOE, .REAL ESTATE TwNssAcnoNs 65-68 (1993).
382. Id.
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negative aspects. The property owner will present her most optimistic
evaluation of the property's value in the real estate appraisal that ac-
companies her initial claim. Since the property owner will be selecting
the real estate appraiser and paying for her fee, the incentive is for the
property owner to select an appraiser who will produce a favorable
report.38 3 In addition to this "objective" valuation, the land also has a
"subjective" value to the landowner, an amount the landowner would
actually require to part with her property. This figure might be either
higher or lower than the parcel's objective value. The property own-
er's minimum acceptable value is, then, her private information and
would not generally be known to the land use entity.
The land use entity must also develop a range of what it believes is
the fair market value of the property, both before and after impair-
ment of the existing use. Since the negotiation is not governed by a
discovery procedure, as it would be in litigation, the agency will have
to collect its own information on these complex matters.
The land use entity's options are not limited to making a monetary
offer. Under the Act, the land use entity has great flexibility in negoti-
ating an outcome that will satisfy the claimant. The land use entity,
for example, can grant a variance or exception or modify its use deter-
mination.3  Therefore, the land use entity will need substantial
information on these various alternatives in order to assess whether to
offer any nonmonetary options to the property owner.
In sum, the land use entity will need to evaluate a greater range of
information than the property owner. It must collect and evaluate ob-
jective data such as appraisals, characteristics of the parcel, and infor-
mation on the existing use. It must also collect and evaluate less
tangible data: the benefit to the community of denying the existing
use, the cost to the community of alternative nonmarket options, and
the ability to exchange the property owner's desired existing use for a
nonmarket option. Even if the agency decides to hire experts to guide
it through this issue, the results probably will be inconclusive . 85 The
data on the cost of nonmarket alternatives will be difficult to gather;
there is lack of agreement, and even controversy, as to the methods of
valuation .386
383. Real estate reports tend to be highly variable and can be influenced by the parties. In
commercial transactions such incentives are avoided by using certified appraisers mutually ac-
cepted by the parties.
384. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(c)9 (1995).
385. See generally J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); Law and Economics
Symposium: New Directions in Environmental Policy, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988).
386. Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 1 (1985); ROBERT MITcHELL & RIcHARD CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO
VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989).
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The difference in the data initially possessed by the parties and the
types of data required by each of them put the state land use entity at
an informational disadvantage. Moreover, in our culture, exact cost
data, which are supposedly objective, are persuasive. A decisionmaker
is likely to find cost data more persuasive than even the most eloquent
description of the public interest.1 7 The landowner will have exact
numbers as to what the land use entity's regulatory action is costing
her. By contrast, the land use entity's estimates of social costs will
most likely be less exact and therefore less persuasive.
Proposition 5. If courts apply the inordinate burden test without a
theoretical framework, litigation outcomes will be uncertain.
If either party believes that she will obtain a better outcome through
litigation after taking into account litigation costs, she will reject the
other party's settlement offer."" To determine whether litigation is
preferable, each party will assess her likelihood of success in litigation
by considering factors such as evidence that she will present at trial,
counsels' abilities, and the predisposition of the decisionmaker. More-
over, each party will also apply the legal rules to her case to assess the
probability of prevailing in the litigation.8 9
Game theory analysts have characterized court outcomes in takings
cases as random. 390 This cold assessment of takings law is backed by
legal commentators and common sentiment.3 91 If courts apply the
inordinate burden test without any theoretical framework, results will
inevitably be inconsistent. 392
Nonetheless, even though court outcomes are unpredictable, the
parties will generally form an opinion as to the likelihood of success.
A party may be optimistic about her case because she believes her
preparation of the case, her evidence, or her capable counsel will sway
the decisionmaker in her favor.3 93 In addition, the parties could be
387. See FisHER & URv, supra note 373, at 81-94.
388. See Steven Shavell, Suit Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 55 (1982); Cooter et al., supra note
337; Hay, supra note 337.
389. Id.
390. Richard Porter, Environmental Negotiation: Its Potential and Its Economic Efficiency,
15 J. ENv. EcoN. & MGNT. 129 (1988) (court decisions are often made on obscure procedural
grounds); Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984) (court decisions are stochastic due to imperfect informa-
tion and strategic behavior).
391. See supra notes 249, 321 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 149, 300-30 and accompanying text.
393. See Hay, supra note 379.
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influenced by others' opinions about likely outcomes under the Act.
At this time, the Act is too recently enacted for a body of data and
opinions to have developed about it. Nonetheless, the Act's intent is
to make compensation more readily available than under takings
law.39 Moreover, proponents of the Act have billed it as being pro-
property owner. Parties may choose to believe this characterization
and anticipate that litigation outcomes will favor property owners.
395
Game theory research has shown that the more optimistic a party is
about the litigation outcome the less likely she is to settle; on the other
hand, the more pessimistic a party is about the litigation outcome the
more she wants to settle) 96 Uncertain outcomes will favor the party
who has more confidence in her case and is less averse to taking
risks.391
d. Summing Up Market Imperfections Even Assuming Rational
Utility Maximization
The above subsection concludes that under the Property Rights Act:
1) the Act's cost-shifting to the land use entity means that it is now
subject to more severe negative outcomes if it fails to settle; 2) given
profit-maximizing incentives, there should be more claims filed by
property owners under the Property Rights Act than under the present
takings law regime; 3) agencies will be at a transaction cost disadvan-
tage; 4) the property owner most likely will have an informational ad-
vantage over the agency; 5) if courts apply the inordinate burden test
without a theoretical framework, litigation outcomes will be uncer-
tain, thereby favoring the less risk-averse party.
Let us now apply these propositions to differing assumptions about
rational government officials' behavior. First assume that the
governmental entity is risk-averse. Under tight budgetary constraints,
an unfavorable inordinate burden determination will have a substan-
tial adverse impact on the agency's budgetary position. We also as-
sume that under the current political climate, agencies will prefer ta
cooperate 398 because they do not want to be viewed as inflexible,
bureaucratic, and lacking in common sense, images which would have
unfavorable political consequences. If, as discussed earlier, litigation
394. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
395. Opinion, gossip and reputation are short-hand methods for persons to evaluate alterna-
tives. See generally, ROBIN M. HooARTH & MELviN W. REER, RATONAL CHOicE: TE CON-
TRAST BETWEEN EcoNOMICS AND PsYcHoLoGY (1983).
396. See supra notes 364-66 and accompanying text.
397. See Cooter et al., supra note 337; Gravelle, supra note 366.
398. See generally Rose, supra note 359.
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outcomes under the inordinate burden test will be considered random
by both parties, risk-averse agencies will prefer to settle rather than go
to litigation."'
Now assume that the property owner is a developer or large corpo-
ration with the resources to prepare its case well and obtain any infor-
mation that may be needed in the negotiation. Also, assume that this
type of property owner is less risk-averse than the typical govern-
mental entity. In this scenario, settlements will favor the property
owner because the land use entity has a stronger desire to settle. The
agency is more risk-averse and may well lack such information about
its case that might make it confident about a favorable outcome. 40 In
addition, the agency may have a greater taste for settling the matter
out of the public limelight than the property ownerA01
Now assume that land use entities are pessimistic about outcomes
under the Act because they believe that the Act is pro-property owner.
Under this scenario, land use entities will be even more eager to settle
and will make even greater concessions to property owners because of
the cost-shifting effects under the Act.' Moreover, to minimize ad-
ministrative costs of the settlement procedure, land use entities will
want to settle as early as possible in the process.
Now assume that under the Act the settlement process, by and
large, will be out of the public limelight and that monitoring of agen-
cies' settlement agreements by the public at large will be lax. In this
situation a land use entity may be able to rationalize a land use deter-
mination that satisfies the property owner but is costly to other public
purposes, such as following growth management goals or preserving
the environment. Such types of agreements would not require that the
land use entity make any immediate expenditure of funds or other as-
sets. Instead, the cost of this exercise of executive discretion would be
borne by the public at large at some future time. The costs to land use
entities under the Act are immediate; they have a direct and relatively
high budgetary impact,40 while the benefits of being a good public
agent are distant and accrue to a diffuse and not easily identifiable
399. See supra notes 390-92 and accompanying text.
400. See Cooter ct al, supra note 337.
401. See Rose, supra note 359.
402. See Shavell, supra note 365.
403. In addition to administrative costs accounted for in terms of dollars and cents, such as
the cost of having to pay a compensation award to a successful claimant and increased person-
hours in processing and attending claims filed under the Act, the Act creates intangible costs,
such as increased risks to a risk-adverse entity, loss of reputation and goodwill, and greater
skeptical scrutiny from legislators and courts. In the regulatory state, the predominant organiza-
tional culture of land use entities is to avoid public controversy, to prefer certainty to uncer-
tainty, and to prefer proven methods to innovation and creativity.
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public interest. Without cost data as to more permissive land uses,
without significant third party checks, and with the agency under
pressure to "settle" the controversy quickly, we can expect "settle-
ment offers" markedly to favor changes in the growth management
scheme that promote more intensive land uses. There is already some




The preceding analysis has assumed that the goal of government
officials is rationally to maximize the utility of their principal, the
government. However, we should still consider whether this basic
tenet of microeconomic theory would hold. Students of land use law
critique local decisionmaking because it can be subject to undue influ-
ence by wealthy and politically powerful groups. 405 In microeconomic
terms, this phenomenon would be viewed as a failure of the negotiat-
ing agent-the government official-to represent the interests of her
principal adequately. Land use law addresses this issue by making the
land use processes public,4 requiring that certain issues be adjudi-
cated,w and closely reviewing local bodies' decisions.4 Each of these
measures are designed to ensure that the decisionmaker remains loyal
to the public interest.
The Act provides no such prophylactic devices to ensure that decen-
tralized decisionmaking is not subject to undue influence. For
404. In a recent rezoning controversy in Broward County, farmers close to the urban fringe
wanted to rezone their land to commercial use. The Government officials agreed to upzone,
citing their potential liability under the Property Rights Act as a justification for the decision.
Telephone interview with Richard Grosso, Legal Director, 1000 Friends of Florida (July 10,
1995) (notes on file with author).
Recent newspaper articles as well confirm this prediction. The Wall Street Journal recently
reported that in Palm Beach County, planning officials wanted to increase preservation area
boundaries bordering the Everglades. They desisted in their plans because they feared lawsuits
under the Property Rights Act. Peter Mitchell, New Property Rights Law Sends Planners Scram-
blingfor Cover, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at Fl, F3. The article also reports that in Manatee
County, Charlotte County, and the City of Deland, the Act has had a chilling effect as well on
conservation efforts. In another article Gainesville City Attorney Marion Radson characterized
the Act as "hav[ing] a chilling effect... [i]t is going to be very difficult to try and be a respon-
sible government when it comes to land use." Lucy Beebe, New Law to Chill Planning, Zoning,
SARASOTA HERALD-Tm., Oct. 8, 1995, at BI.
405. See supra note 128. But see Rose, supra note 126 (skeptical of the common belief that
local processes are inherently corrupt).
406. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 122, 125 and accompanying text.
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example, the Act does not require that the negotiation process be open
to the public at large, nor that the results be approved by a neutral
third party.0 If critics of local land use law are correct in their suspi-
cion of local process, the absence of such prophylactic devices will
place the settlement order process at risk of being subject to undue
influence.
b. Distributional Effects
It is well-recognized that, even where a market is economically effi-
cient, that market may cause or support an inequitable distribution of
resources. 410 The Act may well further distributional inequities. Flexi-
bility is the strength of decentralized decisionmaking. However, a con-
sequence of flexibility is variability of results. Absent any attempt to
coordinate bargaining results, settlements will differ from landowner
to landowner, even if they are similarly situated. For example, a land-
owner in Broward County may negotiate with a government official
who is particularly risk-averse and anticipates that court outcomes will
be pro-property owner. In Dade County, another landowner with a
similar land use problem may negotiate with a government official
who is risk-neutral, anticipates that court outcomes will be random,
and places higher values on long-term guardianship of public re-
sources. The Broward County property owner has a higher probability
than the Dade County property owner of obtaining a favorable settle-
ment."'
Not only will there be variability of results due to differences
among actors, but competition among localities will also lead to a
multitude of distributive outcomes. Local governments compete with
each other to attract new developments and jobs.4 12 Conceivably, as in
corporate law, this competition could initiate a "race to the
409. Only if the settlement agreement is in violation of a statutory provision, such as when
the settlement order is inconsistent with the local comprehensive plan, does the settlement agree-
ment need to be approved by a court. See supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 356-58.
411. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. Rav. 55 (1963) (different persons in an organization will have different utilities and
value structures and consequently fashion contracts with different conditions).
412. See FIsssaL, supra note 258 (large cities tend to be more pro-development because of job
creation concerns). But not all local governments may be competing for more growth. Commen-
tators have observed that suburbs have a "parasitic" relationship with the metropolitan center in
which they are located, and these may aim to control development more closely. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 58 n.50 (1994)
(suburbs establish land use controls which enable them to pursue anti-growth and exclusionary
policies beneficial to the suburb but detrimental to the larger metropolitan community).
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bottom, ' ' 41 a competition to interpret the Property Rights Act in a
way that provides a more permissive development environment. If
there is rigorous competition over laxity and demand for development
opportunities is elastic (i.e., responsive to the laxity of standards),
bargaining flexibility could undermine much of what the growth man-
agement and environmental laws have been able to achieve. 4
This issue of distributive justice is inherent to any reform that relies
on market-like mechanisms. A fundamental principle of democratic
governance is that similarly situated persons should be treated sub-
stantially the same.41 In other areas where the Legislature has applied
market-like mechanisms, it has attempted to coordinate results to
minimize unequal treatment of similarly situated Floridians. 416 How-
ever, the Act contains no such mechanism.
4 1 7
413. It has been postulated that states attempt to structure their corporate laws to be as pro-
management as possible in order to encourage businesses to incorporate in the state. The empiri-
cal evidence does not support this proposition. Scholars have explained that such results may be
due to the fact that the securities market may demand a premium for investing in corporations in
states with pro-management statutes, and that states therefore attempt to create a legal frame-
work that balances the interests of management and shareholders. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAi. STUD. 251
(1977); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV.
709 (1987); Ellicot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study
of Investors' Reactions to 'Changes' in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 551 (1987).
Florida has already had some experience in the "race to the bottom" with land use and envi-
ronmental laws: The political forces that led to the enactment of the State Land Use Plan Act
and the Local Growth Management Act grew from experience with a pro-development culture
that threatened public goods which benefit all Floridians. See DeGrove, supra note 18; PEuHA,
supra note 18; Powell, supra note 348.
414. But see Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV 473, 528-33 (arguing that competition
among city governments may not be sufficiently competitive for a race to the bottom in develop-
ment standards).
415. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in Tit UTnriTAsss 468 (1961) ("[S]ociety should treat
all equally well who have deserved equally well of it."); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAl. JUSTICE IN
T LIERAL STATE 3-31 (1980).
416. Mitigation banking is a market-like mechanism where a development that has had an
environmental impact offsets this impact by participating in a restoration project intended to
restore the environment by either recreating, restoring or enhancing a natural ecological system.
Mitigation banking offers potential efficiencies and economies of scale by concentrating re-
sources in larger, environmentally-sensitive areas. Thus, mitigation banking is a system whereby
a regulatory agency recognizes participation in a larger preservation effort as equivalent to com-
pliance by another project with the agency's regulations. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL L. INST.,
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING (1993); Fumero, supra note 115. In 1993, Florida adopted miti-
gation banking legislation. See FLA. STAT. § 373.4135 (1995). In order to address issues of coor-
dination and consistency among agencies, the legislation adopted standards for the development
of mitigation banking projects. Id.
417. The Property Rights Act provides that when any governmental entity receives written
notice of a claim, the land use entity shall notify the Department of Legal Affairs in writing of
the claim. See FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(b) (1995). This is an informational function, not a coordi-
nation function.
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR POSSIBLE REFORMS
Now that we have explored the potentially negative results of the
Act's decentralized decisionmaking, let us examine whether any modi-
fications could be made that might result in more acceptable out-
comes. The proposals set forth below do not purport to address,
much less solve, all of the problems with the Act that this Article has
identified. Nonetheless, the suggestions below reflect my view on
some reforms that should be undertaken, even now, to avoid perverse
incentives and unwanted results.
A. Adopt a Theoretical Framework for Interpretation of the
Inordinate Burden Test
Microeconomic theory emphasizes the importance of predictable
outcomes because such outcomes best enable parties to adjust their
conduct to the incentives or disincentives set forth in the law. In terms
of takings law, predictable outcomes are efficient because the parties
can factor a government regulation or the risk of a government regu-
lation into their investments."' Random government actions make in-
tentionally rational investments inefficient because government
regulations will interfere with the investments in unanticipated
ways.
419
Uncertain court outcomes also prevent government officials from
adjusting their organizational behavior. The Act's compensation rule
is designed to prevent government officials from overregulating and
needlessly limiting property owners' abilities to use their land as they
wish. In order for government officials to reorient their decisionmak-
ing, they must believe that court outcomes will reward or punish such
conduct. 420
Moreover, game theory posits that uncertain court outcomes influ-
ence parties' negotiation. When the parties are risk-neutral and their
rights are clear, they are more likely to cooperate.4 2' If the land use
entity is risk-averse and land use outcomes are risk-neutral or risk-
418. In the Mithica scenario, for example, if Growth had known the parcel might be down-
zoned, it would have paid less for the parcel because of this risk. Alternatively, Growth could
have negotiated a form of contingent ownership, such as an option, that would have decreased
its exposure to risk.
419. See COOrER & ULEN, supra note 203, at 198-201.
420. Id.
421. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental
Tests, 25 J. LAW & EcoN. 73 (1982); Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, Experimental
Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (1986).
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preferring, the land use entity will be more willing to settle than the
property owner.
4 22
As has been shown in part IV, it is possible to articulate a coherent
interpretative framework for the Property Rights Act in order to re-
duce variability of interpretation and results. Given the negatives of
unpredictable outcomes, the Department of Legal Affairs (or other
likely entity) should issue a detailed advisory opinion crafting inter-
pretative guidelines for the Act.
B. Reconsider Costs Under the Act
The Act markedly increases the administrative costs of land use re-
gulations and penalizes land use entities in cases of overregulation. In
spite of recommendations, 23 these added costs were not funded under
the Act. This marked change from the status quo should be reconsid-
ered. Its potentially negative effects are sufficiently serious that the
Legislature should monitor carefully how land use entities react to this
change. In addition, the Legislature should reconsider whether the
Act's provision of unlimited access to individualized decisionmaking
by landowners is desirable. 2' If the Legislature determines that unlim-
ited access to individualized decisionmaking is good policy, the costs
of this policy need to be addressed.42
C. Public Process
The Act does not require that any of the alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms established by the Act be open to the public at large.
This issue requires further study, both as a matter of policy and as a
matter of interpreting how this process interacts with Florida's sub-
stantive laws. Opening the land use process to the public at large has
marked advantages: it acts as a check to ensure that land use decisions
are responsive to public needs, and it enables the community and
statewide interest groups to monitor local officials' decisionmaking' 26
422. See supra notes 388-404 and accompanying text.
423. See 1994 PROPERTY RIoHTS REPORT, supra note 28, at 74-75; 1975 PROPERTY RIGHTS
REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
424. An alternative that would make the Act less onerous to administer would be to include
a procedure enabling the land use entity or a neutral third party to dismiss unmeritorious claims
expeditiously.
425. As previously noted, the House Report concluded that the Act does not violate
Florida's Constitution unfunded mandate provision. See supra note 25. Nonetheless, the Act
may be subject to attack. The Legislature's finding that the Act addresses an overriding state
interest could be characterized as clever legislative drafting. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 122 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 n.12 (skeptical of legislative fact-finding because any scrutiny
"amounts to a test of whether the legislature had a stupid staff").
426. See supra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, publicity may have a chilling effect on the resolu-
tion of disputes, and it could delay the procedure. A task group
should study this issue and advise land use entities whether the settle-
ment order negotiation process should be made public.
D. Settlement Results Guided by Standards
The equity issues raised by decentralized decisionmaking raise legal
process issues that can undermine confidence in the land use process.
Moreover, competition for permissiveness could undermine Florida's
growth management and environmental laws. In this area, the Execu-
tive Branch could begin a dialogue at the statewide level to help di-
verse land use agencies formulate standards and policies that will
guide them in fashioning settlement orders. Until such standards are
devised, the Legislature should consider delaying the application of
this provision of the Act.
E. Provide Land Use Entities with Available Information
One prerequisite for efficient bargaining results is information.
Many market-type mechanisms that require complex information are
being implemented in Florida and other areas of the United States
with varying degrees of success. 427 The Executive Branch could pool
information on land use market mechanisms, as well as information
on the costs of alternative land uses, and make such information ac-
cessible to local land use entities. Providing such information could
help balance the information inequity which, as discussed earlier, will
tend to favor the landowner.
VII. CONCLUSION
At many levels, the Property Rights Act was an inevitable response
to much of the frustration created by current land use law and its
processes. The Act adopts a multitude of devices designed to give
property owners more accessibility to government regulators and
provides them the opportunities to obtain quick redress in instances of
government overreaching. These are laudable goals which most Flori-
dians support.
However, the Act contains many innovations that represent good
ideas but which have not been fully thought out. For example, the
compensation provision attempts to reset the balance between individ-
ual property interests and the government's regulatory power, but it
427. See supra notes 348-50..
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does so without clear guidelines or a theoretical framework. Conse-
quently, this innovation will likely recreate the same maze of confu-
sion and inconsistent results that exist in takings law and very likely
may not lead to the responsiveness of governmental entities which the
Act sought to instill. The decentralized decisionmaking under the Act
is based upon naive assumptions, including suppositions that "mar-
kets are efficient" and "more accessibility to government is always
good." This Article concludes that too little thought has been given to
the possible consequences of shifting costs and incentives and that, to
avoid consequences that were clearly not intended by the populist im-
pulse which enabled the Act to be passed, reforms are required. The
possibly perverse incentives are too serious to ignore. Without help
from the Legislative and Executive Branches, even the most dedicated
government officials and judges will not be able to correct the flaws
contained in the Act. Leadership is required now to ensure that Flori-
da's growth management and environmental laws continue to be a
source of pride for most Floridians.'
428. Surveys have shown that the majority of Floridians approve of Florida's environmental
and growth management laws. See MAx D. DUDA & KIA C. YouNo, FLOIDL4NS' WILnLIFE-
RELATED AcTvrrmEs, OPINIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATrTTuDES TOwARD WLDLE: 1995 UPDATE
(1995) (survey commissioned by the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission finding
that 9801o of Floridians believe protecting wildlife habitat is important and 97% of Floridians
believe enforcing laws to protect wildlife is important).
